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IKTRODUGTION

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE LISSERTATIOII
1. Statenent
The problem of this dissertation is to attempt to dis-
cover the npture j^nd extent of tne influence of William James
on Georp; vVobbera.i r. ° psychology - n^ philosoiJi.v o.' :'..\-:j.i^lon ^uiA
to consider ueiinin ' s criticisms of James's philosophy. The
problem is suggested by 'the fact that V»obbermin is the German
translator of James's The "Varieti es of Religious Experience. It
is a si ';':ni f i cant problem both because it offers evidence of the
reception and general range of James's influence in Gerijian
thought and because it gives an opportunity for the critical
study of a distinguished German theologian and philosopher of re
ligion who is regarded- by German schola.rs as in part a follower
of James,
2, Limitation
This dissertation v/ill treat only those writings of
James and V/obbermin v^hich have specific bearing on the rela-
tions of the two men. In the case of Jaiiies, this will mean
that his psychological writings vdll be considered only in
their bearing on his psychology and philosophy of religion.
The same will be true of the treatment of James's meta,physi-
cal thought, although the distinction is much more difticult
to draw- in this field since the religious interest pervr-ides

practically all his v/riting. No special study has been made
of James's minor writin^^s except for the purpose of making ad-
ditions to and corrections of Perry's Arinotatc liiljliograpny of
the Y>/ritin,^;s of Yi/illiajn James . All tne articles which are of
special significance for this study are either incoporated in
later books by James or appear in the two volujiies of collected
essays ,
^
The study has been similarly limited in the case of
Wobbermin. His strictly theological writings v^ill be considered
only in so far as they indicate the use which he made of the
methodology of James or reve^.l his own philosophical position.
His historical writings vail be omitted aliuost entirely since
they betray no sign of influence from James. The attempt has,
however, been made to present a complete bibli ograpny of his
writings, and Professor Wobbermin has been most helpful in sug-
gesting material to the writer.
The dissertation is further limited in the treatment of
general literature. No attempt will be made to cover all the
literature on Jaiaes and '«»'obbermin . V/ith a very few exceptions,
the treatment will be limited to German sources. The material
on James in English is so extensive that any attempt to treat
it completely would prevent the carrying out of the purpose of
the dissertation. German source material will be limited to
those writings v/hich have special relevance to the problem of
psychology and philosophy of religion.
t
B. OTHER IIJVESTIGATIOIJS OP JAilES'S IKPLUiKCE
1. General Literature on James
One of the most significant single pieces of research
on James is the Annotated Bi oli o^^rauhy of the Y^ritin><s of Yal-
liaii-i James by Ralph Barton Perry. Perry's study of James's
3
philosophy in the Appendix to Present Philosophical Tendencies
is also a valuable contribution to the study of James and an
indication of some of the lines in which his thought was de-
veloped by other thinkers.
The mass of literature on Jaiiies's pragmatism is alto-
gether too extensive to cite in detail; and most of it is ir-
relevant to this dissertation. Special mention may, however,
be made of A.W. Moore's Praa:natism and its Critics^ and of J.
5B. Pratt's Ifthiat is Praaaatism . A. 0. Lovejoy has v/ritten nu-
merous articles on the subject,^ and there are treatments of
it in English, Prench, and German journals.'^
The volume of Essays Philosophical and Ps.ycholo^i cal
in Honor of William James
,
published by members of the Colum-
bia fa.culty after James had delivered the Pragmatism lectures
there, ^ contains little specific reference to James but indi-
cates the pragmatic attitude tov/ard a wide variety of problems.
The systematic account of James and his pnilosophy, writ-
9
ten by G.C. Cell for the new edition of Ueberweg's Grundri ss
^
is a penetrating study of the development of James's thought
and of its significance in American philosophy. The fact that
this now appears in the standard German philosophical source-

book should be influential in thu future understanding of Jame
by German thinkers.

2. Investigations in the General Field of
James's Psychology and Philosophy of Religion
Tv/o studies of James have sx^ecial reference to our
problem, namely, J, Seelye Bixler's Reli^gon in the Philosophy
of Vvilliam James and Karl Busch's V/illiam James als ReliKions-
phi losoph,
Bixler's book is a valuable internal criticism of the
thought of James, based on a thorough understanding of his wri-
tings. It is not so much a critique as an appreciation and in-
terpretation. The concluding chapter is a brief suggestion of
some aspects of James's influence in American religion. Yet
the book in no way touches on the problem of the present disser-
tation although it has offered the v/riter helpful general ma-
t erial.
The v/ork of Karl Busch is particularly significant for
the present study because it is the writing of a German and for
a German public, Busch was a stiident at Harvard Divinity School
where he received an S.T.B, degree, 1- He knev«f James personally
and was a frequent visitor at the James home, 12 His v/ri tings
shov/ a keen appreciation of James's philosophy of religion and
also an unusual ability to enter into the spirit of a foreign
thinker.
Two Geiman dissertations on James as a philosopher of
religion may also be mentioned; W, Harbert's William James
•

ReliRl onsphilQsophi
e
(1913) and Y/, Paetz's Die erkenntnis-
theoreti schen Grundlagen von Vt/illiain James "The varieties of
religious experience .
"
#

83. Investigations in the Specific Pi eld
of this Dissertation
There has "been no previous investigation of the spe-
cific field of this dissertation. Bixler makes no reference
whatever to Wobbemiin and Busch, while he refers to Wohbermin's
J
translation of the Vari eties , maxes no study of James's influ-
ence upon Wobbermin. John Yi/', Johnson, an American who studied
with Wobbermin in GBttingen, wrote an article on "Die religions-
p sychologi sche Methode" for the Ot to-Yv'obbermin Festschrift vol-
lAme of the Zeitschrift ffir Theolo^ge una Kirche .^'^ but James
was not mentioned in this connection.
Many brief references to the relation of Wobbermin to
James are to be found in German literature on problems of re-
ligion, but none of them involves a thorough study of the- in-
fluence of James.
The general topic of James's influence on German phil-
osophy of religion was discussed with Professors G.C. Cell (Bos-
ton) and W.E, blocking (Harvard) and both approved such a study.
The specific problem of the influence of Jsjxies on Yi/obbermin was
taken up with Professors Arthur Liebert and Arthur Titius (both
of Berlin) who also regarded it as significant.
ff
C, A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE PLAN
OF THE DISSERTATION
The problem of this dissertation, the influence of
James on Wobhermin' s psychology and philosophy of religion,
and Yi/obhermin' s critique of James, will toe developed through
three main stages.
In the first place, a brief exposition of the gener-
al system of thought of James and of Wototoerrnin will be given
(Chapters I and II),
Secondly, the dissertation will study the methodology
which Y/obbermin applies in philosophy of religion and which
he recognizes as partially derived from James (Chapter III),
Finally, the relations between the views of James
and Y/obbermin on pragmatism and pluralism will be considered,
v;ith special reference to their bearing on philosophy of re-
ligion (Chapters IV and V),
1
H. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
Before turning to the critical exposition of the
thought of James and Wobbennin and their relations, we wish
to give a "brief account of the life and general background
of each.
14
1. Yalliam James
Y/illiam James, who was born in New York City on Jan-
uary 11, 1842, was the son of Henry Jajnes, Sr. and Mary Y/alsh.
He was the oldest of five children. His brother Henry became
famous in the field of literature.
James's family life had a profound influence on his
thought and character. His father was a keen critic of con-
temporary religion and a writer of force and sincerity. Start-
ing as a student of theology, he was stirred by doubts which
led him to give up the ministry but to devote himself to the
search for answers to these questions, which he finally found
in the teachings of Swedenborg. Vi/hile William James never
accepted his father's conclusions in theology, he was influ-
enced by the frank and liberal religious atmosphere of the
family discussions,"^^ A cripple from his student days and
having no official position, Henry James, Sr. gave himself
to his writing and his home. The family traveled much during
the earlier years of Y/illicJn James's life, and lived abroad
for a while. 1'''
William James *s education was varied and far from
systematic, and he always looked upon it rather cont emptuous-
18
ly« He went for short periods to several private schools
t
in New York and in France. In 1859-60 he studied at the Acad-
emy in Geneva, Switzerland, and in 1861 he entered the Law-
19
rence Scientific School in Cambridge. Distinctively phil-
osophical considerations were slow in developing, and James
studied in several other fields, only to find each lacking
in some v/ay. His early work in chemistry led to an intere.st
20
in medicine, and he entered the Harvard Medical School.
Here he came under the influence of A^a-ssiz and was persuaded
to go as an assistant on Agassiz's Amazon expedition. Vtfhile
he learned much from this trip, it convinced him that he w^is
not fitted for the life of a field-naturalist. His health
was poor and the hardships and drudgery of collecting and
?1
classifying specimens were too great. *^
He returned to his medical studies at Harvard in 1866.
But his health grew worse and he finally decided to go to Ger-
many in the hope that the rest and change of clima.te v/ould
"benefit him and also that he might be able to study physiolo-
gy in the Gei^an laboratories. He left America in the spring
of 1867 and spent the summer in Dresden and Bohemia, strug-
gling with his ill health and v/ith the Geiman language. In
the fall he went to Berlin and attended a few lectures but
his health prevented him from doing any laboratory work. In
January 1868, James tried again, but vainly, the treatments
at Teplitz. He went to Heidelberg to hear Helmholtz lecture
and hoped to spend the summer semester there but again v/as
forced to stop work. He returned to Berlin for a time and
then went to Divonne for treatment. This also failed to help
9<
€
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him and he returned to America in November, via Paris.
James completed his medical studies at Harvard and re-
ceived the degree of Lector of Ivledicine in 1S69, Ke did not,
hov/ever, v/ish to practise medicine and was undecided as to
v/hat profession he should adopt. For the next three years he
had no definite v;ork. His health v/as poor and his eyes were in
such had condition that he could read only a few hours each
day. Nevertheless he managed to cover some most profitable
and varied reading^4
In 1872 James began teaching at Harvard, offerinc^ joint-
ly with Dr. Thomas Dwight a course in anatomy and physiology.
His health improved under regular work and he found teaching
highly satisfactory. In 1876 James gave his first course in
pk^^ekology
, and in 1878 he contracted with Henry Holt and
Company to v^rite a text in psychology which finally appeared
in 1890.^^
Ja^-fles married Miss Alice H. Gibbons in July, 1878 and
had a very happy and helpful home life. I^s. James read to
him and often wrote letters from dictation so that his eyes
were spared much routine worlc.2^ They had five children, one
of Y/hom died in infancy. Some of the most delightful lines
in his published letters are those describing a sabbatical
year abroad with a fainily.^'^
James's first specific contribution to philosophy of
religion was in the form of lectures, published together in
1897 under the title: The Will to i^elieve and, oth er ii^ssays in
Popular Philosophy. These stirred wide-spread interest and
ft.
criticisin and clearly foreshadowed his pragmatic and pluralis-
tic x)hilosophy. He was asked in 1896 to prepare Gifford Lec-
tures, which he finally delivered in tv/o series in 1901-02 af-
ter a long struggle with ill health. These lectures on The
Varieties of Reli^gous ILxperience were very influential, par-
ticularly in the newly developing field of psychology of re-
ligion, Janies gave the Lov/ell Institute Lectures in 1906 on
" Pragmat i sm'^^ and the Hibbert Lectures in 1908 on "The Pres-
ent Situation in Philosophy , '^^ Y^hile the la,st tv/o are intend-
ed to outline James's epi st emology and metaphysics, they are
more satisfactory as an exposition of his philosophy of relig-
ion and largely fulfill the promise of the "Postscript" of the
Vari eti es . The introduction to Philosophy in which James hoped
to give a systematic statement of his metaphysics was unfortu-
nately never complet ed,"^*^
After continued ill health and vain attempts to find
relief abroad, James returned to America in August 1910 and
died two days after reaching his summer home in Chocorua.'^-'-
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2. Georg Wobbermin
Georg Woboerrnin was born iu Stettin, the chief city
of the province of Pomerania, Germany, on October 27, lb69.
His father, Albert Wobbermin, was a teacncr in the Realgym-
nasium of that city. His mother's maiden name v/as Laura
Q,uandt
.
Georg Vi/obbermin received his early education in the
Marienstift sgymnasium in Stettin, the same school which Al-
brecht Ritschl had attended fifty years earlier. 33 in 1888
he went to the university in Halle and studied there for two
years. From 1890 to 1894 he was a student at Berlin Univer-
sity. Here he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
1894 and became a licentia,te in theology in lb9b. The honora-
ry degree of Doctor of Theology was conferred on him by Berlin
University in 1907.
In giving his Vita Academica at the close of his dis-
sertation, Wobbermin lists his teachers. 34 Rotable ajnong the
names of philosophers are Benno ^rdmann, Vaihinger, Siiimiel,
and Dilthey; while the names of Harnack and Kaftan are signifi
cant in theology. He himself expresses special gratitude to
Harnack, Kaftan, and Dilthey v/ho were particularly helpful to
him in the prosecution of his studies, Paulsen and Herrmann
should be added as influential although not his teachers.
In 1896-97 Wobbermin took a trip through the Greek Ori
ent, visiting Athens and the islands of Asia Minor, and living
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for four months v/ith the monks of the Cloister of Athos, He
v/as married in 1906 to Dora Brockhausen, a v/oman of unusual
intellectual ability, v^rho has helped him greatly in the prose-
cution of hi;, scholarly .vork.
Wobbermin began his teaching career as "Privat-Dozent"
in Berlin in 1898, In 1906 he v^rent to Marburg as "ausser-
. ordent li cher" professor but remained only until 1907 v/hen he
became "ordentlicher" professor at Breslau. In 1910 he re-
ceived a call from Yale University, where he had delivered a
series of lectures in 1907,'^^ but he declined this call. He
went to Heidelberg in 1915 as the successor to Lrnst Troeltsch.
Here he remained until 1922 when he was called to Gftttingen
to succeed Arthur Titius, He is still teaching in Gttttingen
at the present time, having declined calls to Leipzig in 1925
and to Halle in 1926. He and his wife nov^^ live in the Gftt-
tingen house which had previously been occupied successively
by Titius and by Karl Barth,
V/obbermin's interest in James began in his student
days v/ith the reading of the Principles of Psychology . He
also read The 'vV'ill to Believe shortly after its publication
and made special reference to it in his Theologie und Meta-
physik ."^ In 1904 he was asked by James to prepare a German
translation of The Varieties of Religious Experience * Quite
a few letters were exchanged but unfortunately all are lost, ^8
He did not meet James until the fall of 1907 vifhen he visited
Harvard University,'-''^ and this was the only time that the two
met
,
ft
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Wobbermin has spoken and written v/idely in the fields
of theology and philosophy of religion. He takes an active in-
terest in periodical literature and has written many articles
as well as serving as contributing editor for the Theo logi sche
40
Lit eraturzeitung and for the Zeitschrift fiXr Theologie und
Kirche .'^l The 1929 volune of the latter journal was dedicated
to Wobbermin and Rudolf Otto on their sixtieth birthdays. He
was also an assistant editor of the Zeitschrift ftlr Religions- '
psychologi
e
during the six years of its exist ence,^^ and holds
the same editorial relation to the new Zeitschrift fttr Religions-
psychologi .^'^ Wobbermin edited Kant's Religion innerhalb der
Grenzen der blossen Vernunft for the Pmssian Academy Edition
of Kant's works.'^ He was editor of the volume on "Religions-
45philosopnie" in the Q.uellen-Handbttcher der Philosophie series.
He is now editing, with Titius, the Studien zur syst ematischen
Theologi
e
,^6 His most important books are Theologie und Meta-
physik
, MonisiLus und Monotheismus » Der christliche Gottesglaube ,
and the three-volume Syat ematische Theologie .
Among Wobbermin' 3 important addresses are the lectures
4.7
before the International Congress of Religion in Berlin in 1910,
48the Yale lectures, and the address at the general meeting of
49
the Kant-Gesellschaft in Halle in 1927, He is to lecture at
the First International Congress of Psychology of Religion at
Vienna in May 1931,^^ He was invited to lecture at the Univer-
sity of Chicago in 1927 and had expected to take the trip but
was finally detained by illness.
9t
t.
1
c
Only the main currents of Wobbemin's thought can be
sketched at the present time. Three interests may be cited;
the historical, the personalistic, and the methodological, all
falling within the larger field of theology. The historical
interest is developed in the early studies which he made of
primitive Christianity and its documents and in more recent
writings on Luther, Schlei ermacher , and Ritschl. This inter-
est is in no sense to be confused with a one-sided historicism
His ontological interest takes the form of per sonalism,^-^ This
view is seen in the attack on materialism. The essentially
monistic character of Wobbermin's personalism is seen in his
opposition to James's pluralism. The third interest, that in
the problem of methodology as related to systematic theology,
is the one in v/hich he feels the particular influence of James
It was with the purpose of developing German interest in the
psychological method as applied to theology that 'wobbermin
translated James's Varieties of Religious £xp eri ence ,^^
It will be the problem of this dissertation to attempt
to determine the extent of the influence of James upon Vvobber-
min's thought and to examine V/obbermin's criticisms of James's
epistemology and metaphysics.
The writer wishes to express her gratitude to Profes-
sor and Mrs. Wobbermin for their hospitality and for tneir hel
ful interest in the writing of this dissertation, rrofessor
Yi/pbbermin has given generously of his time to the reading of
5€
c
t
C
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the preliminary manuscript and has suggested certain correc
tions and imi rovement s. The dissertation ov/eb much to his
encouragement.

CHAPTER I
JAMES'S THOUGHT AND lilFLUEITCE
IN PSYCHOLOGY AKD PHILOSOPHY OP RELIGION
ri
William James approached philosophy with a fresh and
unique point of view, hut at the same time with a good knowl-
edge of modern philosophical history. He had read widely in
the years before he took up regular teaching and continued
his study both of the literature of the recent past and of
current writings, which he reviewed with keen insight. In
the spring of 1867, very shortly after his arrival in Germany,
he reported some reading in Hegel's Aesthetik"^ and the fol-
2lowing year he began Kant's first Kritik . He was doubtless
led to the study of Kant by Charles Renouvier whom he raen-
tions in the same letter. In 1896 he gave his first course
on Kant at Harvard, and he reports it as giving him much sat-
4isfaction, James felt, however, that
it v/as English and Scotch writers, and not
Kant, who introduced 'the critical method'
into philosophy, the one method fitted to
make philosophy a study worthy of serious
men.^
These thinkers were Hume, the two mils. Bain, and Shadworth
Hodgson.
James was generous in recognizing his indebtedness to
other thinkers and apt to underestimate the originality of his
own conclusions. But he was an ardent exponent of his views
against all misinterpretation. He felt that pragmatism was
misrepresented by practically all its critics, and he tire-
lessly repeated and revised his statements of the position,

while not giving up in the least his conviction of the cor-
rectness of his account of truth.
We now turn to a consideration of tne specific con-
tributions of James through his writing and teaching.
A. SPECIFIC COETRIBUTIONS
William James had varied interests and contributed to
several fields of thought. We shall not attempt in this dis-
sertation to consider all his writings but rather try to sur-
vey only those which bear directly upon the problem of psy-
chology and philosophy of religion. iJven this means a wide
selection since religion was a central problem for James,
1, Psychology
Psychology was James's first systematic study. In
1867 he wrote from Berlin,
It seems to me that perhaps the time has
come for psychology to begin to be a science
— some measurements have already been made
in the region lying between the physical
changes in the nerves and the appearance of
consciousness-at (in the shape of sense per-
ceptions), and more may come of it, I am go-
ing on to study v/hat is already known, and
perhaps may be able to do some work at it,
Helmholtz and a man named Wundt at Heidel-
berg are working at it, and I hope I live
through this winter to go to them in the
summer,
6
James went to Heidelberg in the spring but was unable to re-
main on account of his health. His interest in the subject
continued, however.
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James began teaching at Harvard in 1872 in the De-
partment of Physiology, and physiological psychology soon
/
iDecajne his major interest although his first course in that
subject was not given until 1876, About this time (Jarnes
is indefinite as tb the date and Boring says 1875 } , James
informally 'founded' the first psychological laboratory in
the world, antedating even 'Wundt ' s (1879). G, Stanley Hall
formally 'founded' his laboratory at Clark University in
1883. '^ James was never a laboratory man, and neither health
nor inclination led him to spend much time in experimental
work. In 1892 Mflnsterberg came to take charge of this work
at Harvard, James having raised the money for a permanent
laboratory in Dana Hall,-^-^
In 1878 James began definite work on a psychology
text which he expected to complete in two years. Due to
ill health and to the slow process of gathering material in
so new a science and conscientiously verifying every hypothe-
sis, the Principles of Psychology was not finished until 1890,
The Briefer Course was published in 1891. With the final ac-
complishment of this task, James gladly left the psychologi-
cal field for philosophy. In writing to Dickinson Mller
twenty years later, he said,
I'm sorry you stick so much to my psychologi-
cal phase, which I care little for, nov/, and
never cared much. This epistemological and
metaphysical ptase seems to me more original
and important,^
He had attempted to treat psychology as a "strictly
positivistic" science rather than as a metaphysics,^*^ but
<i .
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he was forced later to admit that his hopes of 1867 for a
true science in the near future were ill-founded. 1^ James
was rather generally criticized in his own day for this
empirical tendency and at the present time the opposite cri-
ticism is raised by many. James's great influence upon psy-
chology is accounted for by Boring on three grounds: his win-
ning personality, his oppostition to elementarism, and his sub-
stitution of the functional point of vievif.l^ Consciousness
he regarded as having four essential characteristics: it is
personal, continuous, changing, and free.-^^ In commenting
on James's essay, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind
as Correspondence" (1878), Perry says.
The central idea of this essay is the teleo-
logical character of mind. This idea may be
said to be the germinal idea of James's psy-
chology, epistemology, and philosophy of re-
ligion .17
This teleological emphasis is to be found in the description
of the self as a " fighter for ends " v/hich appears in the Prin-
ciples of Psychology^§nd also in the criterion of mental action
which James sets up in the same volume. This criterion is that
No actions but such as are done for an end,
and show a choice of means, can be called
indubitable expressions of Mind. 19
While such a criterion, if applied rigorously, would too great-
ly limit the scope of psychology, it is suggestive as one
method of approaching the distinctively voluntary aspects of
consciousness. The concept of activity also played an impor-
tant part in James's view of the self. In this he was in line
with Leibniz, Kant, and Lotze.

2, Psychology of Religion
Except for the essays collected in The Will to Believe ,
James's next major work was the Gifford Lectures of 1901-02,
published under the title. The Varieties of Religijious Exper-
ience in 1902, This volume is primarily a descriptive study
of psychology of religion, though philosophical interpreta-
tion holds some place. It is based on the conviction, later
stated in the Pra^iati sm . that "the evidence for God lies
primarily in inner personal experiences, "^^ James defined
his original purpose for the lectures in a letter written
in April 1900 while he was working on the third lecture.
The problem I have set myself is a hard one;
first , to defend ... 'experience* against
'philosophy' as being the real backbone of the
world's religious life - I mean prayer, guid-
ance, and all that sort of thing imiaediately
and privately felt, as against high and noble
general views of our destiny and the world's
meaning; and second , to make the hearer or
reader believe, what I myself invincibly do
believe, that, although all the special mani-
festations of religion may have been absurd
(I mean its creeds and theories), yet the
life of it as a whole is mankind's most im-
portant function, A task well-nigh inipossible,
I fear, and in which I shall J^ilJ ^'^t to at-
tempt it is mx. religious act.
James had hoped to make these lectures combine the psychologi-
cal and the metaphysical study of religion, but the psycho-
logical material grew to such an extent that he had to omit
the metaphysical for the most part, ^ In the "Postscript"
James suggested the pluralistic philosophy of religion which
he hoped to develop in later writings.
The Varieties found an immediate circle of friends

and critics and has been widely influential. It has been
translated into i^'rench and German, and the German transla-
tion by Wobbermin is an important indication of James's in-
fluence upon him. This volume came at a time when thought
was awake to the significance of the problems with which it
deals. The work of G, Stanley Kail, Starbuck, and iieuba in
America, of Sabatier in i'rance, of HBffding in Denmark, and
the "return to Schleiermacher" in German thought following
the death of Ritschl, all prepared the ground for the recep-
tion of this psychological study of religion, James's par-
ticular service was to present a psychological interpreta-
tion based upon experience (as opposed to much of German
speculative thought prior to this timej , and yet taking ex-
perience as a unity which might have relations to metaphysi-
cal as well as phenomenal realities (in opposition to the
positivistic tendencies of the Hall School and Feuerbachj,
The psychological study of religion is also evident
in the first five essays of The Will to .believe and in the
article on "The Psychology of Belief" (1889) which v/as la-
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ter incorporated with additions into the Principles ,
James regarded will and belief as " two names for one and
the same PSYCKQLOGiuAL phenomenon."
Yet there is little doubt that the psychological in-
terest played only a secondary part in James ' s development
of the practical arguments for religious belief. His aim
was philosophical, and Perry notes that this side of James's
thought was known abroad before his psychological work.*^^
t<
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3. Philosophy
James's contrihuti ons to philosophy were in three
fields: epi st emology - represented hy his pragmatism; meta-
physics - pluralism or radical empiricism; and finally, phil-
osophy of religion.
a. Pragmatism
To say just when and v/here the pragmatic tendency in
James began would be impossible. The article on "Quelques
Considerations sur la mithode subjective" which was published
in the Critique Philosophique in 1878 indicates, as Perry
points out, an early interest in the practical motives of
belief. 2''' There are clear evidences of it in The V/ill to Be-
li eve . It was given explicit form in James's lecture to the
Philosophical Union of the University of California on August
26, 1898 on the subject, "Philosophical uonceptions and Prac-
tical Results." He there gave credit to Charles Peirce as
the founder and Christ ener of this type of thought and ac-
knowledged his own indebtedness to Peirce. '^^^
Pragmatism as a criterion of truth is developed
chiefly in a limited period of James's thought and in two of
his books; Pragmati sm (1907) and The Meanin^j; of Truth (1909).
The position may be stated as follows:
Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true
IS made true by events. Its verity is in
'
fact an event, a process: the process name-ly of Its verifying itself, its veri-fica-
tion,. Its validity is the process of ITT"
valid-ation.29
James's opposition to rationalism is evident in this
t
emphasis on truth as "in the making. Rationalism asserts an
absolute and objective truth which is valid irrespective of
our activity in attaining knowledge of it. Doubtless James
went too far in his reaction against this viev/ of a static
truth, and other passages in milder tone can be found. But
the point which James seems to have had as his main concern
v/as to prove that there is no eternally ordained and unchange-
able order of the universe which man may only apprehend but
take no share in creating. Rather he v/ished to point out that
the future is alv\^ays in the making and that it can in many
cases be shaped by the v/ills of individual men, Por instance,
the man who -believes the world to be evil and acts on that sup
position, finds his belief verified; but the optimist is just
as truly justified in his belief,
James intended to apply Peirce's pragmatism to relig-
ion^^ and the moral and religious implications of the theory
are evident,
b. Pluralism
Pragmatism as a theory of truth implies a pluralistic
and empirical metaphysics. If the v/orld is in the making and
if individual wills share in the process, reality is not a sin
gle whole, as metaphysical monism teaches, but pluralism is
much more probable. This position is defended in A Pluralis-
tic Universe and in Some Problems of Philosophy in particular,
but is implicit in all James's philosophical thought. Radi-
cal empiricism is, in one sense, a further break away from
the monistic way of looking at things in that it asserts our
5 5
only immediate source of knowledge to be the multiplicity of
our own conscious experience. But it is also a return toward
some sort of rational unity in that it demands that all of ex-
perience "be considered and interpreted to the best of our
ability. It is radical as opposed to those empiricisms which
recognize only sense experience as valid and deny or ignore
the significance of emotional, cognitive, and valuational ex-
perience,
c. Philosophy of Religion
In its initial statements and throughout its entire
course, James's philosophy has explicit religious implications
Pra^at i sm and A Pluralistic Universe show the religious in-
terest on almost every page,
2
James's particular contributions to philosophy of re-
ligion fall under the same categories as his pjiilosophy in gen
eral, namely, the pragmatic, the empirical, and the humanis-
tic. His philosophy of religion starts as a statement of a
few great faiths and moral demands about the universe. The
Will to Believe is a justification of the hypotheses upon
which religious faith rests. Every interpretation of the uni-
verse is based on some initial hypotheses which cannot be
demonstrated with mathematical certainty. The duty of the
thinker is to act upon the most rational hypotheses which he
can find in each field, revising them as often as necessary
to maintain harmony with experience but not refusing credence
to the highest claims of human nature unless there is direct
negative evidence. In keeping with this principle, James
* I.
c <
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presents his "Faith Ladder . ""^^ The principle here set forth
is, in short, that those faiths which are not self-contradic-
tory, and which are recognized as ideals which ought to be
realized, should be held as true and acted upon. This may be
regarded as pragmatic in the sense of Kant's primacy of the
practical reason.
It is only when they forget that they are hy-
potheses and put on rationalistic and authori-
tative pretensions, that our faiths do ham.'^^
Many critics of religious pragmatism are far more dogmatic
about their hypotheses than was James,
The empirical attitude in religion meant for James not
only a concern for all the elements of present religious exper-
ience but also a re-evaluation of the facts of religious tra-
ditionj55 James was always a philosopher rather than a theolo-
gian in his attitude toward religion^ and he had little use for
those philosophies which he regarded as trying to defend divine
attributes against which religious faith and experience re-
belled. This is to be seen in his opposition to all monistic
philosophy.
James used the term "humanism," which he adopted from
Schiller, as practically synoninnous with personalism so far
as it deals with man and his relations to the world. It is a
primary concern for the human values and moral demands. Its
religious implications are evident in the follov/ing quotation;
I myself read humanism theistically and plu-
ralistically. If there be a God, he is no ab-
solute all-experi encer , but simply the exper-
iencer of vi^idest actual conscious span. Kead
thus, humanism is for me a religion suscepti-
ble of reasoned defence ..."
c
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James made another distinctive contribution to phil-
osophy of religion in his conception of a finite God. What-
ever the final verdict may be on the validity of his conclu-
sions, his criticisms of the traditional conception of God
have been very influential. Two facte in particular James
found compelling him to the view that God is finite, namely,
the fact of finite freedom and the problem of evil. Both are
eternal problems in any philosophy of religion which asserts
an omnipotent God, and James holds that both cease to be
problems and may be accepted merely as facts if God is regarded
as finite.
rc
B. GENERAL TRAITS
As a preliminary to our study of his influence on
Georg 7/ot)beniiin, we shall sketch briefly the general traits
of James's philosophical thought. Two aspects are of parti-
cular importance. In the first place, we find James's in-
tense concern for the adequate consideration of empirical de-
tail. Secondly, there is the keen interest in personality
as such, shown most vividly in James's letters, but also in
his psychological v/ritings and in his humanism. Both traits,
as we have seen in the preceding section, have an influence
on James's religious thought, and it is our purpose now to
consider them in greater detail.
The earliest development of James's philosophical
thought was along definitely religious lines, Hi.s first pub-
lished book in the field. The mil to Believe (1897), was
made up of essays, many of which were vi^ritten during the per-
iod viThen James was working on his psychology texts. The es-
say on "The Sentiment of Rationality," printed in Mind in
July 1879, shows clearly the religious bearing of his thought
and the same is true of the address on "Reflex Action and
Theism" which was delivered in 1881. Problems of a religious
and philosophical nature, growing out of the home atmosphere
and his father's theological writings and difficulties, con-
fronted James early, and his son, in editing the Letters,
remarks
,
The center of his interest had always been
religious and philosophical."^^
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1. Reaction against Rationalism
Although James was glad to leave the psychological
field, its influence upon his methodology i^ marked. This
is seen in the dominance of the empirical tendency through-
out his entire thought, as well as in his humanism. Doubt-
less his training under Agassiz and also such little work as
he was able to do in the medical and psychological laborato-
ries enhanced this tendency. His own statements show, how-
ever, that the arguments of monistic philosophy largely suc-
ceeded in stilling this empiricism until he was "liberated"
by the writings of Renouvier. This liberation in 1870"^^
marked the beginning of James's philosophical productivity.
It offered him pluralism and freedom as initial possibilities,
and with these he could approach experience empirically. He
was especially attracted to this field because there w^^re so
fev/ exponents of the experience philosophy in English speak-
ing countries,
Freed by Renouvier from the rationalistic supersti-
tion,'^''" Jaines attacked it with all the energy of his versa-
tile mind, Hegel was, of course, the originator of the ra-
tionalistic method in the "bad" sense, and James's argxiraents
were therefore directed to a large extent against him. l\ev-
ertheless James holds no one consistent attitude toward Hegel
and it is difficult to state his view fairly. On the one
An
hand, he could write an essay "On Some Hegelisms" ridicul-
ing Hegel, while on the other, he could v/rite to Royce,
My ignorant prejudice against all Hegelians.
except Hegel himself, ^^rows wusser and wusser.^"^

implying what James seems firmly to have believed, that most
of Hegel's followers, with the exception of Royce, were much
worse than the master himself. They were abstract and absurd
in the conclusions which they drew by means of the dialectic
method. Bradley, for instance, finding contradictions at
every step and thus reaching the Absolute, particularly stir-
red James's ire. To Howison*s objections to the anti-Hegelian
remarks in the Principles
^
James replied that he did not in-
tend to repeat them in the Briefer Course and then made the
very interesting statement,
I am not as lov/ as I seem, and some day
(D.v.j m.ay get out another and a more
"metaphysical" book, which will steal all
yourHegelian thunder except the dialecti-
cal method, and show me to be a true child
of the gospel.
There are monistic elements in James's later thought which in
part fulfill this prophecy.
James defines rationalism as
the way of thinking that methodically
subordinates parts to v/holes.^^
James rightly criticized Hegel for holding that the process
from the v\;hole to the parts is prior to that from the parts
to the whole. The parts are immediately given while the
whole, the Absolute, is never so given. Any system which
tries to deduce empirical content from some one first prin-
ciple, no matter how rich, is sure to be abstract and out of
relation to living experience. The only valid method of at-
taining truth about the world in v/hich v/e live and about our-
selves is first to study the data of our experiences as they
t.
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are given and then to relate them to one another and to the
whole. James felt that Hegel had real empirical vision but
that he passed too lightly from the concrete and particular
to an abstract system which was the product of eternal rea-
son. "There is a dialectic movement in things"'^''' and they all
belong together in some way. Hegel was right in thinking that
any partial view whatever of the world
tears the part out of its relations,
leaves out some truth concerning it, is
untrue of it, falsifies it. The full
truth about anything involves more than
that thing.
49Hegel had "the vision of a really living world" but his a-
doption of an int ellectuali sti c logic cancelled his empirical
insights,
James was not a radical analyst of experience like
Perry and neo- realists, in general. His starting-point v/as
a concrete v/hole, namely, personal consciousness. In his psy-
chology he substituted the conception of a "stream of conscious-
ness" for the older analytic vi ev/ of separate faculties. His
concern was to urge the rights of these lesser unities against
any theory v/hich denied the validity of individual experience.
The pragmatic theory of truth v/as a protest against
the rationalistic definition of truth in terms of deducibility
from the whole. On the pragmatic theory^ truth is a development
of the practical consequences of ideas. My idea of a star is
true if it leads me to turn my telescope in the direction of
that star and to find it. Truth is further defined by James
50
as "the expedient in the way of our thinking" q^-^^ that
t ^
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which gives satisfaction. James's theory will he discussed
in detail in Chapter IV of this dissertation hut some prelim-
inary suggestions may he made,
James has no one definition of what he means by prag-
matism. In general he seems to mean that truth is a quality
which is added to an idea in the process or at the conclusion
of verification. An idea "points toward" a particular object
or event. That idea becomes true if, by following the "point-
ing," I come to the predicted result. James's opponents reply
that this is a perfectly correct account of the process by which
we arrive at knowledge of the truth or falsity of our ideas,
but object to his view that the process as such had anything
whatever to do with the truth or falsity of the idea itself.
James replies that he is simply defining the meaning of this
quality of truth which some of our ideas possess and which
bl
rationalists leave as an unanalyzed abstraction.
To the criticism that he makes truth merely that which
leads to subjective satisfaction - a just criticism of James's
first statement of the expediency principle if it is taken
literally - James answers that what he means is "in the long
run" and in connection with all the rest of our thinking.
Ideas (v/hich themselves are but parts of
our experience] become true .just in so far
as they help us to ^et into satisfactory
relation v/ith other parts of our experi ence .52
As an account of the testing of truth this is acceptable. It
is not based on momentary satisfactions but rather on the need
of relating all experiences in some systematic way. It is also
a recognition of the fact that our present knowled.^e is very
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fraj^^^entary and hypotnet i cal , Jarnes objects to tiie an-:"^ s of
the truth situation into three elements, "the reality, tiic Know-
ing, and the truth. "^"^ He finds only two frctora, reality and
knov/ler!,;^e. Truth, he holds, is possible only when there is a
knovrer and actual only vmen known. This statement of the problem
points to a subjectivism which v/e shall consider later.

2. Radical Snpiricism
The skeleton of Jaines's whole philosophy is to be
found in his writings prior to 1900, "While his thought
changed somewhat in details, practically every significant
tendency is expressed in The Will to Believe . The three ele-
ments which are least evident are the theory of truth as veri-
fication, the epi st emo logical aspect of radical empiricism,
and the conception of the compounding of consciousnesses.
In the preface to this volume James defines the atti-
tude which characterizes the essays there collected as radi-
cal empiricism ^ He defines the words thus:
I say * empiricism, ' because it is contented to
regard its most assured conclusions concerning
matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modi-
fication in the course of future experience;
and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doc-
trine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and,
unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that
is current under the name of positivism or ag-
nosticism or scientific naturalism, it does
not dogmatically affirm monism as something
with which all experience has got to square.
The difference between monism and pluralism
is perhaps tne most pregnant of all the dif-
ferences in philosophy .^"^
Radical empiricism in this form is what James later called
pluralistic empiricism^^ or merely pluralism. It is his
metaphysical position.
Radical empiricism, as James defined it in 1904, and
56later, was chiefly an epistemology although James called
it also a Weltanschauung. ^*^ It makes one very distinctive
epistemological contribution. In opposition to Hume's anal-
ysis of experience into impressions, it holds that relations
ft
I
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are as truly matters of direct experience as are the objects
related. Thus it avoids the necessity af assuming an Abso-
lute, not given in experience, to account for these relations.
The rationalists claimed that the world as given was a mean-
ingless chaos of unrelated entities and that only an Absolute
could work the necessary transformation into a coherent sys-
tem, and Hume remained skeptical. Radical empiricism finds
conjunctions as well as disjunctions in experience.
Radical empiricism insists that conjunctions
between them [sensations) €ire just as imme-
diately given as disjunctions are, and that
relations, whether disjunctive or conjunc-
tive, are in their original sensible given-
ness just as fleeting and momentary (in
Green's words), and just as 'particular,' as
terms are. Later, both terms and relations
get universalized by being conceptualized
and named.
"While there is real plurality in experience, it has
meaning and may be ordered by finite minds. Each finite mind
is a unity within itself and so capable of mediating the rela-
tions which fall within its experience. In its objective re-
lations, it experiences other unitary and rational minds, in-
cluding the mind of God who is also regarded as finite.
Radical empiricism is an attempt to take seriously
just what is actually given in consciousness, no more and no
less. The emphasis is to be laid particularly on the "no less,"
for some current views have been willing to admit much that is
given by consciousness while they deliberately overlooked or
denied other equally given elements. Taking the empirical at-
titude seriously, the plurality of things is vividly felt. Mon-
ism is the natural accompaniment of a rationalistic attitude
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which tends to suloordinate problems to solutions and differ-
ences to unity. But the practical is not to be forgotten in
favor of the abstract nor the individual lost in the universal
as is the absolutistic tendency. Such problems as «vil are
keenly felt by the empiricist, Jaines writes,
1 can't bring myself, as so many men seem able to,
to blink the evil out of sight, and to gloss it
over. It's as real as the good, and if it is de-
nied, ^ood must be dtnied too. it must be ac-
cepted and hated, and,-resi st ed while there's
breath in our bodies.
°
Facts like this suggest that radical empiricism must
have some very definite religious implications and these will
be considered next.

3. Religious Implications of Radical
Erapirici sm
Let empiricism once "become associated v/ith
religion, as hitherto, through some strange
misunderstanding, it has been associated with
irreligion, and I believe that a nev/ era of
religion as well as of philosophy vdll be
ready to begin,
These v»^ords in the closing chapter of A Pluralistic
Universe indicate the v/eight which James placed upon the re-
ligious implications of his metaphysics and epi stemology. Rad-
ical empiricism, as we have seen, was for James in the first
place an attempt to ansv/er those philosophies which claimed
God to be omnipotent and absolute. The epist^ological argu-
ment of radical empiricism has the same fundamental aim that
was expressed in the preface of The Will to Believe
, namely,
to offer an acceptable account of experience which vdll avoid
the pitfalls of m-onistic philosophy,
For James, the only way of escaping the difficulties
and contradictions of monism was to regard God as finite and
therefore as not responsible for everything vi/hich goes on in
the universe. He held God to be
the name not of the whole of things,
but only of the ideal tendency in things,
believed in as a superhuman person who
calls us to cooperate in his purposes, and
who furthers ours if they are worthy. 62
The rationalist asks, Granting this view of God, how
can it be obtained on an empirical basis? God is not an ob-
ject of direct experience in the usual sense of the word, nam^
ly, sensuous. But James shows the inadequacy of so limited a
(^
conception of experience. Our consciousness is composed not
only of sensations, "but also of feelings, will, ajid reason.
James's radical empiricism means epistemologically just this
fact that our experience includes all that comes to us through
any of these avenues and justifies us in testing out all con-
ceptions which arise within it. Any consideration of the psy-
chological history of the race shov\rs that religious exper-
ience has "been a very real and powerful factor. It is one
of the data which must be incorporated into our general scheme
of things. This does not mean, however, that all traditional
doctrines must stand. Great revisi^)n may he necessary before
religious beliefs can be fitted harmoniously with the rest of
our system of beliefs.
James's revised theism regarded God as a finite being
for whom the world is a real obstacle and its final destiny
dependent upon the cooperation of human beings.
My 'God of things as they are,' being part
of a pluralistic system, is responsible for
only such of them as he knows enough find
has enough power to have accomplished. •••
The 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent' God of
theology I regard as a disease of the phil-
osophy shop.^^*^
Such a God satisfies James's moral and religious demands for
the following reasons. He cannot be held responsible for
evil since he does not will it and, not being omnipotent, can-
not prevent it. He may be regarded, therefore, as perfectly
good; and for James the ethical character of the divine being
is the one attribute which must be preserved if he is to be
called God,
t
God's finiteness leaves room for human freedom v/hich
would "be a mere illusion in an alDsoluti sti c system. And hu-
man freedom in a world as imperfect as this gives dignity
and purpose to moral endeavor. Each ijerson feels that his
choices and achievements will make a difference in thfe out-
come of the whole. The world is in the making, and James
would even go so far as to claim a growing God. Many have
held that only an absolutely all-powerful God is worthy of
worship and have felt that religious faith could rest only
in such a conception. While Jamies recognized the value of
the Absolute to "sick souls" he felt that the moral demands
were too great to be solved in this way. He said that the
only God worthy of worship is the finite God of pluralistic
philosophy.
Thus radical empiricism demonstrates what God must
be like if he exists; but there may be no God. In meeting
this difficulty, James applied his pragmatic theory of veri-
fication to the data of religious experience. He said that
those ideas are true which work; which bring satisfactory re-
sults in the way of relating men to their total environment;
and v/hich make significant differences in human experience
when acted upon. Belief in God can be shown to have made
some very significant differences. The lives of the saints
are evidence of the effects of belief in an extreme form, but
there are also many individuals who give more normal but
equally convincing evidence of the worth of such a belief.
Paith in God further helps man to relate himself better to

the world in which he lives. It accounts, for instance, for
such facts as goodness and purpose in the world. The teleo-
logical development of nature can be explained as due to the
purpose of God. Evil becomes contradictory evidence only on
the supposition that God is omnipotent rather than finite. Be
lief in God "works." Life hangs together better in the long
run and is richer and more satisfying with this belief than
without it. According to the pragmatic criterion, then, we
have justified our "right to believe" for we have shown that
such belief makes significant differences. The criticism of
this criterion is reserved to Chapter IV. The point v>rhich is
relevant in the present connection is that our beliefs are
tested by a consideration of the data of experience taken
as a whole, hence, radical empiricism.

4 , Humani sm
In the conception of personality we come to one of the
deepest currents in the thought of James, The emphasis on the
personal is present in his psychology and metaphysics but is
particularly prominent in his philosophy of religion. He treats
religion as a matter of personal relations in the concrete. The
Vari eti es is written from this point of view, and tovmrd the
end James says,
Religious thought is carried on in terms
of personality, this being, in the world
of religion, the one fundamental fact.t34
As against private personal religion, theologies and ecclesi-
astical institutions are secondary, and James feels justified
in limiting his study to the former, ^5 Ke defines religion in
individualistic terms as
the feelings, acts, and experiences of in-
dividual men in their solitude, so far as
they apprehend themselves to stand in re-
lation to whatever they may consider the
divine . 66
His pluralism as a philosophy of religion is an attempt to
preserve the rights and values of the individual from absorp-
tion in an Absolute,
James regretted his initial use of the word "prcigma-
tism" for he soon became convinced that Schiller's term, "hu-
manism," was more adequate to express his primary interest
Lin
in huipan personality, ' Pragmatism suggested simply the prac-
tical, whereas he v/ished to emphasize what was practical for
the lives oi human individuals and intended to use the tern
"practical" in a much broader sense than most of his critics
1i
i
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would grant to him. This fact vi^as influential in his turn
to pluralism and radical empiricism in his later years as
more adequate expressions of his doctrine; but indication oi
the attitude is to "be found in the Vari eti es where he says,
So long as we deal with the cosmic and the
general, we deal only ¥;ith the syrnlDols or
reality, but as soon as v/e deal 7/ith pri-
vate and personal phenomena s.s such, we
deal with realities in the completest sense
of the term. "^
James's revised theism is an attempt to explain the ree.lit;y o
God in a form compatible with the demands of the only real-
ities we immediately knov/ - our own individual experiences.
In looking back over this brief outline of Jameses
thought, v*re see a steady movement toward the simplification
and huma.nizati on of the interpretation of experience. His
pragmatism opposed the abstraction of rationalism and claimed
that nothing which made no difference in human life was sig-
nificant. His radical empiricism and pluralism attempted to
carry out completely and honestly the interpretation of v/hat
was immediately given in and implied by experience. His
humanism reiterated the importance of human personality, im-
plicit in all phases of his thought, and offered a more sat-
isfactory point of departure for his philosophy of religion.
His philosophy of religion presented a finite God, primus
inter pares
,
v/ho satisfies the moral demands of men and is
their co-worker in the creation of a more ideal world order.

C. JAI/JES'S IlTFLUEilCE
It is the intent of this section to ^ive a very brief
survey of the main lines of Jaines's influence and of the ex-
tent to which his v/ritings have iDecorne knovm.
1, Influence in American and English Thought
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to attempt
any treatment of James's influence in American and English
thought. Yet it is impossible to pass without a v^ord. James's
personality v^ron him friends everywhere and his sympathetic in-
terest took him into many fields. His genius as a correspon-
dent is to be seen by even a casual reading of his published
letters, many of which are excellent philosophical material.
James kept in touch v/ith the development of pragma-
tism under Dev/ey and Schiller, feeling particularly close to
the thought of the latter, Shadworth Hodgson and Dickinson
S, Miller were also constant stimulus to his productive think-
ing. His contacts with Royce led to mutual modifications of
thought and his statements about the evils of absolutism al-
ways excepted Royce from the most objectionable categories.
In fact, at one time James was practically convinced by the
position as presented by Royce. '^^
Royce, in his Phi Beta Kappa Address in 1911, listed
James with Edwards and Emerson as one of the three represen-
tative philosophers of America. "^-^ G.C. Cell, in his article
in the nev; Ueberweg, says that James will be regarded as
\c
c
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die zv/eifellos hervorragen^it e Figur, wohl
auch die bedeutendst e PersSnli chkeit in
der Geschichte der amerikani schen Philos-
ophi e.''' 2
Although there is no "James School" in philosophy,
his influence is to be seen in many types of thought. His
psychology, with its functional view of the mind, has affil-
iations with both present-day self-psychology and behavior-
ism,'''^ The realistic tendency in his thought is the back-
ground of Perry's more extreme neo-realism. Pluralistic per-
sonalism has profited by his critique of rationalism as well
as by Bowne's, And, finally, in philosophy of religion, the
view of God as limited or finite finds support, if not impe-
74tus, in the thought of James,
Por a survey of James's writings the reader is re-
ferred to the bibliography of this dissertation and to the
75
excellent work by R,B. Perry. Special mention may, how-
ever, be made of the fact that many of James's articles were
first published in the English journal, Mind . His work and
point of view were recognized abroad much earlier on this ac-
count ,
c(
2, Influence in Continental Europe
William James was exceptional among American (and per-
haps among all) philosophers in the range of his internation-
al contacts and friendships. This was partly due to the fact
that his poor health necessitated his visiting Europe fre-
quently. It was also in part the result of his linguistic
abilities. He could converse easily in Prench and German,
and wrote letters and several articles in the former. He al-
so knew some Italian hut called his attempts to talk it "aw-
ful gibberish, ""^^ Heither the visits nor the language would,
however, have been sufficient to account for the relations;
they were chiefly due to his personal enthusiasm for varied
theories and men and his capacity for friendship,
a, France
James's personal relations with French philosophers
were closer than with those of any other country. He early
made the acquaintance of Francois Pi lion, editor with Renou-
vier of the Critique Philosophique , and through this connec-
tion his writings received early attention in French jour-
nals,'^''' Many of his articles were translated and his books
were promptly reviewed. His appreciation is shown by the
dedication of the Principles of Psychology
To my dear friend, Francois Pi lion, as a
token of affection, and an acknowledgement
of what I owe to the Critique Philosophique,
Flournoy of Geneva may very properly be listed with the French
philosophers. He and James were life-long friends and James
<
often visited at the Flournoy home. They shared a common in-
terest in psychology of religion. In 1908 J^es met lonile
Boutroux and found him very congenial. Both Plournoy and Bou-
troux wrote monographs on James shortly after his death,
James's chief intellectual deht was to Henouvi er, and
later to Bergson, He corresponded with Tooth and studied their
writings carefully. He felt himself to be a disciple of Ren-
ouvier and did all in his ijower to make the great French iJhil-
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osopher better known in America and liigland. While he did
not agree with Renouvier's doctrine of freedom nor with his
manner of writing, he said of him,
He was one of the greatest of philosophic
characters, and but for the decisive im-
pression made on me in the seventies by
his masterly advocacy of pluralism, I might
never have got free from the monistic su-
perstition under which I had grown up.^^
In addition to the articles to which reference has
already been made, practically all of James's books have
been translated into French, The first of these translations
to appear was Causeries p^dafyogiques (1900 J, containing Part
I of Talks to Teachers
, translated by Pidoux with a preface
by Payot, Part II of the same work came out in 1914 as Aux
ftudiants by Henri Marty with the preface by Boutroux. In
1905 the Varieties was translated by P, Abauzit under the
title, L' Experience religieuse
.
with a preface by Boutroux.
,
Baudin and Bertier translated the Psycholoa'v; Briefer Course
-(Precis de Psychologi e
. 1910). The Principles has, so far
as the present writer knows, never been translated, but A.
C J
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Menard made a very careful study of it, Analyse et critique.
des Principes de la Psycholoa:ie de Vdlliajn Jaines (1911). The
French edition of A Pluralistic Universe i s by LeBrun and
Paris and is called PhilosQ-phie de 1' experi ence ^1910). Some
Prohlems of Philosophy hy Picard follows James's originally
intended title, Introduction a la Philosophie (1914). Most
of the essays in The Will to Believe appeared early in the
Criti que Philosophique and the volume as a v/hole was not
printed until 1916 ( La Yolonte de Groire hy Lo^s Moulin).
Eenri Bergson has written prefaces to tv/o translations: 7d 1~
liam James: SKtraits de la Gorrespondance (French "by Floris
Delattre and Maurice LeEreton, 19 24) and Le Pra,^natisme (hy
LeBrun, 1925). Some of James's w^ritings on psychical re-
search have "been collected and translated by S. Lurandeau in
Etudes et Reflexions d'un Psychiste ( 19 24 ) . L'Idee de Veriti
by IJIme. L, Veil and Ma:cime David (l91o) is the translation of
The IIeaninf<. of Truth . The only significant omission from the
French list is the Essays in Radical Empiricism . The most re-
cent addition to the French literature on James is the James-
Renouvier correspondence, edited by Perry and appearing in
the Revue de Mi^taphysique et de Morale (1929).
T• <
t
b. Italy
Jaines oecame interested in the x-r^ici^^s-tic movement
developinei in Italy early in the present century under the
leadership of Fapini and a j^roup of youn^i thinkers, who pub-
lished a philosophical journal called Leonardo
.
In 1905, af-
ter an attack of influenza, James took a trip to Athens and
v/ent to Italy on his return journey to meet this ^.roup. He
was persuaded to g,ive an address at the Congress of Philoso-
phy meeting there at the tiii-e and spoke in French on "La
notion de conscience," James expected great things from this
Italian movement, but his hope for permanent values from
their work seems to have been misplaced.
The Italian philosophers found much inspiration in
James's pragmatism. Many articles were written on it and
some of his books v/ere translated. Only a fragmentary list
can be given here. The Principles of PsycholOKy was trans-
lated by G.G. Ferrari and A, Tamburini (1900-01). Ferrari
also translated Talks to Teachers and cooperated with M. Cal-
deroni in the Italian edition of the Vari eti es (1904). Pra^-
mati sm was translated by Papini in 1911.
Several of James's v/orks have been translated into
Spanish, Russian, and Japanese, The Ingersoll Lecture on
Human Immortality appears in Swedish and Icelandic and the
Talks to Teachers in Norwegian, The Vari eti es appears in six
languages, including the Danish edition by HOffding. This in-
dicates the widespread interest in the thought of James.
e
52
c, Germany
James's personal relations with Germany were much less
intimate than with France or Italy, Although he spent much
time in Germany during his early years, he seems never to have
come in close contact with the most significant philosophers
of his time, Ke met Wundt and admired him grea.tly, but Vmndt
was far from understanding him. Stuinpf was cordial and James
corresponded with him, but this was an exception if the pub-
lished Letters are to be taken as an indication.^1 Simmel
and Troeltsch were appreciative of the work of James and the
latter wrote.
Das phi losophi sche Werk William James', das
mit manchen Traditionen der angelsftchsi schen
Philosophie enge zusammenhi,ngt , hat schon zu
seinen Lebzeiten auf den europ&ischen Konti-
nent einen starken, man kann f§st sagen, einen
aufregenden Eindruck gemacht,"°^
Troeltsch regarded James's philosophy of religion as the first
thoroughly American contribution,^'^ Even Vvundt sgpoke in special
praise of this aspect of James's thought, saying,
Vi/enn man aber den Llassstab neuer originaler
Gedanken an ihn anlegt, so wird ihn auch
der nachsichtigst e Beurteiler den Religions-
philosophen, die uns das Jahrhundert nach
Kant in Schleiermacher
,
Hegel und selbst in
Schelling geschenkt hat, nicht entfernt an
die Seite stellen KBnnen,^^
Wobbermin points out that Heinrich Meier combines Yaindt and
James in his treatment of the Psychologie des emotional en Den-
kens
. Jerusalem, the Austrian translator of the Pragmatism
,
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took an active interest in James, with whose point of view in
epi st emology and philosophy he found much in common, Jacoby,
Oesterreich, and Mttller-Freienfels have also referred favorably
to James, and Jacoby has written several articles on him.
?ollov\ring James's death, several appreciative articles
and monographs on him were written. Karl Busch emphasized the
personal side of James particularly in a short article in the
Zeitschrift fftr Religionspsycholop;ie .^'^^ liis longer study of
James's philosophy of religion^^ is particularly important be-
cause of his close association with James, Boutroux's book
89
on Jajnes was translated into German in 1912, and the trans-
lation of Plournoy's on the same subject in 1930 is evidence
of the continued interest in James,
James's contribution to psychology was immediately ac-
cepted and esteemed. But his pragmatism was very generally re-
jected or ignored. Kis psychology and philosophy of religion
was underestimated because of its affiliations with a prag-matic
and pluralistic philosophy. Nevertheless his influence is to
be felt, along with that of Leuba, Starbuck, and Goe, in the
awakening interest in psychology of religion in Germany in the
years following 1907, Wobbermin's translation added greatly
to the accessibility of the Vari eti es and Busch suggests that
this aspect of James's thought was even more discussed in Ger-
many than in America, James's name is mentioned in practi-
cally every book on psychology or philosophy of reli^on and
the importance of his pioneer v/ork is felt.
c
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Wobbermiri suggests^*^ that James has had an indirect
influence on the new understanding of Schlei errnacher , The
method of studying religious experience, set forth in the Va-
rieties , is essentially the same as that proposed by Schlei er-
rnacher, but it is more fully developed and better grounded
scientifically. The study of James, especially in the light
of Y/obbermin's interpretation of his relation to Schlei errnacher
,
has influenced a group of younger writers to new research and
appreciation of the psychological phase of Schlei errnacher '
s
thought. Among these younger men may be mentioned Hofmann,
Kesseler, Khevels, Wehrung, and ¥/inkler,
James's books v/jere v/idely reviewed in German periodi-
cals and most of them have appeared in German translations.
The Vi/ill to Believe (first five essays) appeared in 1899,
translated by Lorenz and with a preface by Friedrich Pauls en,
Lorenz ' s original intention was to translate only the first
three essays but James persuaded him to add the other two for
the sake of better balance of thought. The German edition of
Talks to Teachers ( Fsycholo^i.! e und Erziehun^, 1900), was the
work of V, Kiesow, The first edition of Yvobbermin's tr<insla-
tion of The Varieties of Religious Experience was published
in 1907, and in 1908 Jerusalem's translation of the Pragma-
ti sm appeared. The translation of the shorter Psycho lo^y is
the work of M. and E. Dttrr (1909), Julius Goldstein trans-
lated the Pluralistic Universe which was published in 1914 al-
though Goldstein had talked the matter over v/ith James in 1910^
cI.
<
c
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at which time James had suggested cutting certain sections v/nich
referred rather definitely to Lngli sh or American i^roblems ,^4
The Ingersoll Lecture on Human Immortality was translated in
1926 by E, -von Ast or-Gi essen.
James's books are accessible in German libraries, both
in translations and in the original, and the evidence from many
sources seems to indicate that he, is better known than any other
American philosopher.

CHAPTJIR II
WOBBEKillN AS A GERIiAK INTERPRETER OF JALIES
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Albrecht Ritschl, who had been the dominant fi^j^ure in
German theology for the previous twenty years, died in 1869
while V/obhermin v^as a student at Halle, A definite turn of
thought back to Schlei ermacher was immediately evident. This
movement included both follov/ers and opponents of Ritschl as
well as many of the younger theologians,-'- One result v/as a
grov/ing interest in the problems of psychology of religion,
Schlei ermacher had made religious experience the basis of
theology, although he had not carried the principle far enough.
His treatment left two defects whicn influenced his German
followers in this period. These defects are defined as fol-
lows :
Sie liegen einerseits in der ungenttgenden
Berttcksichtigunts der Geschichte des re-
ligittsen Lebens, zumal der niederen He-
ligionsformen. TJnd andrerseits beruhen
sie auf der vorschnellen iiinad sciriung spek-
u 1at i V- di alekt i s ch er irhi 1o s opheme
,
That is, Schlei ermacher was neither empirical enough, nor phil-
osophical enough in the best sense, but rather reached hasty
and somev/hat dogmatic conclusions in both fields. JMevertheless
his thouj^ht offered fruitful suggestions,
Georg Runze is among the earliest representatives of
this nev/ movement in German thought. In 1877, twelve years be-
fore the death of xcitschl, he wrote a book on Schlei ermachers
Glaubenslehre .'^ and in 1894 published Die Psychologie des Un-
sterblichkeit SKlaubens und der Unst erblichkeitsleu^-nun
^^
as the
1c
<
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second volume of his Studien zur vergleichenden Relip;iQ^p-
wissenschaft Evidence of his continued interest in the
psychological approach is to be found in his editorial work
for the Zeitschrift fttr Relip:ionspsycholojgie .^ In Max
Reischle the psychological tendency is even more noticeable.
His book on Die Prage nach dem Wesen der Religion (1889),
while still under the influence of Ritschl, has a distinct
interest in psychological methodology.^ "Wobbermin's first
contribution to this general trend is his dissertation on
Die innere Erfahrung als Grundlage eines moralischen Eeweises
fttr das Dasein Gottes (1894). The content of this work v/ill
be discussed later in the present chapter. Gustav Vorbrodt
wrote several books and took an active interest in the devel-
7
opment of psychology of religion.
In America a contemporaneous but independent trend in
the same direction vi^as to be found. James, as we have seen,
had published several articles before 1890 v/hich had a dis-
ci
tinct bearing on psychology of religion. G. Stanley Hall's
school was also active in the development of psychology of re-
ligion. In this connection we need only to mention the names
of Burnharn, Leuba, Starbuck, Irving King, St rat ton, and Ames,^
Leuba is most characteristic of the empirical Hall tradition
but Starbuck had more influence in Germany at this time, large-
ly due to Vorbroit's interest in him and his method. The
Gesellschaft ftir Religionspsychologie
, founded in iJuremberg in
September 1910, was particularly influenced by his statistical
10
methodology.
1
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In Germany the chief representatives of the new move-
ment were theologians while in America they were psycnologi st
s
and educators. -^-^ But neither in Germany nor in America did the
movement take a unified form. Yvolobermin was particularly con-
scious of the disparities which he clearly formulated and at-
tempted to overcome. Yi/e shall turn now to a study of his con-
tributions to the problem, with special reference to his rela-
tion to James.
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A. THE DEVELOPMEFT QE V.'0±5iiERMIN' S THOUGHT
WolDbermin*s Ph.D. dissertation at Berlin in 1894 v/as
0" Die innere Erfahrun^ als Grundla^e eines moralischen jjev^/eises
fttr das Lasein Gottes , 'wTiile Wobbermin at the present time
lays little weight on this early stat ement j-*-^ it is particular-
ly significant for our study because of its relation to his
knowledge of James. Ke had read Jaiaes's Frincij^les of rsychol -
ofc/ in 1893 and quoted it on "the psychologist's fallacy par
13
excellence " in his dissertation. His general thought aoout
the nature of the self and his attitude toward psychological
methodology bear strong resemblance to James's position. "^"^ On
the other hand, the dissertation was prior to the Will to Jje-
li eve and the Varieties of rieligious Experience , it shows an
original methodological concern with the problems of theology
which cannot be attributed especially to James. The influence
of Schlei ermacher is evident in Wobbermin's treatment of inner
experience as tiie starting point for theolo^^y, and the gen-
eral empirical position is characteristic or "woboermin's whole
thinking,
V^bbbermin remained in Berlin as licentiate in theology
for a year after receiving his doctorate, and then took a medi-
terranean trip. The interlude of research in Asia Minor, how-
ever, seems to have had little direct bearing on the rest of
Wobbermin's thought. He collected and published in 189b a
series of liturgical prayers found in the Cloister of Athos,
Altchri stliche liturgisch e fcatticke aus der Kirche Aegyptens
.
tt
which tiie Theologische Li t eraturzeitunR- ijronounced
reprSlsenti eren einen J^'und von ungev/Ohn-
licher aedeutung „ittr die (iescnichte des
Gottesdienstes. *^
1 7This was translated into Ji^nglish "by tiishop John v.ordsworth.
Both this work and the earlier ^1696; Kelie^'i ons^geschi cht li che
Studien zur ITragje der Beeini lussun^ des Urciiri s 1 1n
t
urns durch
das antike Mys t eri env/esen deal with special fields in which
the influence of Jaines has no place, and they v/ill therefore
he omitted from further study.
V/ohbemin ' s next systematic work was his Theologi
e
und Ivletaphysik which appeared in 1901 (the year in which James
delivered the first of the Gifford Lectures). It hears the
subtitle, "Das VerhS-ltnis der TheolOi^ie zur modernen Erkennt-
nistheorie und Psychologie" and is a critical study of various
current types of thought, Yv'obbermin examines first the anti^
metaphysical position in theology, the characteristic repre-
sentative of which is Ritschl. He rejects Ritschl's asser-
tion that theology must be independent of metaphysics, but
shows that Ritschl himself v/as not opposed to all metaphysics
but only to the speculative type represented by Schelling and
Hegel. ?/obbermin next considers the theory of "Snpiriocri-
ticism" which is defended in Avenarius's book, Die Kritik der
rein en 2rfahrun^
.
and shows its materialistic tendency to be
untenable. He concludes v/ith a treatment of the concepts of
personality and causality
.( the latter with special reference
to the problem of freedom), which are of fundamental impor-
tance to theology. In this book reference is made to James's
i
6^
Principles of Psychology and to his The Will to Believe . The
arguments of the latter are cited in defense of V/obhermin'
s
19doctrine of freedom.
In 1902 Y/ohb eimi n published the little "book on Per
christliche Gott eSj^laube in seinem Verh&ltnis zur ^eKenv/glrti-
p;en Philosophi e, a series of lectures delivered at the vaca-
tion course of the Brandenburg Conference for the Church and
^0
Theology, Here James is spoken of as one of the chief repre-
sentatives of voluntari sm, '^^ and the Vari eti es
,
published in
June of the same year, is mentioned in the note on Ja:nes.22 a
new and extensively revised edition of the same book appeared
in 1907 and in it several quotations from James's Varieties are
given. There is, however, no special treatment of James him-
self other than the brief references that were in the first
edition. Yet V»'obbermin regarded the general position given
here as the exposition of his relation to James's metaphysics.
It may be noted that this book has been translated into Lng-
lish and Japanese,^
Wobbermin's German translation of Jaiaes' s Varieties of
Reli.Qjious Ilxperience was published in 1907, He had originally
intended to write a comprehensive introduction showing the re-
lation of psychology of religion to the general problems of
theology, but he came to the conclusion that he could not do
justice to the subject without destroying the unity of James's
work and further delaying its appearance in German, His re-
marks in the preface to the first German edition state his
reasons.
II
[
Meine ursprttngliche Absicht, meiner Fber-
setzung des amerikani schen Philosopher! Jaines
eine Einleitung vorauszuschi cken, liiri in ihr
fiber den Wert der religionspsychologi schen Ar-
beit im allgeraeinen zu handeln und zu den
wichtigsten Probleraen derselben meinerseits
Stellung zu nehmen, habe ich aufgegeben, und
zwar aus doppeltem Grunde, Zunftchst wollte ich
das Erscheinen der I5bersetzung nicht noch vvei-
ter verzOgern, nachdein persttnliche und berufliche
Umstande schon eine betrftcht liche Versp9.tung ver-
ursacht hatten. Hinzit kam aber ausserdem die Fber-
legung, dass die Ausftthrung meiner Absicht den
Rahmen einer Einleitung notwendig flberschreit en
mtisste, wenn sie einigemiassen erschfipfend sein
sollte, und dass sie dann also den einheitlichen
Gharakter des Buches sprengen wttrde, Ich lasse
daher die TJbersetzung als solche ausgehen und
werde jene meine Absicht in anderer Form nach-
holen.25
The three-volume Syst emati sche Theologie is wobberrnin' s ful-
filment of this original intention.
The translation received prompt attention and appre-
ciation on most points, though the translator was rather gen-
erally criticized for the arbitrary omission of James's "Post-
script," which suggested his philosophy of religion, A second,
slightly altered, edition appeared in 1914, but the controver-
sial "Postscript" was still omitted.^''' In the preface to this
edition, Iftobbermin gives a very generous appreciation of James
whom he met in Cambridge in the fall of 1907. His words are
well worth quoting.
Als ein eben so selbstSlndiger wie ftlr die
hOchste Schicht des amerikani schen Kultur-
lebens repr^sentativer Lenker erwies sich
James fast in j edem Wort, das er sprach,
Und als den Grundzug seines Wesens offen-
barte er dabei j enen ideali sti schen Opti-
mismus, den er uns in seinera "Willen zum
Glauben" so eindringlich empfohlen hat.

Zwei Moment e waren fttr seine gesamte Welt-
anschauung die eigentlich entc-rschei denden,
Eine tief innerliche Heligiositat , eine Re-
ligia3sitat, die sich auf die religiOse
"Erfahrung" grttndet und die daher von aller
Kritik theologi scher Lehrbi Idungen und
kirchlicher Institut ionen unabhSLngig ist,
Und daneben die an Carlyle geinahnende Be-
wertung des entschlossenen, allein durch
schttpf eri sche Tfttigkeit siegenden Geistes,
Auf diese beiden Pfeiler grtlndete sich ihin
die Fberzeugung, dass der Meiisch sich oei
aller Unterordnung unter die Gottheit als
Mitarbeiter derselben empfinden und betati-
gen mttsse, da sein letztes Ziel fiber das
ganze Getriebe des endlichen Seins hinaus-
liege.28
Wobbermin mentioned with approval Royce's estimate of Janies
in the Phi Betg, Kappa Address^^ and alv/ays set James high
among Aaierican thinkers.
Very shortly after the appearance of the first Ger-
man edition of the Varieti es , whose avowed purpose was to
arouse interest in psychology of religion, the Zeitschri ft
ftir Reli;^ionspsychologi
e
was founded (Halle, 1908j with Wob-
bermin as a contributing editor. ^"^ In 1914 the Archiv fttr
Religionspsychologie was founded by K. Koffka and W, Staiilin
as the organ of the 't}esellschaft fttr Religionspsychologie. "^2
In addition to these two journals, there was a flood of gen-
eral literature in the field by such authors as Troeltsch,
Ka.ftan, Bornhausen, Vorbrodt , Pfennigsdorf
,
Traub, Scholz,
23
Mayer, and many others. Just how much of this lively inter-
est in the problem of psychology of religion was due to the
influence of 7/obbermin and James it is impossible to say. But
it is to V/obbermin's particular credit that he kept more clear-
ly in mind than most of his contemporaries the distinctively

religious aspect of the problem.
The stir in theological circles, caused by the wri-
tings of Haeckel, centered in the period from 1905 to the oe-
ginning of the Y/orld War. Y/obbermin was keenly interested in
this problem and wrote several articles, later colledted in
his Monismus und Monothei smus . He joined the Keplerbund, ^in
organization founded "in the service of truth and in the belief
that science is in harmony with philosophy and religion,"^^
and active in the fight against Haeckel' s materialism and
atheistic monism.
In 1913 Wobbermin completed the first volume of his
work on systematic theology. Die religionspsychologi sche Me-
thode in Religionsvifi ssenschaft und TheolOKie . In this book
his interest in James is very definite. "While Schlei ermacher
is clearly in mind, he does not receive exceptional attention.
The historical movement of theology tov/ard Wobbermin' s posi-
tion is given with justice and poise. In the same year Wob-
bermin brought together and republished a series of his arti-
cles on psychology of religion, Zum Streit urn die Reli ^ions -
psycholo/:^i
e
, which he dedicated to the memory of James.
The V/ar was a check to the completion of the three-
voluine Syst emati sche Theologle , and the second volume did not
appear until 1921. In the preface to this volume Y^obbermin
explicitly announced his major intent as a "return to Schlei er-
macher, "^^ a position only hinted at in the first volume. 37
James is still mentioned frequently but in most cases only as
carrying out to its logical conclusion the Schlei ermacher po-
sition. In the third volume (1925) the name of James appears
but once and that in an insignificant place, 28 Furthermore
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the title of the first volume was chane^ed in the second edition
(1925) to read; Einleitun^ in die syst ernati sche TheoloKie : Prin
zipien- und Methoden-Lehre im Hinblick auf ihre Geschicnte seit
Schlei ermacher . The same trend toward Schlei ermacher is evi-
dent in the minor writings of Yi/ohbeiTflin over tne same period.
He holds, however, that his attitude toward James has not
changed and that the influence of James is implicit in his
later work, hut that explicit use of James material would be
irrelevant .-^^
Wobbermin writes a great many book reviev/s, particu-
larly in the field of psychology of religion, and has been
called upon to write articles on psychology of religion fox
several sourcebooks.'^^ His recent writings on historical
problems and their relation to the present theological situa-
tion fall outside the problem of this dissertation and will
largely be omitted from our discussion. ^1
c< 5
c
B. COIIPARISOH OF THL THOUGHT Oi^' JAI^IES AST) 'A'-OBBEmilK
WolDbermin ' s interest in James had tvi,'o chief sources:
his ov/n primary concern for the problem of religion, v^fhich he
felt that James shared; and his conviction that the combined
methodology of James and Schlei ermacher was the key to a more
adequate science of religion, James and V/ohbermin have sever-
al other points in common and are also far apart on some is-
sues. These points of agreement and difference v/e shall nov/
consider.
1. Methodology
Willi am James and Georg I'obhermin began their pjiilo-
sophical thinking along very similar lines. James's first
work was in the field of scientific psychology. His psycho-
logical researches gave him a firm basis for the continued
study of the nature of human selves in all their relations.
The religious interest, as we have already indicated, was al-
so of deep and lasting importance to him. Even before the
lengthy task of writing the Principles v/as completed, James
printed some essays that shov/ the weight he attached to re-
ligion in his philosophy. His religious thought, hovvrever,
did not run in traditional grooves, but found a new empirical
basis in the demands of human nature for an adequate explana-
tion of its moral and religious experiences. He recognized
the often ignored fact that all our knowledge is based on cer-
tain initial acts of faith and used this as an argument for
1•
the "right to "believe" in religious propositions which are
found to be most satisfying to our morovl natures. The
method thus developed is a combination of tne psychological
gathering of data and the ethical evaluation of those data
as indications of the total world view which religion claims
to give,
Y/obbermin's point of departure is a self-psychology
similar to that of James, In his dissertation on Lie innere
Erfahrung he starts with a detailed and empirical study of
what is immediately given in self-consciousness. His conclu-
sion from this examination of experience is
dass der feste aber einzige Punkt , auf den
wir dabei zurttck- und von dem wir ausgehen
mtlssen, unser Selbstbewusst sein ist,43
Our experience of the external v/orld at first seems to belong
in a special objective category, but thoughtful analysis shows
that all we know and can assert about this world is what is
within our own self-conscious experi ence,^^ Self only is im-
mediately given and
in gewissem Sinne alle unsere iiirfahrung
eine innere ist . , . 4i3
This may be paralleled by James's statement that
the only form of thing that we directly
encounter, the only experience that we
concretely have, is our own personal
life.'^^
Neither thinker means to assert that the external v;orld is il-
lusory but only to deny that it is immediately given,
Vi/obbermin
' s ultimate concern is to discover what the
evidence given in immediate self-consciousness means for re-
1«
ligion. But this problem can receive no answer until the pre-
liminary methodological question is ansv/ered. The first step
in this direction is the estahli shment of a justifiable psy-
chological method which is valid in all fields and not a case
of special pleading for religion. Wobbermin discusses the psy-
chological methods of introspection and objective observation,
shov/ing the advantages and limitations of each.
Introspection is, of course, conditioned by the fact
that it must be based on memory, A conscious process can sel-
dom, if ever, be described v/hile it is going on. But in in-
trospection v/hich follov/s immediately or reasonably soon after
the process under consideration there is no great danger of in-
accurate memory. It is, to be sure, possible to add much to
our knov^ledge of the mind by objective observation, but this
would have very little significance if it vvfere not for the ini-
tial fact of our own conscious experience v/hich is the presup-
position of all objective study and which necessarily inter-
prets the data of that study by analogy with its own conscious
experiences, past or present. Introspection is the only method
of studying the m.ind as it really is. uther methods necessarily
substitute something else as an intermediary, and to attempt
to impose these methods on psychology because they are general-
ly accepted by the natural sciences is to do violence to the
true nature of mind. 47 v/obbermin's treatment has much in com-
mon with James's in the chapter on method in the .b'rinci ples ."^^
though James lays more emphasis on the dangers and fallacies
of the method of introspection.
€<
Having justified the method of int rosi- ective appeal
to inner experience, Vi/obbermin takes up the implicati ons' of
moral experience for religion. Moral experience is a univer-
sal' aspect of huiLan consciousness and its deliverances are to
be trusted.
jjies Bevmsstsein, an verpflicht ende JMormen
gebunden zu sein, ist eine der ursprttng-
licnen Ideen der Menschheit , die var scnon
"bei alien i\iat urvOlkern in gleicher Weise
vorfinden/-^^
They are not to be thought of as confined to rimitive con^
sciousness, however, but are present in all normal conscious
experi ence.
boweit v/ir Menschen kennen, haben sie
sittliche Anschauungen , sittliches ae-
wusstsein. Das Spezifische des sitt-
lichen Sewusstseins besteht in dem unbe-
dingt verpflicht enden Gharakter, mit dem
ein V/ille auftrit'u.50
These facts of moral consciousness have the greatest
significance for religion.
Wir finden dass je v/eiter wir in der
Stufenfolge der VOlkerentwicklung zurtlck-
gehen, urn so enger religiftse und sittliche
Vorst ellungen an einander geknttpft sind,
mit einander verschrnelzen, V/ozu die Men-
schen sich selbst verpflichtet ftthlen, das
setzen sie auch als selbstverstSlndli ch bei
ihren GOttern voraus. So erscheinen diese
als die idealen Abbilder jener.^1
Wobbermin does not, hov/ever, intend to identify religion with
morality as some thinkers have done. They grov/ from a common
foot but each has a distinctive content. Morality has to do
with the feeling of human obligation while religion has ref-
erence to the superhuman and transcendent being whom we call
God* Our deepest knov/ledge of the nature of God is derived
1i
from the indications of our ov/n moral nature but this does not
mean that God is no more than the vague and confused claims of
our moral wills. He is rather the source of the authority
of our moral ideals revealed in history through Jesus and the
disciples, Schleiermacher is the most important historical
source for this type of thought in theology, hut, so far as
the moral argument rests on freedom, Kant is the thinker to
whom Wohhermin refers.
James, as we have already seen, made emphatic use of
the moral argument for the existence and nature of God, but
there are significant differences between his treatment and
that of 7/obbermin, James is not so sure that God actually does
exist, but he is more certain v/hat God's character must be if
he does exist at all. Y/obbemiin says that our moral experience
logically implies a God^^ while James says that our moral na-
ture demands a God for the satisfaction of its deepest needs.
On the other hand, both use the pragmatic argiment from relig-
ious needs in asserting what the nature of God must be, yet ar-
rive at different conclusions. "Wobbermin says that religion
demands a God who is an absolute ethical person, and James
asserts that the only God who is v/orthy of v/orship must be
finite, for otherwise he could not be thought of as ethical in
57
a v/orld vi^hich contains so much evil. They agree that God
must be moral and personal but disagree radically on his om-
nipotence. This difference is fundamental for their metaphy-
sics and will be considered in a later chapter.''^ The impor-
tant point here is that both arrive at their views by means
i
72
of an empirical study of experience.
The appeal to inner experience is thoroughly justified
methodologically. In every field of investigation v/e are prac-
tically limited hy our own capacities of experiencing the data
which constitute its problem. Moreover, each field is reported
to consciousness through definite media which must be taken in-
to consideration in the construction of the respective science.
The natural scientist is largely concerned with the data of the
senses and v^^ould not think of refusing toto genere their con-
tributions. Yet there is a rather general tendency to demand
that psychology discard introspection because it is not objec-
tive observation of sense experience and we find equally strong
prejudice against the acceptance of the claims of moral and re-
ligious experience as valid indications of the nature of ulti-
mate reality. Both James and Wobbemin defend the rights of in-
ner experience against such a false empiricism, and the latter
says,
1st es denn nicht v/irklich so und muss es
nicht so sein, dass die Methode jev/eilig
durch die Natur des Gegenstandes, also,
kurz gesagt , durch den Gegenstand selbst
bedingt ist und bedingt wird?^^
The object which the science of religion must study is the
religious experience.
Vvie hinter aller Metaphysik das metaphy-
sische Bewusstsein, so steht hinter aller
Religion die religiSse Erfahrung .^^
Sense experience is not the exclusive source of knowledge. Uo
empirical science can, for instance, give any account of values
for they lie within the realm of metaphysics. Religious values
like other values demand superempirical treatment.
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Yet Wobbermin does not intend to defend any one-sided
Yiew of the methodology which is suited to a study of reli-ion.
He demands a modified combination of the historical and psycho-
logical approaches in a unified method, judged by the criteria
of religious experience itself. This he calls "die religions-
psychologi sche Methode in Religionswi ssenschaft und Theologie,"
In this dissertation it v/ill be referred to as the "religio-
psychological" method, a translation ¥/hich the writer ov^^es to
Dean Knudson's usage in The Doctrine of God ,^^ Wobbermin holds
that the " religio-psychological" method is absolutely fundamen-
tal to the construction of a science of religion (theology),
thus largely breaking v/ith traditional theologies based on the
authority of historical revelation. But the method is in no way
to be confused with the merely empirical treatment of ps^^-chology
which is characteristic of xjeuba and tiie Stanley Ha,ll school in
America and of many of the German psychologists of religion. Y/ob-
bermin cites with approval Troeltsch's attack on the exclusively
empirical tendency, and regards it as one of the special mer-
its of James that he kept clearly in mind the religious objec-
tive of his studies in the Vari eti es «
James applied essentially the same method to his whole
philosophy in what is known as his radical empiricism. This
method is a criticism of Hume who left an atomism of unrelated
impressions and also of those who tried to answer Hume by pos-
tulating an Absolute of some sort in which relations inhere.
To be radical, an empiricism must neither
admit into its constructions any element
that is not directly experienced, nor ex»
c
elude from them any element that is direct-
ly experienced. 7or such a philosophy, the
relations that connect experiences must them-
selves he experienced relations, and any 3d.nd
of relation experienced must "be accounted as
'real* as anythin/^; else in the system , iileraents
may indeed "be redi st ri'but ed, the original plac-
ing of things getting corrected, but a real
place must "be found for every kind of thing ex-
perienced, whether term or relation, in the fi-
nal philosophic arrangement,
This viev/ of experience made the hypothesis of an Absolute un^
necessary and seemed to James to harmonize best
with a radical pluralism, with novelty and
indet ermini sm, moralism and theisiu, and with
... 'humani sm,
'
In summary v^e may note three points Y/hich stand out
particularly prominently in the methodology of James and Wob-
bermin. Both are determined to consider religion in its own
right and not as subordinated to any other interest. Both find
the study of inner personal experience an indispensable element
in the science of religion. And, finally, both appreciate the
special significance of moral experience as a clue to the na-
ture and existence of God, Naturally there are differences in
the interpretation of each of thes-e points by the tv/o thinkers,
but sD extensive a common methodological basis and interest is
not to be overlooked.
t
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2 . Pragniat i sm
A further x-^oint of comparison between tiie methodolot^y
of Jaines and Wobbermin needs to be made explicit, namely, prag-
matism. The pragmatic method as a test of truth by pro.ctical
consequences and as a theory of relative truth wobbermin in-
tended to reject, and in this he agreed with most of German
thought. The full treatment of this topic will be the concern
of Chapter IV of this dissertation. It is our purpose here
simply to mention the conflict and to point out that Y/obbermin
makes the differences greater than is really necessary. He
does not take into account James's later v/ritings in which the
statement of pragmatism is somewhat modified, and his interpre-
tation of The Will to Believe tends, like that of most critics
of the book, to overemphasize the title and lay too little
weight on the actual argument presented,
Jaines Ccurie to rega,rd his pragmatism as of much less
significance than his radical empiricism and it is unfortunate
to reject his v/hole philosophy because of its pragmatic affil-
iations, Wobbermin himself shows the pragmatic tendency in
the v/eight he gives to "what is neces-sary for religious faith"
in his arguments for the nature of God, His practical, peda-
gogical reason for translating the Vari eti es
.
"to av/aken inter-
est ,..," is also somewhat pragmatic.
r€
3. Metaphysics
V/oblD ermi n nowhere gives a unified account of his meta-
physics. Certain aspects are developed in his Theolor^ie und
Metaphysik
,
particularly his views of personality and freedom.
The polemic writing, Monismus und Monothei smus , is a negative
presentation of his metaphysics as a criticism of materialism.
We shall consider first his critique of materialism.
The problem of materialism was recognized both by James
and by Y/obbermin. Jajnes was especially aroused on the subject
because he was so often accused of being a materialist himself.
He developed his theory of radical pluralistic empiricism in a
period when practically all influential philosophers were moin-
istic and rationalistic. James hated all Absolutes, whether
idealistic or materialistic, v/ith their tendency to er^se dif-
ferences and to solve problems by referring them to the Whole.
James believed in the place of reason in the reordering of ex-
perience but objected to a rationalization of exi^^erience which
attempted to subordinate its concrete multiplicity and to blot
out its contradictions. The materialistic claim he felt to be
particularly inadequate. The materialist does not know what
the matter is which he posits as the ultimate reality. On the
other hand, the philosopher of experience has a very intimate
knowledge of the experiential order which he claims as ultimate
The abstract and vacuous character of Matter is vividly por-
trayed in a note to 0. W. Holmes, Jr, in which James says with
humorous disgust.
*
m.y I*m blest if I'm a Materialist :
The raaterialist posits an X for his ulti-
mate principle,
V/ere he satisfied to inhabit this vacuous
X, I should not at present try to disturb
him.
But that atmosphere is too rare; so he spends
all his time on the road between it and sen-
sible realities, engaged in the laudable pur-
suit of degrading every (sensibly) higher
thing into a (sensibly) lower...
James further objected to the materialistic view on
moral grounds. In his early essay on "The Psychology of xie-
lief" he said that no philosophy which denied man^s higher
nature and which was fundamentally pessimistic could endure.
As a pragmatic statement of mere faith this has little weight,
but if it is based on the logical implications of moral ex-
perience, as, for instance, in the treatment of Wobbermin and
even more cogently in that of Sorley,^"^ it is of utmost impor-
tance for the philosophy of religion.
Wobbermin approached the problem of materialism direct
ly through the controversy over Haeckel. Since boyhood he had
been interested in Haeckel 's work, mile he was still in the
Gymnasium, his science teacher had given him t^e Hatural His-
tory of Creation to read. This book left a lasting impression
and Wobbermin determined then to test his faith by seeking an-
swers to the problems raised by Haeckel.
Wobbermin acknowledges his indebtedness to Haeckel for
his general interest in the whole question of natural science
and its relation to religion. It was this interest also that
Played a large part in his choosing theology as a profession.-^
He rightly regrets the meager interest that religious people
have given to the questions of science.'^O It is not a little
I
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due to this fact that the battle of science and religion has
been so intense. There has been ignorance on both sides. Yi/ob-
berniin determined to keep abreast of scientific taought as far
as was possible in connection with his tneological v^ork. The
essays in Monismus und Monotiiei sruus show that he succeeded to
an unusual extent in carrying out this aim.
The battle over tne theory of evolution and tne natu-
ralistic denial of validity to religion came to a head as a re-
sult of Haeckel's lecture in tne Sing-Akademi e in Berlin in
1905 and the reply of Wasmann early in 1907. The Keplerbund
published articles in Unsere "welt , its nevirly founded journal,
attacking Haeckel most vigorously and in some cases unfairly.
The most exaggerated of these attacks v/as that of the zoologist,
Arnold Brass, curator of the iieplerbund. Ke directed his cri-
ticism against the famous "falsification" of the embryo dravv-
ing, and went so far as to question all Haeckel's work because
of this incident. Yi/obbermin defended Haeckel's general sin-
cerity against unjustly sweeping criticisms, v/hile of course
'deploring the "falsification" incident.'^^
The scientific-philosophic issue in Haeckel's argument
v/as clearly analyzed by 7/obbermin. Haeckel started from a con-
fusion of genetic v/ith value judgments. He felt, like many sci-
entists, that when he had given a genetic account of the origin
of any character he had said all there was to be said about it.
An explanation of v/hat caused it ( empirically J was regarded as
an adequate answer to the question of meaning and value. James,
in the Varieties
,
points out that all our thoughts and feelings

whether religious or scientific, have an organic foundation.
But he puts the critical question,
How can such an existential account of
facts of mental history decide in one
way or another upon their spiritual sig-
nif i canceV^S
It is only by ignoring the origins of L:cientific conceptions
that they can he given unique authority. Wohbermin takes much
the same position v/hen he says,
Haeckel verraengt ... genet ische ^eur-
teilung ... und Yt/erfbeurteilung,''*^
and shows the naSvet^ of Kaeckel in thinking that' the analysis
of several thousand vi^orms can stand significantly over against
the experience of a single man. The error of Haeckel 's method
is the attempt to interpret personal life and values "by means
of a merely quantitative criterion. On the basis of "empiri-
cal" investigations Haeckel, like Leuba, believed that he had
disproved the objective validity of religion. But Wobbermin
replies that religion cannot be so measured and that its value
cannot be determined by reference to its pirimitive forms alone,
Ptlr die religiflse Beurteilung ist das Snt-
scheidende nicht, wi e der llensch geworden
ist, sondern v/as er ist, genauer: was er
v/erden kann und werden soil, v/ozu er ver-
anlagt und v/ozu er bestimmt ist,'*^
Any view which claims that the v/orld of natural science
is the whole and final world leads to self-contradiction and
logical absurdity. "^^ It necessarily leaves out such facts as
personal consciousness and God, for they cannot be deduced from
the material conditions But epi st emologi cal considerations
such as
\
1
)
\
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dass alles Naturerkenrien die Exist enz eines
denkenden Bewussts/eins bereits zu seiner
Voraussetzung hat,
a fundamental proposition of Kant's, led Wobbermin to regard
the empirical world as only relative and phenomenal.'''^ He
posited God as absolute reality and value, and as ethical
personality. Haeckel's impersonal view, on the contrary,
is a partial denial of his own evolutionary principles.
Denke ich das Wesen Gottes nichtbewusster
und persOnlicher Art, so ordne ich es damit
der hOchsten Organisationsstuf e, die schon
in der Lebensentwicklung der empirischen
"Welt erreicht vdrd, unter.82
Wobbermin shows that this is just what Haeckel does,
Haeckel's skepticism is also evident in his view of
teleology, and Wobbermin' s position is seen in contrast. Haeck'
el held that the evolutionary development and especially the
facts of dysteleology disproved the claim of religion that the
purpose of God was being realized in the process. It must be
admitted that the fact of evil is a difficult problem for re-
ligion. But 'jVobbermin has at least a partial answer to the
objection to purpose raised by Haecicel. "While it may be that
purpose ( Zweck ) cannot be demonstrated with certainty (pur-
pose being a conscious experience of a person and hence only
indirectly accessible to tthers), an end ( Ziel ) can be ob-
jectively proved. Ends are being attained in evolution and
there is no doubt
dass die Welt lebender Wesen ein zusammen-
gehOriges Ganze darstellt, das sich aus
erst en primitiven AngSngen in fortschrei-
tender - zi elstrebiger - Weise zu immer
hflheren Organisationsstuf en entfaltet hat.^^
m
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Evolution is in essence teleological and so far forth no refu-
tation of religious faith.
A further difficulty arises from the monistic inter-
pretation which Haeckel gives, based on a naturalistic read-
ing of Spinoza.®^ Although the Christian v/orld view is, ac-
cording to Y/ohbermin, monistic, it is a metaphysical rather
than an empirical monism.
Jede monistische Betrachtun^. der empirischen
Wirklichkeit - die material! stische v/ie die
spiritual! stische - bedeutet eine Vergewalti-
gung, weil eine Verkfirzung des gegebenen em-
pirischen Tatbestandes . ^
The justification for this claim upon both materialistic and
spiritualistic monism Wobbermin finds in the necessarily dual
character of the empirical order which is made up of both na-
ture and minds (persons ) .^'^ The attempt to reduce the latter
to the former by the use of "scientific method" is the error
of the materialists, and^he psychological method must be sub-
stituted for the treatment of those objects which are not v^ith-
b8
in the realm of natural science.
Empirical monism is thus rejected by Y/obbermin, but he
holds to a type of personal! sti c monism as the necessary philo-
sophical interpretation of the empirical multiplicity of the
v/orld of experience, values, and religion. His arguments are
given chiefly from the theological point of view and presuppose
somewhat dogmatically the assertions of Christian faith. Ad-
mitting the dualism of empirical reality, he denies it any fi-
nal validity but finds it included in and subordinated to

dem Monismus des Glaubens an j enen Gott,
von dem, durch den und zu dem alle Dinge
sind.^^
Wobbermin himself regards the following statement from Moni s-
mus und Monotheismus as a particularly important account of
his total view.
Es ist ein Monismus. der nach rflckwarts
den Dualismus der empirischen vVirklich-
keit zur Vorausset zung hat und der zu-
gleich nach -yorwarts den Pluralismus
einer Vielheit persCnlicher Geister, die
in die Lehensgemeinschaft mit Gott ein-
gehen, in sich schliesst . Begrttndet aber
sind beide, j ener Dualismus und dieser
Pluralismus, in dem ethischen liebes-
willen des gei stig-persBnli chen C-ottes,
der nach christlichem Glauben das eigent-
liche Wesen Gottes in seiner tiefsten
Tiefe erfasst ausmacht, Der so gedachte -
weil so erlebte - Gott ist ja keine starre
Einheit, sondern hat das reichste und voll-
ste Leben in sich, dessen Entfaltung und
Auswirkung die ganze Mannigfaltigkeit der
Wirklichkeit verstAndlich macht, so sehr
sich das auch im einzelnen unserer Sinsicht
entzieht
.
Das fttr uns eigentlich Wichtige und Ent-
scheidende ist dies, festzuhalt en, dass
Gott die allein absolute Realitat ist, dass
also die gesamte empirische, die naturhaft
vorzufindende Wirklichkeit nicht absolute,
sondern nur relative Wirklichkeit hat.^^
The comparison of this v/hole section with the thought
of James raises some very important problems. James i s an
avowed pluralist and Wobbermin claims to reject this plural-
ism completely, but the above steitement makes concessions to
pluralism. It grants a dualism of tne empirical order which,
when fully explained, would differ little from pluralism in
that realm. And it further grants a plurality of personal
lives which develop in a community under the ethical will of
\I
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a personal God. So far James would "be in almost complete agree-
ment. But when God is claimed to be "tiie absolute reality"
which "includes" other persons whose lives are "unioldings" of
his unitary nature, James can no longer follow and the issues
are clear cut.
Yi/obbermin' s phraseology sugg^ests that his view is an
Kegelian absolutism, but nothing is further from his inten-
tions. He is even unwilling to describe his system as ideal-
istic oecause of the Kegelian connotation given to the tem
in current German thought. ^-^ He calls his position a theis-
tic personalism. It is to be regarded as monistic in the sense
of traditional theism which holds God to be perfect in power,
knowledge, and goodness, and therefore to be the only absolute
reality. His vi.ew is in no sense pantheistic, and he shows
that even mysticism is explicable in non-pantheistic terms. ^2
Three factors are united in Y/obbermin ' s theism. He
says,
Mein ontologi sches Interesse drttckt sich
aus in einer Gesamtweltanscha.uung , die
Transzendenzgedanken mit Immanenzgedanken
durch theistischen Personali smus verbin-
det.^S
God is thought of as transcendent over the empirical world, as
ein ttber die ganze empirische Vdrklichkeit
schlechthin erhabener Gott,^^
But his relations to the vi^orld are not adequately expressed by
by the conception of transcendence alone,
Andererseits ist eben dieser Gott kein
v/eltferner Oder v/eltfremder Gott, son-
dern ein die Yi/elt , zumal die ^eschichte,
lebendig durchwaltender Gott.''^
Equal weight must be laid on immanence and transcendence, and
#
there seems to "be a contradiction betv/een the God who rules
in majesty over the world and the God who is expressed within
its living process. The contradiction is solved only by
the conception of divine personality to which the other two
elements are subordinated.
Der Gott des Christ lichen Glaubens, der
Gott, der die hfichste Macht tloer alle
7/irklichkeit lebendig durchv/irkt, er ist
ein gei stig-ethi sch-persflnli Cher Gott,
Ethisches Fersgi^leben ist das Grundwesen
dieses Gottes.
Personal theism might also be used to describe Jamea '
s
conception of God, but with the following differences. Jajnes
held God to be transcendent in the sense of being higher than
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the human worshiper, but did not regard him as all-powerful.
In some of his thought, Janies believed God to be an extensive
(though not all-inclusive) consciousness which is in immanent
99
relations with men. He agreed with V/obbermin that God must
be thought of as ethical and personal but could not accept the
view that God was absolute.
CI
SUMMARY
We have found James and Wobbermin agreeing on an em-
pirical psychological method as the only sound basis for the
construction of a science of religion. They Tooth give special,
though different, emphasis to moral data in their methodology.
They differ on pragmatism as a criterion of truth and as a
methodology. Both regard the conception of personality as of
prime significance, and join in the argument against material-
ism, Vi/hile James is not final in his metaphysical statements,
his general view seems to be idealistic, as is Vi/obbermin ' s.
But they differ in that James holds to a final pluralism v/hile
Wobbermin's ontological view is monistic. Both are, however,
personali stic . In brief form v/e may say that James presents
a psychology of religion v^hich V/obbermin adopts as the method
for attaining a philosophy of religion; and that James presents
a philosophy of religion - pragmatic-pluralistic - which Y/ob-
bermin largely rejects or ignores.
In the follovang chapter we shall consider the problem
of methodology as it is developed by Wobbermin on the be^si s of
the combined methods of James and Schlei ermacher
,
leaving the
discussion of metaphysical issues to later chapters.
f
CHAPT]iR III
THE "KELIGIO-FSYGHOLOGIGAL" METHOD IN
PKILOSOPHY OF RELIGIOil
m
#
The prolDlem of the present chapter is the study of
the theological method which Vi/ohhemin developed as a synthe-
sis of the methods of Schlei emacher and James, Since Y^/ohber-
min regards his chief debt to Jaines as this methodological one,
it is of particular imiortance for our study.
Vrf'ohhennin felt that the great need of theology during
the last fifty years or more^ vv^s a unitary metnod. This he
tried to develop "by a combination and extension of tne point
of vievv of James and Schlei eimacher, James broke away from
the traditional rationalistic philosophy and adopted a frankly
empirical method which had much in comri^on with the psychologi-
cal approach of Schlei ermacher, though the two men differed
widely in their application of tae principle, Schlei ermacher
v/as a tueologian before everything else and regarded himself
as only a dilettante in philosophy, 2 in contrast, J^ies's
interest was in philosophy and he was in no sense a theolo-
gian. Y/obbermin, like Schlei ermacher , is primarily a theolo-
gian, but v;ith greater metaphysical interest than Schlei er-
macher.
This contrast in interests between Vi/obbermin and Jaines
leads to a terminological difficulty. Woboermin's aim in the
study of religion is theological; James's philosophical. Yet
to a certain extent the tv/o can be identified. Our initial
problem, then, is to state hov/ the terms v/ill be understood
in this dissertation.
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For Wobbermin theology is, taken in its widest sense,
"die Wissenschaft von der Religion."*^ Theology is only the
science of religion, however, and not to be confused with re-
ligion itself. Religion is the actual experience of individu-
als, and any study of religion, whether theology or philosophy
of religion, must be based upon the data derived from religious
experience. This is an essential methodological thesis for
Wobbermin as well as for Schlei ermacher and James. So far
there is no real difference between philosophy of religion and
theology. They are normative disciplines which aim to discov-
er the truths to which religious experience points and to ex-
plain these in relation to the rest of experience.
Their point of departure, however, is unique. Philoso-
phy of religion is more general and inductive, starting with
the data of religious experiences of every kind and testing
them in relation to the rest of experience. Its study may be
limited to one historical religion but this is not necessarily
so. Theology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with
the historical revelations of a particular religion and seeks
to interpret and criticize the beliefs which it involves. It
is more interested in the experiences of historical individuals
than in those of contemporaries. The latter serve chiefly to
illustrate and confirm normative experience. Some theologians
tend to put theology in the place of philosophy and claim that
the religious tradition reveals self-evident metaphysical
truth. But many regard theology as dependent upon phil-

osophy for the final justification of all its concepts. v»ob-
bennin v/as particularly concerned about an adequate metapnysi-
cal basis for his theology. He opposed the ant i -metaphysical
teaching of Kitschl and held that "Theologie ohne i^ietaphysik
ist unmBglich. A large part of 'vVobbermi n • s v/riting is phil-
csophical rather than theological in the narrower sense, and
he uses philosophy of religion and thealogy practically inter-
changeably in many cases.
It v/ill be the intent of this dissertation to study
the philosophy of religion presented by James and "'nVobberrnin,
leaving to one side as far as possible strictly tneological
questions, i.e., those referring to scriptural interpretation,
creedal matters, etc. The term "theology" must necessarily be
used frequently in the statement of 'nVobbermin' s vi ev/s out it
is to be taken in this general philosophical sense unless spe-
cial note. is made of the narrower meaning.
Another distinction needs also to be xnade. The psy-
cho logice.1 method is adopted by James and Wobbermin but neither
is primarily interested in psychology of religion. Wobbermin
says,
Das Interesse, das ich an der Keligions-
psychologie habe, ist ein durchaus theolo-
gi sches.^
And James's original intent in the Vari eties v/as to use a
psychology as a propaedeutic to a philosophy of religion.
Though the Eaaount of material which he found forced him to de-
lay the philosophical treatment, there is no doubt that it was
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his chief interest,''' The present chapter deals with psycholo-
gy, hut as a methodology rather than as an independent science.
I
A. HISTORICAL SKtCTGH OF METHODS
There are many methods of studying religion. Y^ohber-
min cites four v/hich stand in opposition to his own; dogmatic
traditionalism, constructive rationalism, historicism, and
psychologi sm.^ Historicism and psychologism are the strongest
current tendencies in German theological thought and have re-
ceived special treatment at V/ohbermin' s hands.
Just ."before the "beginning of the Vi/orld V/ar, 7/ob"bermin
started his attack on historicism and psychologism. His book
on Richtlinien evangelischer Theologie zur Uberwindung der ge ~
genwSirti^en Krisis is a recent statement of his position, and
he says in the preface that he originally intended to include
in the title a suggestion of the "Kampf gs-gen Historismus und
Psychologi smus" which the book embodies,^ Karl Earth's early
treatment of the "dialectic theology" had the same aim, accord-
ing to Wobbermin, but his recent writing shows a turn back to
dogmati sm. '-^
Yi/obbermin ' s " religio-psychological" method is to be
distinguished both from historicism and from psychologism. It
intends to give equal v^eight to historical and psychological
factors (a principle advocated by Schlei ermacher }H and thus
to avoid the one-sidedness of either theory alone.
4
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1. Historicism
Historicism, as defined by V/obToermin, is the viev/ that
history is the final and exclusive answer to the questions of
theology, •'2 The influence of Ritschl is to he seen in this ex-
clusively historical tendency, for his own treatment was rather
strictly limited to historical sources,-'-'^ Wohbermin ascribes
to Troeltsch also a degree of historicism. But Karnack is the
most important representative of historicism in recent times,
and Wobbermin cites his lectures on Das "'»Vesen des Christ entujns
as typical.
Harnack erhebt ja hier ganz ausdrttcklich
den Anspruch, rein als Kistoriker die
letzten J?ragen nach Wesen und Wahrheit ...
in zureichender und erschttpf ender Weise zu
beantv/ort en. 14
Schlei ermci,cher and Jajnes opposed such historicism. But
they went too far in the other direction and failed to give due
significance to the meaning of history for the religious lif e,-^^
In spite of the emphasis given to the "religi o-p srychological"
method, Vvobbennin intends throughout to combine historical with
experi entia.l data. This is brought out explicitly by his desig-
nation of his method as that of the " religi o-psychological" cir-
cle, which v\fill be discussed later in tMs chapter. -^^ In the
period of most distinct James influence, Wobbermin* s writing v/as
more psychological and in the last few ye.ars the historical has
V
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predominated "but neither has been treated as the exclusive ap-
proach to philosophy of religion.-
Wobbennin distinguishes two meanings of history: in the
first place, history means the actual living process of events
as they are experienced, and this he calls Geschi chte ; secondly,
history means historical research, the scientific study of the
facts of history ( Geschi cht
e
) , which he calls Historie ?^ The
latter is relative and hypothetical, bearing somewhat the same
relation to the original events that an idealized portrait bears
to the real person portrayed. Wobbermin's objection is against
the treating of Hi storie as final and authoritative. Ke ap-
peals to Geschi cht e as one of the tv/o necessary methodological
moments. James shares this interest in the living stream of
history ( Geschi cht
e
) and finds in it a pragmatic test of the
validity of religion.
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2, Psychologi sm
Psychologi sm needs to be clearly distinguished, from
the method used "by Wohbermin. It may he defined as
die UherschSLtzung und einseitige Geltend-
machung der Prinzipien der empirischen
Psychologie.lQ
Schlei ermacher v/as charged v/ith teaching a limited psychologi sm,
and the same objection has been raised against Wobbermin in so
far as he adopted the methodology of Schlei ermacher and James.
Both Hegel and the Barthians are critics of the place given to
feeling in the theology of Schlei ermacher. But, while he makes
feeling central, it is a "feeling of absolute dependence on the
God revealed in Jesus Christ," and the object of dependence
gives at least a partial balance betv/een subjective and objec-
tive factors. 1^
VxTiile subjectivism is a danger in the application of
psychological methodology, empiricism is more serious a danger
for the cause of religion. American psychology of religion,
with the exception of the contributions of James, carries em-
piricism too far. Leuba is an extreme example of this tenden-
cy. He has written many articles and several books on the
problem. He intends to make a purely empirical study of
the psychological data and to state unbiased results. His em-
pirical study reveals that mystical states, for instance, can
be induced by the use of hashish or other drugs. These mysti-
cal experiences may have the same form as those claimed to be
tK
95
revela,tions or direct experiences of God. The conclusion that
Leuba drav/s is that empirical psycholOe;,y has shovvn the natural
causes of the experiences and therefore proT/ed relig,ious faith
in divine causality an illusi on.'^"'" In reply it may be said
that no sane philosophy of religion has held that religious
phenomena v/ere independent of the rebt of our experience and
offered no traceable relation to its universal cause-effect or-
der. What it has claimed is that empirical causes are not meta^
physical causes and that metaphysical causes are the expression
of what the v/crld really is.
It is possible to carry through a purely empirical
study of religious experience, but Wobbermin raises the ques-
tion as to what the results may be expected to be,
Empirische Psychologie hat es allein mit
dem menschlichen Bewusstsein zu tun, 22
Wobbermin' s definition is too narrow, excluding as it does the
justifiable psychological study of non-human consciousness,
but it suggests the important fact that empirical psychology
can give no metaphysical conclusions. It can report descrip-
tively on religious experiences of God but it cannot tell any-
thing further about the religious object since that object is
non- empirical. Even to deny its existence is to make a meta-
physical judgment. For the study of religion, at least, psy-
chology cannot be limited to the empirical in the ordinary
scientific sense,
A difficulty arises here, for Jajnes and Vi/'obbeirnin call
their .own methods empirical. The term is used in tv/o differ-
€5
ent senses. When we speak of empirical sciences we mean those
sciences which deal v\rith the objects of sense experience. The
object of religious experience is not given in arjy sense exper-
ience and so empirical science is not qualified to deal v;ith
it. Furthemore, human psychology comprises more than is giv-
en by the senses (e.g. thoughts), and the introspective method
is a necessar3i^ addition to the objective method of empirical
science even for general psychology. iErapirical is used, in
the second sense, to designate the whole content of experience,
the stream of consciousness, as it is imjiiediat ely given. When
Wobbermin claims an empirical basis for religion, he ib using
the term in this latter sense. James has the same meaning in
mind in his radical empiricism. It is no demand for radical
limitation to sense experience. Rather it is tne demand that
every factor in conscious life, whether derived from the senses
or from some other source, be considered in the final account.
The impli captions of this latter vie?/ for religion are evident.
Religion is a part of the experience of the race and its claims
must be considered.
Between the extremes of historicism and psychologi sm,
we find a middle ground v/hich James and Wobbermin tried to de-
velop. Their position conserves the emphasis of psychologism
on the multiplicity of experience and that of historicism on
the traditional basis of religion and its historical develop-
ment . 24

B. THE SGHLEIERMAGHER-JAi'IES COUCEPTIOH OF
MiiTHODOLOGY
In the combination of the thought of Schlei ermacher
and James, V/obbermin finds the basis for his unique setting
of the problem of methodology in philosophy of religion or
systematic theology. We nov,r turn to an examination of this
methodology.
1, Historical Sources
Although James and Schlei ermacher use a common method-
ology in the treatment of problons of religion, the rest of
their thinking runs in quite different directions, Wobbermin
sketches their historical backgrounds in the preface to the
second German edition of the Vari eti es . Schlei ermacher , he
says, v/as particularly influenced by Kant's critical thought
and James by modern psychology . 25 This is, of course, in-
tended merely as a partial statement but even then it does
not do full justice to James, Wobbermin tends to overempha-
size his psychological work, James was, it is true, greatly
influenced by modern psychology in v/hich he v/as himself a
pioneer, but it would be quite incorrect to regard this as
his chief intellectual heritage. He has been called a re-
stater of Kant because of his ov/n critical demands regarding
the study of experience. His thinking is in the same criti-
cal line as Schleiermacher ' s, although James felt himself to
1
"be more influenced by the British empirical tradition than
by Ka.nt, The French philosophers, Renouvier and JSergson, v/ere
also very influential in tne development of James's txiou^ht,
a fact that is entirely overlooked "by Wobhermin. In them
James found support for the anti-intellectualism which Vifas the
root of his prq,gmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism.
fe
2. The Problem of Methodology
The methodology which is presented by Schlei emiacher
and developed by James is psychological. It aims to find and
test the distinctively religious factors v/hich are given in
experience. In contrast to the treatment of the problem by
empirical psychologists both in Germany and in America, Schlei
ermacher and James lay the emphasis on the religious rather
than the psychological part of their problem, on the content
rather than on the method,
Schlei ermacher' s conception of the problem is stated
as follows by Wobbermin:
Das religionspsycholoft'ische Denken ^uss] in
Bewegun^' gesetzt v/erden, um das spezifische
Religiftse in seinem Unterschied von anders-
artigen Elementen und Pactoren des mensch-
lichen Seelenlebens zu erfassen und um dann
weiter die ent sprechende jFrage nach dem spe-
zifisch Christlichen der historisch als
"christlich" bezeichneten Zrscheinungen des
reliA'ittsen Lebens zu beantvyorten ,
Wobbermin takes up this general problem outlined by Schlei er-
macher and finds additional support for his methodology in the
thought of James.
Neither James nor Schlei ermacher carried out to its
completion the method which they advocated and their solutions
of the problem v/ere therefore unsatisfactory. We shall con-
sider first the general traits of the Schlei ermacher-James
method and then Wobbermin' s ov/n method which is an attempt to
overcome their limitations and present a valid unified method
for the study of religion.
t.
a, Feeling versus Intellect
In contrast to most thought on religion, Schlei eriuacner
and Jarnes set feeling above intellect as tne source of religion
in human experience. Schlei ennacher' s famous definition of re-
ligion as the feeling of absolute dependence has been regarded
as vicious subjectivism but it is a significant antithesis to
the rationalistic derivation of religion, for instance in Hegeli^
Schleiermacher • s limitation of the specifically relig-
ious to the feeling of absolute dependence is, however, too ar-
bitrary and narrow. As Wobberrnin rightly points out,
das Geftthl erschOpft sich nicht im Abhangig-
keit sgeftthl.
Wobberrnin regards the feeling of dependence as tne fundamental
religious feeling but would add to it two other feelings, tnat
of security ( Geborgenneit sgeftthl) and that of longing ( Sehn-
sucht sgeftihl ) ; and Titius, in criticizing Wobbemin, says
that two more are involved, naraely, the feeling of obligation
( Verpf lichtungsgeftlhl ) and the feeling of aspiration ( Strebens-
^eftthl) ."^^
James also gives feeling an important, though not an
exclusive, place in his thought. He says,
I do uelieve that feeling is the deeper
source of religion, and tnat philosophic
and theological formulas are secondary
product s. "^-^
His study in the Vari eti es v/as an attempt to fathom this feel-
ing source in a fresh and unconventional way.
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b. Experience
FeeliEg is too narrow a source for religion and it is
experience as a whole v/hich Schleierrnacher and James essential-
ly mean to claim as its source.
Experience is taken by both men to mean conscious ex-
perience. A philosophy of religion, they hold, can be at-
tained only through a study of the data of human experience,
Schleierrnacher empjhasizes the fact that religion is a matter
of immediate personal self -consciousness,'^^ His definition
of piety brings out the same point.
Die FrBmmigkeit ist ... weder ein Wissen
noch ein Tun, sondern eine Bestirajntheit
des CJeftthls oder des unmitt elbaren Selbst-
bevmsst seins.-^*^
Although Schleierrnacher uses feeling in this connection, he
makes it synonymous with immediate self-consciousness , v/hich
is a significant elaboration of his view. This definition in-
terests Wobbermin particularly because it makes the self or
the person central and states that piety is necessarily an ex-
perience of selves. "^"^
James is equally convinced of the personal character
of religion, and the experiential basis for all philosophy of
religion. This conviction for him is based on the general con-
clusion that the one indubitable truth is "that the present
phenomenon of consciousness exists, "^^ !From this point, he
holds, all thought must start. Wobbermin formulates much the
same thesis in the specifically religious field when he says,
c1 ; '
.
t
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Die religifise Erfahrung : das ist also fttr
die theologisclie Arbeit das eigentliche Ob-
jekt, von dem aus ttber das Verhaitnis von
Religion und Metaphysik und ... von Theolo-
gie und Metaphysik zu sprechen ist.'^°
Religious experience offers the iimediat ely relevant data for
the study of religion and any attempt to ignore it or to dis-
count its value "because it is religious is unjustified.
James's study in The Varieties of Relii.-<i ous ISxperience
is psychological, a description of definite cases in v/hich the
distinctively religious phenomena occur. He draws chiefly up-
on -extreme Cc-ses, giving as his reason the statement that
there is no essential difference in quality between the mild
cases and the extreme and that in the latter the characteris-
tics are more easily discerned and described.'^''' Jaraes is rather
generally criticized for this choice, and Wobbemiin goes so
far as to add to his translation of the Vari eti es the subtitle,
"Materialien und Studien zu einer Psychologie und Pathologic
des religiOsen Lebens."'^^
Wundt criticized James for omitting the institutional
aspects of religion. James's reply to this criticism was given
in advance. In the second chapter of the Vari eti es he pointed
out that personal religion is the fundamental fact and that
churches and theologies depend upon personal founders and
thinkers. '^'^ James's work is admittedly limited in scope, but
within its field it is of very great significance for the
study of religion along empirical lines.
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c. The Specifically Religious
The peculiar prolDlem of psychology of religion, as Wolo-
faiermin has said, is to discover the specifically religious ele-
ments in the conscious life of man. This v/as Schleiermacher'
s
chief interest but it remained for James to define the problem
more clearly. According to Wobhermin, James found the specifi-
cally religious element to be the consciousness of the presence
of the divine. It is to be questioned, hov/ever, whether
James ever made any one element primary, Busch seems to be
nearer right v;hen he refers to James's statement that there
is no distinct religious emotion but that the "religious sen-
timent" is
a collective name for the many sentiments
which religious objects may arouse.^^
The specifically religious attitude meant for James that solemn
and reverent response v/hich the individual makes to the v/hole
of life and the cosmos.
'For Schleiermacher, as we have already suggested, the
specifically religious was the feeling of absolute dependence.
He talked of intuition and of feeling and felt that the essence
of the religious consciousness lay in them but, according to
V/obbermin, his conclusions remained uncertain and hesitant .'^•^
fi:
Wobbermin recognized the importance of the problem set
by Schlei ermacher and James and also the incompleteness of their
development of it. There v/ere errors and omissions in tii.^
.thought of both, as he saw them, and he took as his purpose the
correction and fulfilment of their program. He criticized
Schlei ermacher ' s doctrine of feeling as too limited and also
felt that he had an insufficient appreciation of hi story.
James, according to vVobbermin, did not succeed in fully trans-
cending the limitations of "scientific" empiricism. 1/Vobbermin
v/ished to make very clear that the empiricism which he adopted
45
from James was no one-sided doctrine of sense experience, Y/e
shall find in Wobbermin's emphasis on the transcendental his at-
tempt to correct eminricism, Wobbermin further criticized James
for excessive interest in abnormal, subconscious, and spiritue.!-
istic phenomena,'^ 6 and it is true that these factors played a
rather large part in the Yari eties .
fI
<
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C. WOBBERIOK'S IffiTHOD
The synthetic method which V/obTDemin developed on the
basis of the thought of Schlei emiacner and Jamea was an at-
tempt to give to the scientific study of religion a unitary
metnodology in exchange for its many and fragmentary methods.
He complains that theologians have been content to construct
opposing systems without troubling themselves about their col-
leagues' contributions, at least so far as method is concerned.^
Wobbermin, on the other hand, wishes to see the scientific
spirit applied in the field of philosophy of religion to the
end that a single inclusive method be used b^ all in their study
and that the present one-sidedness of conflicting methods be
overcome. He feels that the psychological method v/hich he pre-
sents is both Uiiitary and inclusive of tne many points of vi ev/
represented by the other methods, and that it may therefore
safely be substituted as the necessary basis for a science of
religion."^^
While method is important, Wobbermin has been criticized
for laying too great v/eight upon it. Knudson says the method
is secondary and "a reflection of one's philosophical and the-
ological standpoint." Woboermin's insistence that psychology
of religion be treated as transcendental psychology because its
object is super- empirical is a partial attempt to meet this
critici sm.
(f
106
1. Hefinition and Statement of Method
V/obbermin had some difficulty in finding a satisfac-
tory terminology to designate the method which he presented.
Ee first called it the method of transcendental psychology,
but objections and misunderstandings led him to change to the
form, "religio-psychological." Ke has used this title since
1913, A third tenninology, however, has been derived from his
analysis of the method, namely, the method of the "religio-
psychological" circle, Wobbermin intends to use tnese three
titles synonymously and advises his readers who dislike the
term "transcendental" to substitute for it "religio-psycho-
logical."^*-* There are, however, differences in emphasis which
make it necessary to consider the three methods separately.
a. The Method of Transcendental Psychology
In his address at the V/orld Congress for Liberal Chris-
tianity and Religious Progress, given in Berlin in August 1910,
Wobbermin presented his theory of a transcendental psychologi-
cal method, previously suggested in an article in the Zeit-
schrift ftllr angewandte Psycholo^;i e .^^ He chose the terminology,
as he states in his Zurn Streit um die Relipcionspsychologi
e
, to
distinguish his own point of view from the merely empirical and
psychological treatment of religion in the above-mentioned jour-
nal. As Wobbermin shows in his Congress address, the general
conception oi psychology of religion both in America and on the
c
Continent at that time v/as that of a thorough-goin^i empiricism
which necessarily excluded all that was specifically religious
and turned out to he v/hat ¥obbermin regarded as nothing but
general psychology gathering data in a nevv field.
The term "transcendental," borrowed from Kant,^*^ is
used, then, as a protest against the attempt to treat religious
experience purely empirically. The transcendental method is a
critical evaluation of religious experience for the purpose of
ascertaining its objective validity.
Die transzendentale Betrachtung hat ihr ent-
scheidendes Interesse nicht an den Taktoren
des individuellen Seelenlebens in ihrer sub-
jektiven Indi vidualitat , sondern an d^m in
diesen und durch diese hindurch zuci Ausdruck
komraenden allgemeing-ttltigen Obj ektgehalt .^^
Wobbermin's emphasis on the psychological approach as a method
for studying religion rather than for its ov/n sake is evident
in this statement. There is, of course, a justifiable psycho-
logical study of religion on the purely empirical descriptive
basis, but the method which is used in philosophy of religion
has as its aim not the individual and subjective or the ob-
jective in the sense in v/hich the teim is used by empirical
science, but rq^ther the universal and metaphysically objective.
This meaning is implied by Woboermin when he calls his method
transcendental. The presupposition of the science of religion
is that there is "eine religiOse Wahrheit."^^ The task of
verifying this presupposition naturally goes beyond the psycho-
logical into the metaphysical realm, but a psychological anal
ysis of the religious consciousness from the point of viev/ of
fi
c
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its interest in truth is a necessary step in the discovery of
what is specifically religious. Among the many different ex-
pressions of the religious life a common element is found in
the viev/ of the religious goal as transcendent.*^ The notion
of a transcendent goal does not, hov\fever, distinguish religion
from any other kind of search for truth, V/hat is unique in
religion is the conviction
daoS eben das Tra.nsz endent e , das ihr Ziel
ist, die letzte und httchste Vi/ahrheit "be -
deutet .i:^^
Wohbermin was criticized for confusing psychological
and mets.physical issues in this treatment and claiming to re-
main on the psychological level when he was really offering a
critical epi stemology.^^ He maintained, hov/ever, that just
this v/as necessitated hy the nature of the subject and there-
fore intended by his transcendental method which combines the
empirical and the super- empirical.
General critieism of the concept of transcendental psy-
chology led Wobbermin to change his terminology although he
felt that there was no change in his own meaning. When he had
first adopted the phraseology in op^.osition to empirical psy-
chology, he had intended it as a synthesis of ihe Kant- Scnlei er-
go
macher position with that of James, and he still maintained
that fundamental position. However, he came to feel that Janies's
psychology remained more or less on the pragmatic level and that
Schlei ermacher ' s was a better start in the direction of a trans-
cendental analysis of religious experi ence, ^-^
(
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b. The "Heligio-Psychological" Method
In 1913 two books by Wobbermin appeared v/hich are of
particular importance for our study, his collection of the- pre-
viously published articles on psychology of religion with a new
comprehensive introduction and entitled Zum Streit uiri die ReliKi
onspsycnolo^ie
.
and the first volume of his systematic theology,
Die religionspsychologi sche Methode in Religionsva ssenschaft und
Theologi
e
. In the latter book Wobbermin speaks but once of the
transcendental method, applying it to Schlei ermacher , but adding
that it might as well read "religio-psychological. "^^ In the
former book the separate essays appear in their original form
and maintain the transcendental terminology but the introduction
expresses V«obbermin' s willingness to change in every case to
the term "religio-psychological."63
The meaning of the "religio-psychological" method may,
as Wobbermin says, Yiell be expressed by a slight change in the
famous words of Augustine, "deum et animam scire cupio," To
describe the method, they should read, "animaui et deum scire
cupio," for it is through psychological knowledge of the human
mind that knov/ledge of God is obtained. In another connec-
tion Y/obbermin says.
Die Religionspsychologi e ist die gewiesene
und unersetzliche Basis f<lr alle religions-
phi losophi sche Arbeit .^^
Although this method is characteristically psychological, Wob-
bermin does not allov/ his readers to overlook tne fact that it
66
is psychology of religion .
c(
c. The Method of the "rleligio-Psychological" Circle
Wobbermin used the expression, "der reli^^i onspsy cho-
logische Zirkel," in the 1910 article in which the general
transcendental method was developed hut did not lay special
v/eight on it until later in his thinking.^''' This particular
putting of the methodological problem is now rather generally
regarded as Wobbei-mln' s most distinctive contribution to the
field.
The concept grows out of tne tv/o-fold task v/hich Schlei
ermacher set. for theology, namely, to give equal v\feight to the
religious experience of the individual ana to the historical
68factors. Thought about religion moves between these tv/o foci
The starting coint is the individual inquiring about the mean-
ing and objective validity of his ov/n religious experience. But
it is only by going beyond the individual experience that these
questions can be answered. Y/obbermin describes as follows the
methodological circle vi^hich results,
Wir wollen zur Beurteilung una Kormierune,
des eigenen relig,i5sen Lebens auf Grund
der geschicht lichen TatoestJlnde die Kri-
terien reiner Religiositat gewinne^, und
v/ir kttnnen doch diese geschi chtli chen Tat-
bestSlnde, nSmlich die Ausdrucksformen des
religittsen Lebens in der Geschichte der
Menschheit, nicht anders als nach Ivlassgabe
unserer eigenen religifisen JLrfahrun^^,, also
unseres eigenen religiBsen Bewusst seins,
verstehen und auslegen.^^
This is not, however, a vicious circle for truth is attained
throughout the process. The individual gains new insight and
higher standards for his religious life through his search for
ct
historical verification, and at the saine time adds greatly to
the understanding of history by interpreting its theories in
living experience. One learns to understand the religious ex-
perience of others through observing the same characteristics
inonds own experience,''*-'
Yet religion does not lose its absolute value because
it is thus mediated through finite experience. The "religio-
psychological" method does not mean
die eigene. religifise Erfahrung zur entschei-^
denden Instanz der Glaubenslehre zu machen.'^l
Religious experience is only one factor in the " religio^psycho
logical" circle. Those who have made experience the sole cri-
terion have offered no means of distinguishing between false
and true experiences, Vi/'obberrain escapes from such subjecti-
vism by introducing the historical factor as of equal or su-
perior significance. The religious experience of the indi-
vidual is to be interpreted and tested by Scripture. Scrip-
ture is to be understood after analogy v/ith our 0¥/n religious
experience but that experience is never to be taken as consti-
tutive. It is only a methodological aid, indispensable to be
sure, to the understanding of Scripture but subordinate to it.
Die eigene religittse Erfahrung muss .,.
grundsfttzlich der Hciligen Schrift unter-
geordnet Y^erden,"^^
In his reaction against psychologi sm, Wobbermin v/ent
rather too far in the direction of authoritarianism. But this
attitude is not characteristic of his whole thought, ^uite re-
cently he has emphasized the demand that theology be scientifi
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He firds no conflict between science and reli(-ion out points
out that theology deals with God, man, and the world, while the
sciences deal only with the world and man, Knov/ledge of Ciod is
partly derived from the Bible and partly frorii personal exper-
ience. This is just v/hat is meant by the "reli^io-psychologi cal"
circle. He objects, for instance, to Barth's thought because
Earth makes no distinction betv/een these two sources and also
because of his extreme authoritarianism which would lead to be-
lief in verbal inspiration if carried out. "^obbeiiiiin, as a the-
ologian, raises ilant • s question in a nev; field by asking, What
can vve know in religion? He is not to be regarded as an au-
thoritarian .'''^
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2. Relation to James
We may nov^ ask hov/ much of this point of view V/obber-
min really owes to the influence of James. The general psycho-
logical approach is compatible vdth James's position in The
Will to Believe and The Varieties of Aelij^ious jlxperi ence . But
this is neutral evidence.
Let us first inquire as to the other possible sources
for this trend of thought. As we have already seen, Schleier-
macher himself believed in the psychological approach to the
problana of theology and came very near to Wobbermin's demand
that this psychology be transcendental. The influence of Schlei-
emacher on Y/obbermin in this direction v/as undoubtedly the
first important one, '''4 Julius Kaftan, Wobbermin's teacher at
Berlin, emphasized the empirical as opposed to the dogmatic and
purely historic8.1 aspect of theology and also shov/ed a special
interest in problems of psychology of religion.'''^ Wundt ' s gen-
etic study of religion and Troeltsch's Apriorism were influential
though they received much criticism. Just hov*^ much, then, can
be credited to the influence of James?
In the first place, James's Varieties was the earliest
comprehensive study of psychology of religion. It influenced
V/obbermin sufficiently to lead him to project a systematic treat-
ment of the problem of psychology of religion as an introduction
to his translation, an intention which he was, however, unable
to carry out at that time. He regards the influence of James
as implicit in all his later study of systematic theology and
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of Schleiermacher.'?'? During the period from 1902, v/hen the
Varieties first appeared, to 1913, when Wolobermin published the
first volume of his Syst ematische Theolorge . his relation to
James was very prominent in his writings. He felt that James's
application of the psychological method to the study of religion
7 6
was more satisfactory on the v/hole than that of Schlei ermacher
.
From 1913 on there is a gradual turn away from James, or
at least away from any explicit use of Jaines, and back to Schlei-
ermacher. The second volume of the Syst emati scne TheolOR^ie ,
which appeared in 1921, announced as its purpose:
Zurtick zu Schlei ermacher i und: von Schlei er-
macher aus vorw&rtsl
Jomes was still mentioned frequently, but the problem of his
relation to pragmatism was constantly in the foreground. Wob-
bermin rejects pragmatism, and appears to be really troubled
by this aspect of James's thought. From this time on James's
name is almost wholly dropped. It is mentioned by once in the
third volume of Syst emati sche TheolOp<ie (19 25)^^ and is omitted
in every case where the "religio-psychological" method is dis-
cussed and referred to Scnlei ermacher.
Several explanations of this change are possible. In
the first place, Wobbermin's treatment of Jarnes in Das 7^'esen
deE Reli/g:ion shows that he was increasingly dissatisfied with
James's empiricism.^^ j^^^ first felt that James's method
was a successful escape from the narrow empiricism of most psy-
chologists of religion but he later came to doubt this conclu-
sion. This consequently meant a change in his view of James's
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success in presenting a transcendental psycholOeiy. Scrileier-
macher's analysis came much nearer to Wobbermin' a . Further-
more, the two-fold aspect of the iuetnod of the "relif^i o-psycho-
logical" circle shows the direct influence of Schlei erniacher
,
while James vfery largely omitted the historical side of the
study. His interest in James centered, therefore, in the new
light v/hich James threv/ on the psycholoesi cal side of Schleier-
macher's teachings.
Another ground for the change seems to lie in James's
philosophical development of his early thought. 'Wo'blDermi n ' s
interest vms aroused by the psychological method of The Will to
Beli eve and the Varieties, but James's later writings v/ere in-
creasingly reifiote from tue t nought of V*obbermin and his interest
v/as largely exhausted v/ith the translation of tne Vari eti es and
the meeting of German criticism, James's philosophy had an un-
favorable reception in Germany and Wobbermin's motives for mak-
ing a translation of the Vari eti es were v^idely questioned,
Wobbermin himself feels that his attitude toward James has
not changed and that the influence of James is implicit in his
present treatment of Schlei ermacher and in his systematic tr.eology.^^
We may conclude that Jaiues's influence on Wobbermin's methodology
i.s that of an original imj^etus and a constant undertone but that it
is not a continued source of intellectual guidance.

CHAPTER IV
PRAGMATIC METHOD IK PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGIOK
I
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Wobbermin "believes his ov/n philosophy to be opposed
both to pragmatism and pluralism, tv/o of the most characteris-
tic features of the thought of James, In this chapter v/e shall
consider the problem of pragmatism, leaving the discussion of
pluralism until Chapter V.
Pragmatism is treated by James primarily/ as the method
of finding metaphysical truth and as its criterion. ""Ahile re-
lated to his psychological method of describing consciousness
empirically, it goes beyond the merely psychological. Wobber-
min accepts the psychological method as a necessary basis for
the normative science of religion but regards the pra^atic
method as an inadequate account of the nature of truth,
Wobbermin's interpretation of James is based almost en-
tirely on impressions derived from the latter' s Psychology , The
Will to Believe , and The Varieties of Relif<iQus Experience . Al-
though some few references are made to later vvri tings, ^ they
are used merely in confirmation of Wobbermin's earlier interpre-
tation of James's philosophy and methodology. He has not read
the Essays in Radical Sarpiricism . Some Problems of Philosophy ^
and James's Letters
. In our treatment of James special reference
will be made to the earlier works, but later writings will also
be used wherever they seem to offer the best statement of James's
meaning. This is Justifiable because James's fundamental con-
cepts remained practically constant from the time that he
adopted pluralism under the influence of Renouvier, In The Will
to Believe , his pluralism is stated and pragmatism and radical
empiricism are evident although without the later epi st emologi-
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cal emphasis. His humanistic interest and his attitude toward
religion are also given in characteristic form in tnese early
writings. Wobhermin's criticisms may therefore be tested by
James's thought as a whole.
r
A. THL MEAHIKG OP PRAffiLATISlvl
James's pragmatism has been rather generally misunder
stood, and his ov/n statements of the view vary rEitner v;idely
so that a unified conception of v/nat he really meant is diffi
cult to attain, JLn the first jjlace, pragmatism is for James
a philosophical methodology wnich serves as a protest against
abstract int ellectuali sm. This metriou iu defined as
the attitude of looking away from first
things, principles, 'categories,' sup-
posed necessities; and of looking towards^
last things, fruits, consequences, facts.'^
The rationalism which James mea.nt to attack by means of this
methodology had surely underemphasized the significance of
consequences and empirical facts, James probably overempha-
sized them, but his defense of the empirical method v/as never
theless a valuable contribution to the philosophical thought
of the last twenty- five years.
Pragmatism meant, furtiier, a definite theory of truth
v/hich may be stated briefly in a preliminary form as follows;
True ideas are those that we can assimi-
late, validate, corroborate and verify.
False ideas are those that we cannot,^
This definition implies the dependence of truth upon the indi
vi duals in v/hom the verifying process takes place, a,nd there-
fore makes truth relative and grovd ng,
A third formulation of the pragmatic principle, from
the same volume, is an application of tne theory to religious
truth, though Ja;nes also applied it in this sense to truth in

general.
If theological ideas prove to have a
value for concrete life, they will be
true, for pragmatism, in the sense of
being good for so much, For how much
more they are true, v^fill depend entire-
ly on their relations to the other truths
that also have to be acknowledged.^
Three different elements in the pragmatic doctrine are
brought out by these definitions: first, its concern for the
practical empirical starting point in philosophy and for a
just interpretation of empirical detail; secondly, its view
of truth as in the making; and thirdly, its acceptance of sat-
isfactory consequences as an important (some critics have
said, the only] element in the pragmatic criterion of truth.
We shall consider these points in detail.

1, Empiricism
James's contribution to empiricism is not to be under-
estimated. His pragmatism is a demand that attention be given
to human experience as it is actually lived tlarough and that
no philosophy be accepted v/hich does not meet the facts of
this actual everyday experience. James particularly rebelled
against philosoohi es like that of iSradley which substitute con-
ceptual abstraction for the living reality of the perceptual
world and so "lose the inner secret of its wholeness."'^ In
this he is consciously in harmony with the thought of Bergson.^
Bradley's theory makes immediate experience illusory, a mere-
"patchwork" rather than a "unity like that which the living
perception gave."'^' Bradley escapes skepticism by assuming
beyond the vanishing point of the whole con-
ceptual perspective, an 'absolute* reality,
in which the coherency of feeling and the
completeness of the int ellectual^ideal shall
unite in some indescribable v/ay.
But such a vague Absolute only serves to contradict the most
real thing we have, our own experience, and m.ust be given up
as a useless and untrue metaphysical moiist.er, James's loyal-
ty to experience compelled him to reject such logic as that
employed by Brr.dley and others to prove the Absolute.^
Taking the empirical attitude seriously, tne pragma-
tist tests the truth of his ideas about experience by acting
upon them and seeing whether they lead to tne consequences pre-
dicted. When two rival theories are compared, we can judge
their truth by considering what consequences for future action
flow from each. In the Varieties
. James adopts from British
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philosophy the principle that, if no_ differences can be found
in the consequence-s , the theories may be judged indistinguishable
if not identical. He says,
The guiding principle of British philosophy
has in fact been that every difference must
make a difference, every theoretical differ-
ence somewhere issue in a practical differ-
ence, and that the best method of discussing
points of theory is to begin by ascertaining
what practical difference would result from
one alternative or the other being true.-*^
James applies this test vividly in his Pra^ati sm to
the question vi/hether the w^orld is run by matter or by spirit.
The future alone can offer a solution, James holds, and the
experiment must be an inductive testing of experienced facts,
not a "logical" deduction from abstract categories and first
principles. The question v/hich the pragmatist asks is, Yi/hat
practical difference does it make if the v/orld is run by mat-
ter rather than by spirit?
It makes not a single jot of difference so
far as the past of the world goes, whether
v/e deem it to have been the work of matter
or v/hether we think a divine spirit was its
author . il
Assuming the v/orld to have come to an end, a person looking
back over its course would find all the values that have been
experienced.
The actually experienced world is supposed
to be the same in its details on either hy-
pothesis matter or spirit
... Calling mat-
ter the cause of it retracts no single one
of the items that have made it up, nor does
calling God the cause augment them. 12
If, however, there is a future, the idea of God as causally
active makes all the difference in the world.
f1
123
It guarantees an ideal order that shall be
j-jermanently preserved. A world v/ith a God
in it to say the last v/ord, may indeed burn
up or freeze, but we then think of him as
still mindful of the old ideals and sure to
bring them elsewhere to fiuition; so that,
where he is, tragedy is only provisional and
partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not
the absolutely final things. 13
James later revised his thought somewhat and granted
that by the hypothesis of a God, even in a world which had
come to an end, positive values would be added which would
have been impossible if matter had been the ultimate princi-
ple. Matter is as impotent as an "automatic sweetneai't" to
respond with personal interest and sympathy to human love and
worship. It simply does not "work" pragmatically. Therefore,
regardless of the future, the hypotnesis of a God is pragma-
tically true in so far as it makes a difference which is em-
pirically verifiable. '•'^
James made a very important contribution to philosophy
by his insistence on the search for significant consequences.
Yet there is a difficulty in the method of interpreting ideas
by tracing their practical consequences. Some ideas have no
practial consequences for future action unless the conception
is taken in a very broad sense. Such id^eas, James would say,
v/ould have practical consequences if a situation ever arose
in which we needed to use them. Facts of ancient history, for
instance, may function practically by giving our thinking a
wider orientation and helping us to a better understanding of
the present.
<5
James *s viev; of the empirical character of relations
is also of great significance. It is the insistence that hu-
man experience be taken as a whole and interpreted so that no
empirically given elements are ignored or referred with undue
haste to some metaphysical Absolute, Relations are experienced
and those philosophies which regard this experience as not
empirically given simply have not "been empirical. This whole
question of James's treatment of relations has been taken up in
Chapter I and v/ill be referred to again in Chapter V?-^ It is
mentioned here simply as showing the empirical demands of prag-
matism.
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2, Truth in the Making
This formulation of the pragmatic position is very
difficult to understand fairly because of the ambiguity in the
use of the word "truth." In most ordinary thought truth is
regarded as reference to objective reality, Y»Tien our ideas
describe an object correctly they are said to be true, V/hen
they fail to agree with the object they are untrue. But there
is a true judgment v/hich may alv/ays be made and by which our
imperfect judgments are criticized. Truth, according to this
view, is a logical quality of our ideas as tested by whatever
objective reality they may refer to, James is not satisfied
with this account of truth v^rhich seems to make it a static mat-
ter. He wishes to analyze the situation further and define
just what quality it is that belongs to ideas when we call them
true. This quality seems to be verifiability . An idea is true
when it is verifiable, when it leads to the results predicted.
Against this view it may be argued that verification
adds nothing to the truth of an idea. It merely shows us that
the idea was in the beginning true - or false. If any change
had to be made in the idea in order to make verification pos-
sible, that really amounts to admitting that the original idea
was false and that only a nev/ idea can fulfill the conditions.
Thus the idea has not changed in the process of verification,
but rather our knowledge of its fitness to describe the object
v/hich we mean has grown. Truth is no quality added to the idea,
but rather our knov/ledge of the truth of an idea is another
(\
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judgment, intimately associated with the first.
One reason for James's advocacy of this view of trutn
was the fact that all our knowledge is admittedly so hypotheti-
cal. He thought "by his definition to allov/ for a growing truth.
But it seems to the writer, as to many others, that it is bet-
ter to describe cur present knowledge as largely hypothetical
than to misuse so valuable a conception as that of truth.
The natural inference from the pragmatic theory of a
growing- truth is the assertion that truth is purely an indi-
vidual affair, to which reality need not conform. It is a sub-
jective account of truth based upon the way in which it is ar-
rived at. But James did not accept this inference from his
theory and did his best to convince his critics that his theory,
like theirs, rested on a belief in objective reality. Ke v/as
an epistemological realist.
His realism dominated his dynamic view of nature and of
truth. He did not go to the extreme of denying that there were
many facts v/hich were true objectively and independently of
their verification. He says,
The future movements of the stars or the
facts of past history are determined now
once for all, v/hether I like them or not.
They are given irrespective of my wishes,
and in all that concerns truths like these
subjective preference should have no part;
it can only obscure the judgment
This view is true not only of his early thought as expressed
iri The Will to Believe but also of his mature statement of
pragmatism. In The IJeaning of Truth
, he says that wherever
the verifying process between idea and object is possible

that idea will both be true, and v/ill have
"been true of that object, whether fully de-
veloped verification has taken place or not.
In saying this James makes the possibility of verification
rather than the actual carrying out of tne verifying process
the test of truth. With this most of his critics ¥/ould have
agreed if they had understood him. James does not mean to
deny that there is objective reality or that there is objec-
tive truth. But, as Perry says, 20 his interest is in such
truth as is humanly attainable, and that is admittedly a rel-
ative and growing truth. No two persons agree completely and
it is folly to talk of perfect objective certainty. Some of
our beliefs are better established than others but all are to
a certain extent hypothetical. We may, of course, give up to
skepticism V\rhen we find tnat absolute truth is beyond our
reach. But the practical, and at the saxie time the rational,
attitude to take is one of faith, a faith that our present
knowledge is partly true and that by thinking v/e can gain a
higher degree of certainty. This empirical attitude toward
the problem of knov/ledge is defended by James in The Will to
Believe , He says,
When as empiricists we give up the doc-
trine of objective certitude, v/e do not
thereby give up the quest or hope of truth
itself. We ,,. still believe that we gain
an ever better position towards it by sys-
tematically continuing to roll up experiences
In so far as James is asserting the hypothetical char-
c
acter of finite truth, he is clearly right. The objectionable
aspect of his doctrine of truth as in tne making lies in his
confusion of truth v/ith verification.
/
3. Practical Consequences
The classical definition of truth as tested by con-
sequences is^.
The true ... is only the expedient in the
v/ay of our thinking. 22
Expediency must, hov/ever, be qualified by coiranon sense. It
cannot be based on the iimnediate facts alone but must be that
sort of thinking which in the long run serves best to inter-
pret our experience, Elsewnere James brings the idea, out more
clearly when he says that satisfaction
is assumed to consist of such satisfactions
(in the plural) as concretely existing men
actually do find in their beliefs. As we hu-
mans are constituted in point of fact, we
find that to believe in other men's minds,
in independent physical realities, in past
events, in eternal logical relations, is
satisfactory, ... Above all we find consi s-
t ency satisfactory, consistency betv/een the
present idea and the entire rest of our men-
tal equipment, including the whole order of
our sensations, and that of our intuitions
of likeness and difference, and our whole
stock of previously acquired truths. 23
The inclusion of consistency among the necessary satisfactory
consequences is overlooked by many critics of pragmatism.
James felt emphatically that no belief based on hasty gener-
alizations could be regarded as defensible. It must be tested
in the light of "the entire rest of our mental equipment" in
order to give the type of satisfaction which arises from the
feeling of consistency,
James applied this principle of satisfaction to moral
and religious concepts in particular. It was a statement of
c
the. grounds for belief and practical action as Jarnes first con-
ceived it,^^ The argument is as follows; In many situations
in life there is a genuine alternative hetvi^een positions v/here
no airiount of reasoning will prove conclusively which is true
and right. In such instances it i s the duty of the individual
to act and to "believe in the one that "best satisfies his whole
nature. In many cases faith actually creates the truth be-
lieved in. A man is, for instance, in doubt about his own
power of resisting a particular temptation. If he maintains
this attitude of doubt, he is practically certain to yield. If
on the other hand, he firmly believes in his ov/n pov/ers, he
will in all probability have the necessary moral strength.
There are then cases wnere faith creates
its own verification . Believe, and you
shall be right, for you shall srve your-
self; doubt, and you shall again be right,
for you shall perish. The only difference is
that to believe is greatly to your advan-
tage.
This method is undeniably valid in many moral situations and
also in some physical situations where trie effort of the in-
dividual is involved.
Its application to religion is questionable when it
is made a criterion of religious truth, Religioja by its very
nature demands complete sincerity on the part of its adherents
But religious pragmatism may hold that more satisfactory conse
quences follow fxom belief in God than from disbelief and that
therefore God's existence may be regarded as a true idea, i,e,
satisfactory or expedient. Or it may hold that it is good for
men to believe that God exists, whether there be any objective
Vi
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reality v/hich corresponds to the belief or not. But we must
not charge James with holding the theory in this extreme form.
He says explicitly that he does not mean to urge a comfortable
26
faith v/hich nevertheless contradicts present knov/ledge. In
the definition which we have already quoted, 2''' he does say that
ideas will be true for pragmatism - but in the sense of being
good in some of their effects. That is, pragmatism adiaits that
even false ideas may do some people good, Jiut it does not as-
sert that ideas can be true and false at the same time. Just
how far they are to be regarded as true depends on their rela-
tion to other acknowledged truths. This demand for a con-
sideration of all acknowledged truths is an indication that,
with all his pluralism, James yet felt the need to take reali-
ty as a whole and not merely piecemeal.
Some sort of belief about religion is necessary, for
absolute demonstration in this sphere is impossible, men must
either accept the hypothesis that there is a God or that there
isn't or suspend Judgment forever. In the case of some hy-
potheses it is permissible to remain in uncertainty until the
evidence is in.
Throughout the breadth of physical nature
facts are what they are quite independently
of us, and seldom is there any such hurry
about them that the risks of being duped by^
believing a premature theory need be faced,
But in a matter like belief in God, a man's duty is to examine
the evidence as far as it is possible for him to do so and then
to commit himself to the viev/ that seems most reasonable. The
point v/hich James v/ishes to emphasize is the duty of men to
/r
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make definite choices in those "living options" which are of
fundamental significance to their lives and in which no amount
of v/ciiting will bring absolute demonstration, and wnere all
prolonged v^raiting means so much loss of j.josciiole value. In
the light of this situation James constructed what he called
his " faith-ladder, "S'^
This pnase of pragmatism has much in common vdth iiant ' s
primacy of the practical reason and Karl Bus ch says,
Der Pragmatismus ... i st ein otiefcruder
des ir'rimats der praktischen Vernunft.-^l
JSant had shovved the hypothetical character of the deliverances
of the pure theoretical reason and asserted the supremacy of
the practical or moral, Fichte, Lotze, and Kitschl all em-
phasized this same imperative character of moral reason, and
wobbennin also lays great weight on moral concepts.
In a recent article on "Wagnis ira (ilauben, Vi/obber-
min has given an appreciative statement of J arnes ' s pragmatism
with which vve shall close this section,
Y/illiam James hat einst eine kleine ychrift
unter dem Titel The will to B'elievt ... ver-
{)ff entlicht , die zu dem Best en gehort, v/as
der beruhmte Psychologe nberhaupt geschrieben
hat, i:er Glaube, von dem James hier spricht,
ist nicht der spezifisch religiOse, geschweige
denn der spezifisch christliche Cilaube, ±is
ist vielmehr der Glaube, vd e er in aller Welt-
anschauung v/irksam ist, auch wenn sie keine
bev/usste Beziehung zu Religion hat - der Glaube
als willensmSLssige Entscheidung in lebensv/i ch-
tigen Angelegenheit en, Solch v/illensmassige
Entscheidung exi st enti eller Art ist aber auch
im religiSsen, zumal im Christ lichen Glauben
ein bedeutsames Element, So sehr der Glaube
im Sinne des Christ entuma seiner eigenen !fber-
zeugung gemass reines Gnadengeschenk Gottes
ist, so gev/iss ist er doch anderseits immer
zugleich freier Akt des Giaubigen.'^'^
•m
B. THE PLACE OF PRAGMATISM IN JAIJES'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Y/o'b'bermin "believed that James's pragmatism not only
could but also must toe separated completely from his psychol-
ogy of religion if the Ititter was to serve as an adequate
method for philosophy of religion.*^"^ Y/ohhermin felt that in
the Vari eti es James's psychological methodology stood in no
necessary relation to his pragmatism, and he omitted from his
translation the "Postscript" which sketched James's pluralis-
tic-pragmatic metaphysics. He has been very generally criti-
cized for this omission which seems to be based on personal
prejudice against the thoughts expressed and not to have sci-
entific justification,"^' Ymndt in particular criticized him
most harshly both for seeking to introduce pragmatism into
German philosophy of religion and for omitting the "Post-
script" v/hich, according to him, is the very key to the entire
work. In explaining the second, vVundt writes,
Deutsche Theologen ... haben dem Pragma-
tismus, wenn nicht in j eder Beziehung, so
doch vor allem in dem, was man seine Re-
ligi onspsychologi e genannt hat, ihre An-
erkennung gezollt. Nun i st freilich weder
die Psychologie im allgemeinen noch die
Religionspsychologie insbesondere ein aus
der gesamten Philosophie des Pragraatismus
loszulOsendes Gebiet. Sie ist das eigent-
lich ebensowenig, v/ie man etwa Hegel
s
Lehre vom "subjektiven Geiste" aus seinem
System herausnehmen und als^ selbstSlndige
Psychologie behandeln darf.36
Wobbermin's originally stated purpose of arousing in-
terest in psychology of religion did not cormnit him to James's
pragmatic philosophy and his introduction to the translation
(
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of the Vari et i es clearly stated his anti-pragmati c .sentiments.
Therefore Vi/undt ' s first criticism is certainly unjust,
Yvundt ' s further criticism that it is only through prag-
matism that an adequate understanding of James's isychology
can be gained and that the two cannot he separated, is, if
true, more important. According to Y/undt ' s claim,
die deutschen Theologen, die den Pragmati s-
mus gleichzeitig rezipierten und von ihm
abstrahi ert en, hah en daher selbst erst jene
Mat eriali ensamnilung zu einer Religions-
psychologie gemacht, v>ras sie weder ihrem
Ursprung nach sein sollte, noch ihrem Wesen
nach sein kann,*^^
Two questions are involved in the problem set by Wundt : first,
as to James's intention in the Vari eti es ; and secondly, as to
the possibility of deriving from the book a psychological meth-
odology which is independent of pragmatism.
In regard to the first we may ask whetner James really
meant to make the entire Varieties an exposition of his phil-
osophy of religion rather than a psychological study. A ref-
erence to his Letters is significant here. In 1899, v/hile he
was working on the Gifford Lectures, he wrote that he intended
the first series to be an objective study and the second
my own last will and testament, setting
forth the philosophy'- best adapted to nor-
mal religious needs,
His intention, therefore, was to fulfill both the psychological
and the philosophical objectives but, in the actual working out
of the lectures, his psychological material went beyond his
original expectations and his "Postscript" is the only clear
indication of the philosophy of religion which he hoped to pre-
sent there but had to reserve for later exposition,
<(
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"Wobbemin is therefore right in so far as James failed
to fulfill his second purpose in these lectures. He does not
deny that Jaines himself had a distinct interest in the philo-
sophical outcome of his psychology of religion. Yet, as V/ob-
bermin says, it is The Hill to Believe which furnishes the
point of transition between the psychology of the Vari et i es
and James's later pragmatic philosophy. ^1 Wobbermin is, how-
ever, at fault in so far as he ignores other pragmatic-plural-
istic elements which appear scattered through the Vari eti es .
These are included in the translation and, in some cases, are
given a more pragmatic coloring than the original seems to de-
mand,
Wobbermin is also right in holding that Vis it possi-
ble to de-rive from James a psychological methodology v/hich is
consistent and which may be used independently of his meta-
physical conclusions. The empirical method of studying the
data of immediate religious experience, sketched in the pre-
ceding chapter, is in general a fair interpretation of Jameses
psychological intent as expressed in the Vari eti es . There is
no objective necessity for reading this empirical methodology
pragmatically. The pragmatic element is a very minor point,
and William Stern is correct in saying,
Zweifellcs liegt der eigentliche Vi/'ert des
Werkes im Psychologi schen,43
Wundt ' s criticisms cannot be maintained.
There remains, hov/ever, the further question as to the
relation of pragmatism to James's philosophy of religion. There
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is little doubt that, although James agreed to the omission of
the "Post script , "^^ It contained suggestions of the metaphysi-
cal interest which was central in his thought on religion. The
pragmatic aspect was particularly prominent in his earlier wri-
tings tout is also to toe seen in his "faith- ladder" and in his
assertions atoout "life exceeding logic, ""^^ both of which appear
in A Pluralistic Universe .
James hoped toy the otoj ective psychological method of
the Vari eti es to discover the common needs of the religious
life and so to make possitole a philosophy "toest adapted" to
meeting these needs, The pragmatic emphasis on the adapta-
tion of philosophy to needs is unfortunate tout doutotless should
toe taken in connection vv^ith the argument, in The Yall to .deli eve
,
that our religious needs as well as our scientific needs may
point to real aspects of the structure of the universe.
The inner need of toelieving that this world
of nature is a sign of something more spirit-
ual and eternal than itself is just as strong
and authoritative in those v/ho feel it, as
the inner need of uniform lav/s of causation
ever can toe in a professionally scientific
head. The toil of many generations has proved
the latter need prophetic, V/liy may not the
former one toe prophetic, too? And if needs of
ours outrun the visible uniiserse, why may not
that be a sign that an invisitole universe is
there? What, in short, has authority, to de-
bar us from trusting our religious demands?
Science as such assuredly has no authority,
for she caja only say what is, not what is
not; and the agnostic "thou shalt not believe
without coercive sensible evidence" is simply
an expression (free to any one to make) of
private personal appetite for evidence of a
peculiar kind. 47
This is far from a dogmatic assertion that we should believe
practically in a world which Y<ie knov/ theoretically to be unreal.
t
Wobbermin reaches the same conclusion by a more critical route
in his argument for the moral proof of the existence of God.'^^
We may conclude, then, that, while the psychological
method of the Varieties may justifiably be taken in isolation
from the metaphysical aspects of the volume, for Jajaies the pur-
pose of the book was not exhausted in its psychology of re-
ligion but was essentially the purpose to lay the foundations
for a pragmatic-pluralistic philosophy of religion.
« I t
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C, WOBBMOK'S CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISil
WoTobermin did not distinguish betv/een the various em-
phases in James's i:iragmatism but considered it as a whole and
felt himself completely out of sympathy with tue theory involved.
He did not regard James's empiricism as pragmatic, though it
was clearly a phase of the pragmatic philosophy in James's own
thought, Wobbermin . . thoroughly agreed v/ith James on the im-
portance of experience as over against dogma of any kind. Yet
he felt a difficulty in tue use of the term "empirical" to de-
scribe the method of either Jaaies or Schlei ennacher , Both
were unclear on the matter,
James spricht auch von "rein empirischer
Phi losoi^hi e" und fflhlt sich mit seinem Prag-
matismus als Vertreter solcher empirical phil-
osophy. Dieser in seinem strengen Vi/'ortlaut
vttllig v^^idersinnige Begriff Iftsst aber andrer-
seits erkennen, was James in beiden Fallen mit
dem Terminus empirisch zum Ausdruck bringen
will. Es ist das grundsS-tzliche Zurttckgehen
auf die Erfalirung, das er durch j enen Begriff
festzulegen sucht, Und dieser Grundsatz ge-
staltet sich dann also fttr das religiOse Ge-
biet zu dem des Rttckganges auf die religiOse
Erfc-ihrung,49
In so far as pragmatism means appeal to inner experience, "Wob-
bermin accepts it. But he felt that James laid too great weight
on the empirical, particularly in drav\fing his pluralistic meta-
physical conclusions,
Wobbermin adds little to the general criticism of James's
conception of a relative and grov/ing truth. He recognized, of
course, the relativity of human knov/ledge but was unv/illing to
abandon absolute truth as an ideal or to confuse truth and
cc
knowledge. In discussing his Yiew of faith as ethically con-
ditioned personal conviction he says,
Von dieser Position aus . muss ich alien
Eogrnati smus ablehnen, andererseits aber
auch alien endgttltigen und ahsoluten Rela-
tivismus ablehnen, so sehr ich den emj-.iri-
schen Relativismus schatze und tlherall
durchzuftthren entschlossen bin. 50
He admits the importance of empirical relativism but rejects
absolute relativism. James, on the other hand, finds the con-
ception of a growing universe and a growing God more accepta-
ble.
But it was with the concept of practical consequences
as a test of religious truth that Wobbermin felt the greatest
difficulty. Ke interpreted James's view of truth as that which
satisfies in the narrow sense of immediate satisfaction of de-
sires. But truth, he said, m.ust not be confused with any sub-
jective interest in its attainment, A concept may be practical
and yet be totally false. In his criticism of Haeckel, Wobber-
min expresses this criticism, showing that the tneoretical in-
terest in truth and the ideal of truth grow gradually in the
race but that, once trie ideal is recognized, it stands forever
afterward in its own right and independent of practical inter-
est s.^'^ Pragmatism, however, according to V/obbemiin, is will-
ing to take the interest in truth without any epi st emological
criticism and make it constitutive for religion,
Die methodische Verwertung des V^ahrheits-
interesses darf also nicht ohne Weiteres
in irgend eine Art phi losophi scher Wahr-
heit sbegiilndung umgesetzt werden. In die-
sen Pehler ist z,B. William James verfal-
len, indem er die besprocnene V ervi^echsel-
ung benutzt, urn seinen sog. Pragniciti smusm die religionsphilosophische Arbeit ein-
zutragen.53
cc
This treatment of the problem of truth is not, Wobbermin holds,
a necessary consequence of the psychological method but re-
sults from a certain confusion in James's thought,
James will durch seine reli gionsp sycholo-
gischen Unt ersuchungen sogar einen ganz
direkt en Beitrag zur Yi/'ahrheit sfrage lie-
fern, so dass bei James gerade diese di-
rekt e Art, sozusagen eine "reli gi onspsy-
caologi sche" Entscheidung der Vi/ahrheits-
frage zu versuchen, zu beanstanden ist.
Denn diese einfache Einschiebung des
ganz en Problems der 'wahrhei tsfPage in die
Religionspaychologi e beruht auf j enem von
James so befttrwort et en irragmati smus, der
eine unklare Grenzvermischung zwischen
Psychologie, Erkenntni skritik und Meta-
physik bedeutet.^^
.Wobbermin is clearly right in holding that. James's
treatment of pragmatism sets no clear boundaries. The various
definitions discussed earlier in the present chapter are an in-
dication of this fact. But it seems to the v/riter that V/obber-
min is wrong in asserting that James puts his psychology in the
55
service of his pragmatism. He derives from his psychological
study certain metfcphysical implications but in so doing he is
consciously going beyond the realm of psychology. V/obbennin
does the same thing in his "transcendental psychology" and so
must all metaphysics unless psychology it^ to oe left as an iso-
lated science v/ith no contributions to make to our knowledge
of reality, Vvobbermin's difficulty may in part arise from his
laying too exclusive emphasis on James's psychological phase,
James intended his accourjt of truth to be purely logical,
and did not mean his theory of interest to be taken in the
sense of an illusionism v/hich substitutes practicality for
fc
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truth.
James felt in the end that his cnoice of the word
"pragmat ism" was unfortunate and tried in a letter to uickin-
son Ivliller to explain vi^hat he meant, using beans on a table to
ward which various possible attitudes that may be taken, de-
pending upon interest and yet equally true. He concludes by
saying,
All that Schiller and I contend for is tnat
there is fto_ "truth" without some interest
,
and that non-int ellectua.l interests play a
part as well as intellectual ones. Vvhere-
upon we are accused of denying the beans,
or denying being in anyway constrained by
them'. It's too silly'.57
wobbermin recognized this objective demand in Jmnes's pragma-
tism and defended him against the chai'ge of holding to such il
lusionism as, for' example, is found in Vaihinger's als-ob
theory.
Die entschiedene (ielt endmachung des Kriteri-
ums der Brauchbarkeit una Mtzlichkeit rtickt
diese Philosoj^uie des als-ob m die nftchste
Kfihe des Pragmatismus. Sie unuerscneidet sich
v~on letzterem aber durch das Gewichtlegen aui
die bev/usste Falscliheit der betrefienden An-
nahme, Speziell fttr das Gebiet der Religion
ttberwiegt dieser Unterschied die formale Ana-
logue durchaus, Aus persbnlicher Berflhrung
mit William James weiss ich, dass seine eigene
Stellung zur Religion und seine ganze Denk-
weise in Sachen der Religion eine total andere
war, als diejenige der Philosophie des als-ob.
Er meinte, durch seinen an der 5'rage nach der
praktischen Bewfthrung orientierten Pragmatis-
mus zugleich auch die Wahrheit der Religion
wi ssenschaftlich vertreten zu kOnnen.'^S
Although James did not go so far as the als-ob philosophy,
IJ/obbermin still felt that he laid too great weight on prac-
tical verification, and explicitly rejected the pragmatic
c
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account, although he sav/ in it a distinct improvement on the
irrational position of Vaihinger and said,
In di eser Jiinsicht hat William James mit
seinem scharfen Blick ftlr die Lebensv/irk-
lichkeit viel klarer gesehen, und er ver-
tritt mit seinem Pragmatismus eine zwar an-
fechtbare, weil einseitige, aoer praktisch
viel "bedeut samere Position als der Begrttn-
der der Philosophic des "als-oh,"^^
This interpretation and partial defence of James is
evidence of a grovang understanding of James. It appears in
the second volume of the Systemati sche Theolo^ie (1921), Wob-
"bermin's attack on pragmatism in his introductions to the
Varieties and in his polemic writings between 1907 and 1914
shov/s much less appreciation of Jajnes's insistence on sincer-
ity in belief. Both James and Wobbermin felt that religious
experience v/ould be of no value whatever to the individual if
he were convinced of its objective illusoriness. As Wobber-
min puts this.
Religiose Erfahrung ohne die sen Wahrheits-
anspruch ist nicht mehr religittse Lrfahrung
im Sinne echter Religion. Eine Lrfaiirung,
die sich als religiiJse bezeichnen Oder be-
zeichnen lassen wollte, ohne dass sie einen
solchen Anspruch auf Wahrheit sgeltung er-
hObe, die v/a,re v/ie ein Messer ohne Klinge.^^
With this James v/ould have agreed perfectly although Wobber-
min and other critics have not always recognized the fact.^l
James does not deny the necessity of belief in the truth of
religion in order that it may have value. His fundamental
thought is not that we should believe in religion because it
gives us temporary and superficial satisfaction but ratner
because it gives the most reasonable satisfaction as an ex-
planation of all our experience. He says,
Philosophy and Religion have to interpret
the total character of the world. ^2

Mttller-Freienfels has defended Jaines against the
charge of cheap practicalism in his book on Die Fhilosophie
des 20. Jahrhundert
s
.
In der Tat hat Jaines sicherlich nie an^
die gemeine Ntttzlichkeit bei seiner Theo-
rie gedacht , sondern vor allem an j ene
feineren, seelischen Hotwendigkeit en und
Befri edigungen die uns einer Theorie ge-
neigt machen, und zu denen z.B. auch der
Wunsch nach Aufhebung von Widersprttchen
und der nach mOglichster KLarheit der Be-
griffe gehOrt, Auch die geistige Harmonie
zSLhlt ja zu den vitalen Bedtlrfni ssen, und
so lassen sich die feinsten Probleme des
Denkens, die weitab von allem banalen
Nutzen liegen, in die pragmati sti schen
Theorie einordnen.^*^
V/obbermin comes nearer to James's position on belief
than he seems to realize when, in his early v/ri tings, he ana-
lyzes sense experience and religious experience and points out
the gaps in each which must be bridged by faith. He admits
also, in the quotation given above, that in religious exper-
ience we have a truth-claim ( Wahrheit sanspruch ) rather than ob-
jective certainty. Nevertheless he e^oes beyond Jaines in his
feeling of the certainty of the religious consciousness of God
as opposed to the hypothetical knowledge vifhich we have of the
external world.
Der religiose Glaube ist in keiner V/eise
eine Hypothese. Sondern er ist eben eine
innerlich-persOnliche, ethisch bedingte
TJberzeugung. Und zv/ar eine Uberzeugung,
die - wenigstens der Uberzeugung nach -
gerade herausftihrt aus dem ganzen Gebiet
des Hypotheti schen und hineinftlhrt in die
Sphere der absoluten 'A'ahrheit, weil der
absoluten Wirklichkeit .^^
Religious experience, he says, is unlike other experience in
that it is direct contact with truth itself.

Die metaphysische Weltanschauung sucht
die Wahrheit; und wo sie sich der Grenzen
menschli Chen Denkens bewusst wird, sucht
sie nur teilweise V/ahrheit und AnnSLherung
an die Waiirheit. Die Religion aber lebt -
ihrer Uberzeugung nach - in der V/ahrheit
und aus der Walirheit heraus. ReligiOse
Erfahrung v/ill, sov/eit ihr eigentlich re-
ligittser Gharakter reicht, Lrfahrung der
Vi/aiirheit sein,^^
The parenthetical "ihrer Uberzeugung nach" is a suggestion
that in this context all the evidence for the conviction had
not been given, but it does not indicate any real doubt on
the part of Wobbermin as to its truth. Metaphysics only seeks
truth and is limited by the nature of finite consciousness.
But religion is an iromediate experiencing of truth and reali-
ty. The transcendent world of religious faith is the true
v/orld, the world of absolute reality and absolute value. Corn-
pared v/ith this realm the external world is only phenomenal."'''
Vi/hile Vvobbermin believes that he has rejected pragma-
tism he has incorporated in his own thought some of its impor-
tant ideas.

SUMMARY
In the present chapter v/e have analyzed tae concept of
pragmatism. Three phases are evident in James's thought. In
the first place, pragmatism is that philosophical method which
seeks to take all of experience into account. It is, secondly,
the theory that all our present truth is relative and growing.
And finally, it is tne viev/ that our truth is tested by conse-
quences.
While WolDhermin intended to reject Jameses pragmatism,
he adopted its empirical aspect, accepted relative truth so
far as the empirical order vtras concerned, and appealed to sat-
isfactory consequences in the sense of those beliefs wiiich
meet religious needs.
In regard to the omission of uhe "Postscript" from V/'ob-
bermin's translation, the critics are right in saying that it
represented James's primary interest and tnat a translation
should be as complete as possible. But V/obbermin is correct
in holding that James's psychological methodology can be taken
independently of his pragmatism.
James's pragmatism is to be criticized for confusing
truth with knowledge and for not distinguishing clearly iiis
transitions from psychology to epistemology and from epistem-
ology to metaphysics. But James does not hold to illusionism
or practicalism. Kis demand for satisfactory consequences is
a demand that every truth-claim be tested by the whole system
of experience, including moral consciousness, and that nothing
be regarded as true which does not satisfactorily meet the
conditions set by the whole system of ideas.

CHAPTER V
THE PROBLE'iL 0? FLURALISLI
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On the question of metaphysics James and Y/obbermin
differed. James's point of view was pluralistic, although in
his later thinking he made some concessions to aosolutism, Yvob-
bermin's metaphysics is essentially monistic, in spite of "his
objection to this teminology . Both James and Y^obbermin a-
void the term "idealism" as descriptive of their thought be-
cause of its absolutistic connotations. James often speaks
of idealism, meaning absolute idealism, and criticizes it
most vigorously. He distinguishes his ovi/n point of view from
naturalism or materialism by calling it spiritualism^ or rad-
ical empiricism. 3 He rejects a dualistic spiritualism which
separates God from the v/orld and spirit from matter.^ In
place of this view, which he ascribes to orthodox theism,^
he takes the pantheistic position which puts God and man in
relations of intimacy. But a further distinction must be
made in order to give room to pluralism. Pantheistic spiritu-
alism must be divided into monistic and pluralistic types.'''
Y?hat James seems to be trying to say is that reality is all of
the same character (vs. dualism), that thi s character is men-
tal (vs. materialism), but that v/ithin this substantial homo-
geneity there must be recognized a plurality of individual
forms - "caches," persons, and things-(vs. absolutism). James
is vague as to the status of things, sometimes describing his
view as natural realism. The same is true of Y.obbermin's
account of things. He claims empirical dualism within an
1 (
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ontologically mentalistic monism, but does not give a clear
metaphysics of nature. They agree in accepting mentalism, in
opposing monistic pantheism, 8.nd in regarding personality as
of supreme importance.
The present chapter will consider these tv/o metaphysi-
cal positions v/ith special reference to their implications for
philosophy of religion. It v/ill propose through\.thi s study to
discover the nature and extent of the influence of James's
metaphysics on Wohbemiin. .

A. JAIffiS'S PLURALISTIC l^ETAFKYSICS
Pluralism v/as originally a protest against absolutism
of all kinds. It declares reality to be made up of many in-
dividual parts which could never be included in any "all-one"
or absolute. It is an assertion of tne externality of rela-
tions as opi-osed to the internality of relations claimed by
monistic philosophies. James says,
Lverything you can think of, however vast
or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view
a genuinely 'external' en'vironment of some
sort or amount. Things are 'with' one an-
other in many ways, but nothing includes
everything, or dominates over everything.
The word 'and' trails along after every sen-
tence. Something always escapes. *Ever not
quite' has to be said of the best attempts
made anyv»/here in the universe at attaining
all-inclusiveness . The pluralistic v/orld is
thus more like a federal republic than like
an empire or a kingdom. However much may be
collected, however much may report itself as
present at any eff (active centre of conscious-
ness or action, something else is self-gov-
erned and absent and unreduced to unity. ,.,
j?or pluralism, all that we are required to
admit as the constitution of reality is v^htxt
we ourselves find empirically realized in
every minimum of finite life. Briefly it is
this, that nothing real is absolutely simple,
that every smallest bit of experience is a
multum in parvo plurally related .., 10
James's pluralistic philosophy had its origin in his general
empirical attitude, but he also found support for it in epis-
temology and metaphysics.
t I
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1, Empirical Basis
Experience as it comes to us is made up of particulars
which seem to stand out against each other as distinct indi-
viduals. James speaks of the "empirical sand-heap of the
world, "^''* and feels that philosophy must account for this mul-
tiplicity and distinctness as well as for the order v/hich is
revealed in its relations. Absolutism fulfills the latter func-
tion at the expense of the former.
James's rebellion against all absolutisms is well shown
in his attitude toward absolute pluralism. In his Pra^iatism
he asserts thett the pragmatic philosophy
must equally abjure absolute monism and
absolute pluralism. 12
An absolute pluralism or positivistic empiricism would fail as
badly as an absolute monism or idealism in reaching the real
truth about the world we live in. We find countless differences
and yet we have to go beyond mere empiricism for the adequate
explanation of them. Simply centering attention on particulars
as they come leads to chaos and not to philosophy.
All the magnificent achievements of mathe-
matical and physical science - our doctrines
of evolution, of uniformity of law, and the
rest - proceed from our indomitable desire to
cast the v/orld into a more rational shape in
our minds than the shape into v/hich it is
thrown there by the crude order of our exper-
ience. The world has shov/n itself, to a great
extent, plastic to this demand of ours for
rationality. How much farther it will show it-
self plastic no one can say. Our only means
of finding out is to try; and I, for one, feel
as free to try conceptions of moral as of me-
chanical or of logical rationality . 13

This is a modified empiricism "but one that can he ra-
tionally defended. It makes no dogmatic assertions about the
nature of reality but offers a hypothetical method which has
proved successful in the ordering^; of our experience. This
method is particularly significant for religion since it sug-
gests that we may start from the empirical basis of our moral
experience and test the realities which it implies. This at-
titude has much in common v/ith Wobbermin's int erpret,ation of
the place of the empirical in religion and its implications
for a science of religion. -^^
Much empiricism is materialistic but James opposes ma-
terialism as strenuously as does Wobbermin, Ke says,
Pragmati sip, devoted though she be to facts,
has no such materialistic bias as ordinary
empiricism labors under. -'-^
Materialism is just as one-sided as rationalism. Both ignore
part of experience; the one leaving out the facts of inner
consciousness v/hile the other overlooks the external world and
much of the experience of finite persons, James and Wobbeniun
are keen critics of any partial philosophy. They take person-
al consciousness as the key to philosophy and analyze it rig- •
orously, but not atomistically. The philosophy which they
construct on the basis of their psychological methodology me-
diates betv/een the two absolutist ic extremes,
James's pluralism seems to lead to a "multiverse" in
v/hich unity is problematic. Things exist di stributively and
are in innumerable and changing relations which, according to
him, are of "the strung-along type." But even on this view,
r
which makes the "each-form" fundamental, unity is possible.
If the each-form Toe the eternal form of re-
ality no less than it is the form of tempo-
ral appearance, we still have a coherent
world, and not an incarnate incoherence, as
is charged by so many absolutists. Our 'mul-
tiverse*- still makes a 'universe'; for every
part, tho it may not be in actual or immediate
connexion, is nevertheless in some possible
or mediated connexion, with every other part
however remote. 1'''
James holds that this view preserves the manyness of concrete-
ly felt experience and at the same time provides through its
"radical" empiricism the unity which rationalists have claimed
1&
to be 'fe. property only of the absolute v/hole of things."
James also differs both from monistic materialism and
monistic idealism on the score of determinism. Monism logi-
cally leads to complete determinism. Materialism gives a caus
al determinism in which the whole future can unroll only as
the past has ordered. The chain can nowhere be broken. Abso-
lute idealism, on the other hand, teaches a block-universe wit!
in a timeless Absolute, But any type of determinism contra-
dicts experienced facts (our feeling of choice, free will, etc
and cannot be accepted v/ithout further evidence. The problem
of freedom as such v/ill be considered in greater detail later
in this chapter. The point which is relevant in the present
connection is that experience counts against belief in deter-
mi ni sm
.
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2. Epistemological ArgTtments
Absolutism has "based its argument for monism largely
upon epistemological reasoning. It has held thai relations
among the objects of our experience can "be explained only if
we assume an A'bsolute in which those relations ixist. Other-
wise, they argue, it would be impossible for us to experience
them at all for they are admittedly not alv/ays present in our
experience and many of them we never have experienced. But,
according to idealism, nothing exists outside conscious exper-
ience. Therefore an Absolute is necessary to preserve the ra-
tional order of the universe. The absolutists are, says James,
too much influenced by the empiricist, Hume. They believe him
when he says that relations are not experienced. As a matter
of fact, Hume's analysis of experience is false, "Si/e experience
relations just as truly as terms related, Uo absolute is needed,
therefore, to make relations possible. And the very multiplici-
ty of the relations so exx:;eri cnced makes pluralism more proba-
ble. 19
James is an epistemological dualist, holding that in
the act of knowing our ideas refer to objects which are exter-
nal to our consciousness, known by inference and not immediate-
ly. In his famous "Tigers in India, "'^^ James illustrates this
point. Our ideas are one set of facts and the tigers are an-
other. The pointing of the former to the latter is v/hat is
meant by knowing and demands no identity of idea and object so
long as a connecting world of experience is granted.

The ideas and the tigers are in them-
selves as loose and separate, to use
Hume's language, as any two things can
he; and pointing means here an opera-
tion as external and adventitious as
any that nature yields, 21
Some of our experience is, of course, iminediate. Our feelings
are imjnediate though the recognized cause of them is often ob-
jective rather than subjective. The case for absolutism de-
pends on the acceptance of an ultimate epi stemological monism,
the view that idea and object are identical for absolute knowl
edge. However, since James and Yi/'obbermin agree in rejecting
epi st emological monism, a discussion of it is not relevant in
this connection.

3. Relie^lous Significance of Pluralism
Busch points out that there are two lines of thought
that led James toward pluralism. lAe have just considered the
2
empiri co-logical and we now turn to the voluntaristic- ethical.
Ethical and religious considerations were very signifi-
cant in James's earliest formulation of a pluralistic metaphy-
sics, and he never gave up this position. As he tried to in-
terpret experience he felt that certain demands were made hy
the moral nature which the universe must satisfy or show very
good reasons for denying, Freedom is one of these demands, and
there are some philosophies v/hich either deny its reality or
make it seriously problematic, IJhile most thinkers have given
freedom some place, monistic philosophies have had to hedge it
in with so many limitations that it ceases to have much moral
significance, James, on the other hand, shows that determin-
ism destroys the meaning of such distinctions as that between
good and evil. It is only by the hypothesis of freedom that
we are justified in dividing the world into good and bad parts
and in standing by the former, ^3 if it v/ere completely de-
termined, we could not call anything bad for it v/ould be mere-
ly what had to be under the circumstances.
Yet James does not argue for a universe of complete
chance. That ?/ould be to exclude the possibility of a v^rise and
loving God, to which objection he replies,
The belief in free-will is not in the least
incoiupatible with the belief in Providence,
provided you do not restrict the Providence
r
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to fulminating nothing but fatal decrees.
If you allow him to provide possibilities
as v/ell as actualities to the universe,
and to carry on his own thinking in those
two categories just as v/e do ours, chances
may be there, uncontrolled even by him,
and yet the end of all things may be just
what he intended it to be from all eterni-
ty. 24
The la,st phrase grants more certainty of the outcome than James
was usually willing to admit and is not fully representative of
25his later thought.
Theism has presented much this view for religious faith.
Its God is a wise and good person v/ho v;ills the moral develop-
ment of finite persons and finds such development best achieved
through the exercise of choice on the part of these finite per-
sons. The provision of such genuine alternatives for finite
choice does not necessarily mean a universe of chaos, For
traditional theism, the final outcome is determined and all
things gradually work toward it. And even for revised theism
of the kind James accepts, there are certain fields in which
choice is practically imj,-ossible, as for instance in tnc case
of natural lav/s. Here man cannot choose to have things dif-
ferent from what they are, but he may still choose v/nether to
obey or not to obey them. The consequences of either type of
conduct are inevitable.
In moral and social fields alternatives are far more
numerous and varied, effects less easily predictable, s.nd ul-
timate consequences generally more significant. An individual
or a group may decide upon a social policy and carry it out to
rc
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the extent of bringing social disaster. The present world sit-
uation offers suggestive material for such reflection. Choices
are being made freely which lead to militarism in France, to
Fascism in Italy, to internal friction in Germany, and to pro-
vincialism in America. The absolute God of traditional theism
is difficult to reconcile with such a world situation. Con-
siderations similar to these led James to the conclusion that,
if there be a God, he must be finite,
James regarded God as limited not only by human free
will, as theism has readily admitted, but also by nature. In
The V/ill to Believe , he says explicitly,
We of the nineteenth century, with our evo-
lutionary theories and our mechanical pnil-
osophies, already know nature too impartial-
ly and too well to worship unreservedly any
God of whose character she can be an ade-
quate expression. Truly, all we iaaow of
good and duty proceeds from nature; but
none the less so all we know of evil. Visi-
ble nature is all plasticity and indiffer-
ence, - a moral multiverse, as one might
call it, and not a moral universe. ... If
there be a divine Spirit of the universe,
nature, such as we knovi^ her, cannot possi-
bly be its ultimate word to man. 26
This same problem recurs in James's Pluralistic Universe where
he describes the difficulties which arise from every form of
monism and which "a frankly pluralistic theism escapes." Monism
introduces a speculative 'problem of evil'
namely, and leaves us v/ondering why the per-
fection of the absolute should require just
such particular hideous forms of life as
darken the day for our human imaginations. 2'
Orthodox theology has been content only when it could
claim for its God perfection in every attribute. It has
thought that God must be omnipotent, omniscient^ and omnipres-
r
ent as well as perfectly good. It i s evident that some of
these attributes are overdrawn if the facts of experience are
to be taken seriously. Many sincerely religious people have
declared that these four attributes must be true and have,
therefore, maintained that the world of experience was merely
phenomenal in so far as it raised contradictions. But if the
divine power is absolute and if the divine being is all-v;ise,
he must know and will the evils of our existence, and no in-
tellectual aid is offered by relegating these experiences to
a phenomenal order. The omnipotence of God can be maintained
only at the expense of his perfect goodness, '^^
Yet goodness, in James's thougiit , is the essential at-
tribute of God, if there be a God; and the choice, so far as
religion is concerned, must be between a moral God and no God
at all. To try to maintain the attribute of omnipotence i s»
he feels, either to give up reasoning in religion and to reat
on blind faith, or else it is to give up the God of religious
experience for some philosophical conception of the whole of
things, possessing unlim.it ed power but seriously limited in
goodness. In stating this moral critique of traditional the-
ology, James is consciously reiterating Mill's criticism of
the notion of omnipotence, v/hich he says must be given up if
God is to be maintained as a religious object. Though James
v/as never dogmatic regarding the existence of God, he thought
that his philosophy gave reason for believing in the existence
of a morally good but finite God. To critics of pragmatism
he said.
r
<
r
159
When I tell you that I have written a "book
on men's religious experience, which on the
whole has been regarded as making for the
reality of God, you v/ill perhaps exempt my
own pragmatism from the charge of being an
atheistic system. I firmly disbelieve, my-
self, that our human experience is the hign-
est form of experience extant in the uDi-
verse. ... V/e may well believe, on the proofs
that religious experience affords, that high-
er powers exist and are at Vi^ork to save the
world on ideal lines similar to our ov/n,31
Among the proofs which religious experience gives, James listed
the mystic's direct evidence of God v/hich is, for the mystic,
X p
s.uthoritative. For non-mystics the best evidence is to be
found in the demands of moral insight and the differences vmich
can be found in experience on tne hypothesis of a God.-^-^
Only a pluralistic philosophy offers a God v/orthy of
worship, James believes,^"^ Pluralism is compatible with the
view that God is one among many finite beings, more powerful
and good than the others, to be sure, but of the same nature,
James writes.
The philosophy of the Absolute agrees with
the pluralistic philosophy in that both
identify human substance v/ith divine sub-
stance, "
But they differ widely in their views of the relations of these
substances, For absolutism, the relation is that of inclusion
of parts within a whole; v/hile for pluralism, the v/orld is a
republican banquet
where all the qualities of being respect one
another's personal sacredness, yet §it at
the common table of space and time.'^'^

The rights and values of human personality -are recognized hy
a pluralistic philosophy more adequately than by monism, James
even goes so far as to say,
Y/hether a God exists, or whether no God ex-
ists, in yon hlue heaven above us hent, we
form at any rate an ethical republic here
belov/, ... 'The religion of humanity' af-
fords a basis for ethics as well as theism
does.*^^
Wliile this exaggerates the significance of positivism
as a religion, it truly sets forth the independence of ethics
from religion. Many have held that without religious sanc-
tions there v/ould be no moral duties, but such a vi ev/ incor-
rectly ignores the universal character of the feeling of ob-
39ligation,^ It can arise and function independently of re-
ligion. Moral criticism is a basic factor in the construc-
tion of religious concepts, and no religion can endure which
fails to meet moral demands. Yet ethics may maintain its
autonomy against any existing religion. This thought is im-
plicit in James's moral critique of religion.
One of the most persistent and difficult problems for
philosophy of religion is that of evil. James holds that this
problem is artificially created by absolutistic philosojjhi es
and that
the so-called mystery of evil and error,
from v/hich pluralistic metaphysics is en-
tirely free^^
is the result of an abstract speculative view which demands
more than the facts can grant. The "healthy-minded" are apt
to ignore the assertions of the "sick souls." The typical
r
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ansv/er of the former is that all seeming evils are for the de-
velopment of moral character and therefore are good. To this
easy optimism James puts the question of the moral value of
the wild beasts' life of prey, of rattlesnakes, and the like.
These cannot "be lightly passed "by.
It may be that no religious reconciliation
v/ith the absolute totality of things is pos-
sible. Some evils, indeed, are ministerial
to higher foms of good, but it may be that
there are forms of evil so extreme as to en-
ter into no good system whatsoever
Facts like these are serious and, many think, conclusive argu-
ments against the position of absolutism and in favor of the
pluralistic hypothesis. Humanism, v/hich James reads theisti-
cally and pluralistically,
gets rid, not only of the standing 'problems'
that monism engenders ('problem of evil,'
'problem of freedom,' and the like), but of
other metaphysical mysteries and paradoxes
as well.
Evil is not a problem to pluralistic philosophy of re-
ligion because it is accepted as a fact of experience which is
not freely chosen by God, but which is something which he has
to join us in combatting. Likewise freedom is not a problem,
for it is granted that men are free and responsible for their
choices. Their acts are not predet emined by God but are the
results of human free will.
God's moral character is thus preserved at the expense
of his omnipotence. The result is the conception of a finite
God, primus inter pares
. who works with men in the achiev-
ing of ends. There is real hazard in the battle of the world

and the final goal depends on human endeavor. We share in
creating the world's salvation^"^ or, if we so choose, its
ultimate destruction. The significance of human activity
is greatly enhanced hy this view which is particularly char-
acteristic, as Bixler has pointed out, of James's later
thought,
God is not to be thought of as any transcendental Ab-
solute who keeps his hands clean while men struggle.
His menial services are needed in the dust
of our human trials, even more than his dig-
nity is needed in the empyrean,
James's doctrine of meliorism expresses this active coopera-
tion of the divine and the human in the overcoming of the
47
evils of present existence.
As we noted in the introduction to the present chap-
ter, James holds to a theory of divine immanence which he
rather paradoxically characterizes as pluralistic pantheism.
Its insight is
the vision of God as the indwelling di-
vine rather than the external creator,
and of human life as part and parcel of
that deeper reality,^°
Immanence is paralleled by transcendence in the theistic as
contrasted with the pantheistic view, and it is this theistic
position which James defines as his own in The vVill to Believe ,
First, it is essential that God be con-
ceived as the deepest power in the uni-
verse; and, second, he must be conceived
under the form of a mental personality,
,.. God's personality;is to be regarded,
like any other personality, as something
lying outside of my own and other than me,
and whose existence I simply come upon and
find, .., In whatever other respects the

divine personality may differ from ours
or may resemble it, the two are consan-
guineous at least in this, - that both
have purposes for which they care, and
each can hear the other's call.^^
Some of James's later statements are more monistic. Thi
is particularly true of the discussion of the co-conscious in
the Pluralistic Universe, Here he remarks,
The absolute is not the impossible being
I once thought it. Mental facts do func-
tion both singly and together, at once,
and we finite minds may simultaneously be
co-conscious with one another in a super-
human intelligence.^^
This panpsychisti c view, adopted largely from J?echner, makes
great concessions to absolutism. James even goes so far under
its influence as to say,
vVe are indeed internal parts of God and
not external creations, on any possible
reading of the panpsychi stic system.^-^
Yet this particular passage appears in a context where James
is asserting the intimacy of the v/orld when it is considered
pluralistically and its foreignness when seen from the monis-
tic point of view. Just how he can hold that finite persons
are "internal parts of God" and yet that they remain indi-
vidual and free is not perfectly clear.
Two phases of panpsychi sm seem to be confused here,
the qualitative and the numerical, to use a -di st inction made
by Miss Calkins. James holds that God and man are qualita-
tively of the same stuff, namely, consciousness, and that
there is a continuity between the individual spirit and the
"wider spiritual environment"^'^ v/hich surrounds him. This
5V.
spiritual environipent may be interpreted by analogy witn the
experience of a finite stlf.
My present field of consciousness is a
centre surrounded by a fringe that shades
insensibly into a subconscious more.^^
There is constant interchange of center and margins and the
"full self is the whole field." "«e may be related to some
great central self in the same way that parts of our conscious
life are related to our whole self.
Every bit of us at every moment is part
and parcel of a wider self, it quivers
along various radii like the wind- rose
on a compass, and the actual in it is
continuously one vvitn the possibles noo
yet in our present sight. And just as Y^e
are co- conscious with our own momentary
margin, may not we ourselves form the mar-
gin of some more really central self in
things which is co- conscious with the
v/hole of us? May not you and I be confluent
in a higher consciousness, and confluent ly
active there, tho we now know it not?^^
Applied to religion this means that
the believer finds that the tenderer parts
of his personal life are continuous with a
more of the same quality which is operative
in the universe outside of him and which he
can keep in v/orking touch with, and in a
fashion get on board of and save himself,
when all his lower being has gone to pieees
in the wreck.. In a word, the believer is
continuous, to his ovi^n consciousness, at
any rate with a wider self from which sav-
ing experiences flow in.^'^
The second statement, taken almost verbatim from the Varieties
,
asserts more consciousness of the wider self than is ^s^anted
in the first. The former view, that we are not now conscious
of our confluent relation to the wider self, is more empirical

and seems to fit "better with James's later view.^^ James does
not, however, meet the difficulty of explaining how conscious-
ness can "be unconsciously confluent with another consciousness.
This very difficulty has been an important argument against ab-
solute idealism, and James's assertion that even the divine con
sciousness is finite and has an environment is not an escape
from the problem, particularly since James maizes no clear state
ment as to the nature of the environment.
Nevertheless James maintained his faith in pluralism to
the last. Reference to the place of the doctrine in Some Prob-
lems of Philosophy , the book on -which ^he was working at the
time of his death, will show hov/ certain he was of its signifi-
cance. It was, hovirever, a numerical rather than a qualitative
pluralism which James v/as concerned to defend. Qualitative
pluralism would mean that the universe v/as coLii.osed of many ul-
timately unique kinds of being and the problem of interaction
and of knowledge would be practically insoluble, Qi'^antitati ve
pluralism, on the other hand, regards tnc universe as made up
of many unique individuals who are nevertheless of the same
quality - for James, consciousness. He believed that God was
"the experiencer of the widest possible conscious span*,^*^ but
that not even he could be identified with the whole of reality.
Every being in the pluralistic system must have an external en-
vironment upon which to v/ork.
There is no doubt that James felt the consciousness of
human beings to be present in some v/ay in the divine conscious
span, but the significant question is whether this presence is
rc
to be regarded as inclusion in or as knov/led^i,e about . Many of
James's statements iraply the forrner and are in so far very lit-
tle superior to monism. On the other hand, James never gave up
his belief in freedom and it is impossible to think that his
theory of co-consciousness was meant in any way to disqualify
the reality of finite choices. In the criticism of monism in
Some Problems of Pnilosophy , he defines the meaning of the pos-
tulate of freedom.
Our sense of 'freedom' supposes that some
things at least are decided here and now,
that the passing moment may contain some
novelty, be an original starting-point of
events, and not merely transmit a push from
elsewhere. We imagine that in some respects
at least the future may not be co-implicated
with the past, but may be really addable to
it, and indeed addable in one shape or_ an-
other, so that the next turn in events can
at any given moment genuinely be ambiguous, qqi.e., possibly this, but also possibly that,
Jsjnes accepts this notion of freedom, a notion which is neces-
sarily rejected by monism, he believes,^-^
Inclusiveness certainly is not to be taken as the dis-
tinctive characteristic of God. The constant and extremely in-
timate intermingling of conscious streams, human and divine, is
accepted by James. But there is purpose and individuality in
the human stream which is not determined by divine choices but
v^hich may be influenced by divine as well as by human means.
James suggested that this contact with the divine might be via
the subconscious, a suggestion for which he v;as seriously criti-
cized by many. But, however one may decide on this issue, it
is only a hypothetical part of James's theory, lft]iat he is

determined to say is that faith irj God is tiie most rational at
titude to take tov»fard the data of experience and that the God
revealed in experience is the active co-worker with men in the
development of an infinitely grcing universe.
In criticizing the monism of Fechner, James gives what
is really an unusually clear statement of his own view of a
finite personal God. Fechner, in trying to meet the problem
of evil, places God
under conditions of 'metaphysical necessity'
which even his omnipotence cannot violate.
His v/ill has to struggle with conditions not
imposed on that will by itself. He tolerates
provisionally Vifhat he has not created, and
then v/ith endless patience tries to overcome
it and live it down. He has, in short, a his-
tory, lfl?henever Fechner tries to represent him
clearly, his God becomes the ordinary God of
theism, and ceases to be the absolutely to-
talized all-enveloper , In this shape, he repre-
sents the ideal element in things solely, and
is our champion and our helper a,nd we his help-
ers, against the bad parts of the universe, ^2
We conclude that, while James makes too many conces-
sions to absolutism and is unclear in his account of the re-
lations of finite minds to God and of God to the total uni-
verse, he never gives up his essential mentalistic and hu-
manistic pluralism. Much of James's thought supports Vv'obber-
min in his conclusions. They agree in the empirical attitude,
taken in the sense of James's radical empiricism as an inclu-
sive study of all the data of conscious experience. They re-
ject materialism and Hegelian absolutism but interpret the uni
verse in terms of consciousness. They emphasize the category
of morality as of j^rimary importance for religion and assert
r< t
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the necessity of iDelief in finite freedom. They differ cniefly
in their defence of freedom and in their final view of the di-
vine attributes, James regarding God as finite vmile Vvobbermin
holds that he is absolute. These differences v;ere critical for
Yk'obbermin ' s rejection of plural! siu, and, in tne follov/ing sec-
tion, v/e shall consider his arguments against pluralism.
: 1^
e
B. Yrf'OBBERMIN' S PHli^OSOmY OF HLLIGIOiS AS A
CRITIQUE OP JAMLS'S ILURALISM
Wobbermin' s appreciation of James is, v^e have fre-
quently said, limited almost entirely to nib psychological
methodology. He has given no careful study to James's later
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writings, several of which he has not read. Except for a
few scattered remarks and for the omission oi tne pragmatic-
pluralistic "Postscript" from the translation of tne Varieties ^
Wobbermin's attack on pluralism is incidental, growini^ out of
his ov/n treatment of the issues involved.
Wobbemin's reasons for his much-discussed omission of
the "Postscrii^t are stated as follows in hi^ introduction to
the first edition of the Vari et i es :
Ausser manchen sonstigen Mrzungen, die ich
im Interesse grOsserer Fbersichtlichkeit vor-
genommen habe, habe ich James* Nachwort fort-
gelassen, da dieses eine metaphy si sche Posi-
tion (diejenige eines religi(3s-metaphysi schen
Pluralismus) vertritt, die ich fillr meine Per-
son vollsta,ndig ablehnen muss, die aber auch
mit dem tlbrigen Inhalt des Buches in keinem
direkten Zusamrnenhang steht und die in der
Hlrze dieses Nachv/orts nur verwirrend wirkt,^^
The claim that the brevity of James's pluralistic statement in
the "Postscript" only makes for confusion rather than under-
standing is to be questioned, James there asserted definitely
the need of taking the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously,
referring back to his discussion of monism and pluralism earli-
er inliie book and also repeating his polytheistic suggesti on.^^
V/obbermin includes the earlier material and also the chapter
Ic.
c
of "Conclusions" with its affirmation of metaphysical as v/ell
as methodological pragmatism. The "Postscript," while frag-
mentary, certainly adds to the understanding of these elements
in a volume Virhich is predominantly isychologi cal.
Because of the lack of any systematic critique of plu-
ralism, Wobbermin's objections have to be derived from the posi
tivc statement of his philosophy of religion. In his attitude
toward metaphysics in general and toward monistic metaphysics
in particular, and in his personalism, his criticism of James's
views of freedom and of a finite God are to be found, a.s well as
many points of close agreement. In conclusion some suggestions
will be made as to the extent of Jajnes's influence on V/obber-
min's metaphysics.
f< t
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1. Metaphysics: Lefinitiori
Wobbennin's insistence on the importance of metapnysics
for a science of religion is to be seen in his statement that
"TheolOt>ie ohne Metaphysik ist unmOgli ch. " '^'^ He defines meta-
physics in his book on TheQlQ^<,ie unci IIeta±-nysik as tne disci-
pline which has to do v^^ith tho^e things v/nich lie beyond exper-
ience.^^ It is "Wachdenken tlber das Transcendent e, '"^^ This
last statement gives tne key to tiie correct understanding of
V/obbermin's conception of metai-hysics. It is derived from
Kant's use of transcendent as contrasted with immanent princi-
ples, Kant said,
Wir wollen die GrundsSltze, deren Anv/endung
sich ganz und gar in den Schranken raftglicher
Erfahrung hSllt, immanent
e
« diejenige aber,
welche diese Grenze tiberfliegen sollen, trane-
zendent
e
GrundsSltze nennen.'^O
As Wobbermin puts it, the positive sciences have to do vdth the
world of sense experience but cannot raise the question of ul-
timate (transcendent) reality, Metaphysics must go further
than this sense vtforld and treat the objects which lie beyond
empirical science - God, life, the world-view, etc. He says,
i-Ietaphysik bezeichnet -ftir mich zunSLchst aus-
schliesslich eine bestimmte Richtung Oder
Tendenz einer Gesamtv/eltanschauunA' und Lebens-
haltun/^ , Hamlich die flber den Gesarntbereich
der uns unmittelbar gegebenen, von uns empi^
risch vorgefundenen Welt hinauswei sende Ten-
denz, die Tendenz liber die empirische, natur-
haft vorzufindende Wirklichkeit hinaus.'''^
Philosophy of religion must be based on transcendent
principles for religion is a relation of man to super- empirical
reality.
r
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TheolO(j,ie ist ohne Metaphysik deshalb un-
mOglich, well die Reli^^on, jedenfalls die
Christ liche Religion, Glaube an eine Welt
der Jenseit ift'keit ist, Glaube an eine tiber
die naturhaft gegebene empirische Wirklich-
keit hinausliegende jenseitige Welt Oder
Wi rklichkeit
The task of philosophy of religion, hov/ever, is unique.
It is not, like metaphysics, a general attitude toward reality
hut is a special investigation of the validity of religious con-
cepts. Wohhermin sometimes calls it Glaubens-jvletaphysi k t o
hring out this point, 74
There is nothing in Vi/ohbermin' s general metaphysical
approach to religion which stands in necessary opxiosition to
James, They agree on the validity of a super- empirical method
for the study of religion. They also hold that the viev/ which
regards metaphysics and religion as contradictory concepts is
absurd, '^^ Metaphysics has mucn to contribute to the study of
religion although, naturally, it is not to be identified with
religion.

2. Monistic Metaphysics
Wobbermin' s metaphysics, like James's, is a protest
against extremes or absolutisms. On the one hand, it rejects
the absolute monisms of materialism (Haeckel) and idealism
(Hegel) but on the other it objects equally to pluralism
( James )
•
In "Das Wesen des Chri st entums"*^^ where the general
metaphysical problem is treated, Y/obbemin discusses two
types of monistic pantheism: the spiritualistic and what he
admits is incorrectly called tne naturalistic or materialis-
tic pantheism. The latter considers mechanical natural lav/
and material entities as ultimate and subordinates spiritual
life and values to this materialistic level. 77 Spiritualis-
tic pantheism, on the other hand, has much in common with the
Christian world viev/, and is particularly dangerous for this
very reason. It is the view of reality as an "unbestimmte
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undundiff erenzierte All-Line." But just here lies the dif-
ficulty for within the "All" are to be found two sets of
facts; the mental and the physical. Spiritualistic pantheism
stellt das materielle Sein und das geistige
Leben einfach auf eine Linie nebeneinander
,
betrachtet sie als gleichwertig und sieht
in der noch undif f erenzi ert en Einheit beider
das eigentlich-letzt e Grundprinzip des Uni-
versums.'^^
The ideal point of view is one which recognizes both
the physical and the mental factors, yet subordinates v.
the physical to the spiritual in accordance with the evidence
of epistemological criticism and value experience. Both
f
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events and mental life are facts, but there is a dif-
in our knov;ledgc of the two series and also a differ-
ence in their value,
Nur das geistige Leben - das eigene Beiausst-
sein - ist uns unmitt elbar gegeben, alles
Katerielle allein durch Vermittlung des
Geistigen, Mr uns ist also das Materielle
jedenfalls etwas SekundSlres, Dann ist es
aber auch von vornherein das Wahrschein-
lichste, dass es tlberhaupt etv/as SekundSLres
ist, dass es nicht Selbstzweck, sondern nur
ilittel zum Zweck ist, v;ie der christliche
Gottes- und SchOpfungs-Glaube voraussetzt .^^
This is one of the clearest statements Wobbermin gives of his
view of material things. His view seems to be an empirical
dualism of matter and spirit subordinated to a metaphysical
monism of divine purpose,^"^
In support of this interpretation v/e ma^'' quote again
fiom the same source. He says the Christian world view is
monistic
insofern sie die materielle Y/elt als Schttp-
fung Gottes und als IjtLttel zur Verwirklich-
urig seiner Zv/eckabsicht en luybrackt cii be-
trachtet, und sofern sie weiter als Ziel
dieser seiner Zv/eckabsichten das "Reich
Gottes," d.h. die Lebensgemeinschaft freier
•persOnlicher Geister unt ereinander und mit
Gott ansieht.
This society of free persans is not the "undifferentiated"
Absolute of pantheism, Wobbermin believes God to be absolute,
but in the sense of being an absolute Person, which is not
necessarily a pantheistic view. His criticism of James is
directed against the view of God as finite. In the rejection
of the two types of pantheism cited by Y/oboermin they are in
harmony.-
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3. Personal! sm
Wobbermin prefers to call his philosophy ontological
personal! sm, S3 and the high evaluation of personality is one
of the most persistent and striking, traits of his thought. In
this he is influenced in the first place by Schlei errnacher ' s
emphasis on the imrjortance of the individual and personal.
Ritschl was also influential and Lotze is mentioned occasion-
ally. Teichmttller, the first German to call his system per-
sonalism, received special attention in the Theologie und
Metaphysi where the interest in x^ersonality is central, Wob-
bermin was mucn more explicit as a personal! st than Jajnes,
and James cannot be counted as a unique influence in this
field. Nevertheless Jcijnes's interest in the individual and
personal, especially as shown in his psychology, played its
part in strengthening the tendency which was already present.
The self-psychology applied to religion in the Vari eti es is
largely taken over by Wobbermin in his "religio-psychological"
method for the study of theology,
Wobbermin traces the develojiment of the interest in per-
sonality from ancient philosophy to modern thought and shows
that it is one of the most unique Cnristian contributions.
Die ant ike Fhilosophie kennt den Wert der
Persflnlichkeit nicht; ja si e kennt eigent-
lich den Begriff der Per sttnli chkei t gar
nicht, wenigstens nicht den Begriff der Per-
sOnlichkeit im heutigen Sinne des Wortes,
den Begriff der individuell selbstandigen
PersOnlichkeit . Dieser Begriff der Persttn-
lichkeit ist der Gentralbegriff der neueren
c5
Denkv/eise, die von Kant inauguriert ist,
Durch nichts v;ird die letztere so sehr
charakt eri si ert wie durch die V.'ert scliSLt-
zung persttnlichen Lebens.^5
The doctrine of personalism, for Wobbenriin, finds its
empirical basis in psychology and ejji st emoiogy . But the Ghri
tian emphasis on the value of personality and especially its
vievvf of divine personality are the most important sources for
Vi/obbermin ' s thought, For James, the empirical is the primary
source for the high estimate of personality, and religious
tradition as such plays a minor part.

a. Psychology and Epistemology
In self-psychology "Wobbeimin found empirical evidence
for personali sm. Psychological investigation reveals a uni-
tary self as the most immediately given fact of experience.
It is not necessary to assume a substantial soul to account
for unity, nor is such a soul given in any analysis of self-
consciousness. Consciousness comes, not in isolated bits,
"but as a unitary activity, "ein dauerndes v/irkendes Reales,"
This is not, however, a denial of the multiplicity of its
functions.
Gev/iss, jeder Bewusst seinszustand ist ein
Komplex, eine einheitliche Verhindung von
Funktionen verschi edener Art. Aher dartther
hinaus liegt einmal jenes schon hesprochene
Selhigkeitshevmsstsein, das zv/ar vielfach
Liit der Lrinnerung gleichgestellt wird,
that sSlchlich aber nach dem Zeugnis der in*-
neren Erfahrung das Bewusst sein der Selbig-
keit im Verlauf der Zeit, das Bewusstsein
kontinui erlichen ?ortbestandes des Selbst
im Y/echsel der Zeit einschli esst . - Und
dasoelbe gilt sodann von jener Einheit des
hOheren - begrifflichen - Lenkens, in der
nicht nur zusamraengehflrige Vorst ellungen
zusammengeschaut , sondern in der auch ein-
ander ausschli essende Inhalt aufeinander
bezogen v/erden, Auch hier haben v/ir eine
Einheit in der Kbexistenz, die tiber die
einfache Synthese des Bewusstseins hinaus-
li egt .87
This capacity of selfhood to maintain its continuity
in different relations and through the course of a life-time
is a basic postulate of the self-psychology v/hich Wobbermin
affirms. Other theories, he holds, make the self merely the
form to v/hich the various moments of consciousness attach,
ci
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but the cont ent of consciousness is not to "be thus separated
from consciousness itself or the self; rather they are identi-
cal.^^
The epi stemo logical question also rests on empirical
evidence. All knowledge, including religious knov^^ledge, must
be derived from tne study of the experience of selves,
Denn abgesehen vom Bewusstsein existiert
fflr uns ttberhaupt nichts,°^
This is not meant as subjectivism but only as an indication of
the central place of inner experience. 1/Vobbermin writes,
Die objektive Offenbarung ist nicht anders
als durch Vermittlung der eigenen inneren
Erfahrung fassbar und verv/ertbar zu machen.^O
This is true of all revelation - not of religious alone, and it
is necessary to make its universal validity evident for re-
ligious experience is often discriminated against on the ground
of its supposed unique subjectivity. In inner experience ob-
jects are given which are not mere appearances but real facts. ^-^
Conscious experience is self-transcendent,- Only so can it give
us facts even of the sense world, for these facts transcend the
self. Our knowledge of other persons is also a step beyond
the immediate,
Streng genommen bedeutet sogar schon das
Rechnen mit fremden Personen ,,. ein Hin-
ausgehen fiber die unmittelbar gegebene £r-
fahrung, ein hineingreifen in das Trans-
cendent e. 92
Self-psychology thus points to epi stemo logical dualism.
James, as we have seen in our previous study,^3 was also
a self-psychologi st and an epi st emological dualist.
c5
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b. The Value of Persons
For V/obbermin, as we have said, the Christian evalua-
tion of human personality is a very important factor. He
defines the Christian view of the self in the follov^ing pas-
sage from Theologie und Metaphysik
.
£s muss aPer das I ch-Problem in der That als
eins der Grundprobleme der syst emati schen
Theologie angesehen werden« Denn es betrifft
das Y/esen der Reli/^ion in seinem innersten
Kern , Die Religion des Christ entums basiert
auf der Voraussetzung, dass 'der Mensch als
ein persSnliches Ich existiert. In welchem
Masse das Evangelium mit dieser Vorausset-
zung rechnet, braucht nicht im einzelnen aus-
geftihrt zu werden. Der V/ert jeder einzelnen
Menschenseele vor Gtott: das ist gerade das
"Evangelium, " Nicht um die Bedeutung, um den
Wert des Geistes gegenflber dem St off, der
Materie, handelt es sich hier, sondern um den
V/ert persBnlicher indivi dueller Iche ,^^
Through the existence of human beings a purpose and plan
are given to the universe which would not otherwise be possi-
ble. This purpose is the achieving of a Kingdom of God which
is to be composed of free persons who recognize their obliga-
94tion to God, the supreme ethical person.
The question of freedom is of particular pertinence in
this connection for on it depend the significance of human mor-
al endeavor and also, as we have seen in the study of James,
the question of the goodness of God. The problem of freedom
is clearly defined by Wobbermin.
Ob auch das menschliche Innenleben lediglich
ein mit mechanischer Uotwendigkeit ablaufen-
des Geschehen aufweise, oder ob das mensch-
liche Ich frei von sich aus zu v^irken ver-
mOge, das ist also die ent scheidende Grund-
frage, auf die sich das ^anze Problem zu-
spitzt .^^
IP
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James's treatment of freedom in The Will to Relieve
is repeatedly referred to in this connection and Vi/obbermin
tried to meet the objections raised by James, and at the same
time to preserve the omnipotence of God. The question of
freedom is inseparably connected with the problems of the na-
ture of God and the explanation of evil, Wobbermin's solu-
tion of these problems is to be found in his personal theism..
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c. Personal Theism
Wobbermin, like James, rejects the "block-universe"
conception of a completely determined divine plan for the
course of history. On any such scheme human freedom would
of course be impossible, for man could act only as he was de-
termined to act and all his struggles vdth evil or with good-
ness would be tragically useless, i'rom the religious point
of view, as Yvobbermin shows, this is the doctrine of predes-
tination. If God is the actual cause of every event in the
world, he vdlls that some individuals shall be saved and
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others lost, Sut this is to discredit the divine charac-
ter. It implies partiality toward some individuals and it
means that God has created some beings whom it is not his
will to save, V/obbermin, like most theists, solved the prob-
97lem by saying that God gives to man freedom of choice, and
therefore, v/hile it is God's will to save all men, he will
not force them to choose the good if they prefer the evil. He
may foreknov/ their choices without causing them. The limita-
tion due to human freedom is a self-lirnitati on of God and there
fore, for Y/obbermin, does not make him less absolute than tra-
ditional theology has maintained.
There are other difficulties, hov;ever, of vi^hi cji the
explanation of evil in a v/orid controlled by a good God is the
iiardest. Llany thinkers have held that all the evils are due
to free choices of human beings or to God's judgment of the
means v/hich vd 11 most successfully develop character. It is
possible to account for many evils in this way. Men choose

182
things v/hich are individually and socially harmful and the
consequences may be far-reaching. Some hardships may be cho-
sen by God as the best means to an end. But it is very diffi-
cult to accept Y/obbermin's conclusion tha.t all evil can be ac-
counted for in terms of human choice or teleological value.
V/e may admit that God can derive good out of natural evils at
the same time that we deny that he chose just those evils free-
ly. James's finite God who is struggling in a difficult and
growing universe, is a more satisfactory solution of the prob-
lem of evil than is an omnipotent God such as Y/obbermin pre-
sents.
In spite of their differences, James and Wobbermin
laid great stress on the intimacy and personal character of the
relation between God and man. The intimacy is, however, com-
bined vv'ith the recognition of the supreme moral v»^orth of the
divine Being and worship is natural and necessary. James says
that God must be our higher self and Y/obbermin, in his txieory
of transcendence and immanence, preserves the av/e which is
present in the v^orship experience at the same time that he
gives place to the intimacy which James demanded. They agree
that God must be ethical personality if he is to be God at all.
Y/obbennin says,
Kur die theistische Auspr&gung des Gottes-
glaubens, nur der lebendige gei st ig-persttn-
liche Gott befriedigt wirklich das religiBse
Bev/usstsein und das religittse Bedttrfnis. Zu
eiuem unpersOnli chen Absolut en kann man kein
persl5nli ches Vertrauensverh&ltni s gev/innenT^
HMriM.
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James might have said this, so pragmatic does it sound ¥/ith its
emphasis on needs,
Wobhermin found in mysticism another point of contact
with James and reg;ardcd the treatment of mysticisii. in the Va-
rieties as one of the most distinctive contributions of the
book,-'-^'^ For James, mystical experience has an authority for
those to v/hom it comes that cannot be questioned. He also sees
in it a pragmatic test of the validity of religious concepts,
for a study of the lives of the great mystics shov^rs that in
most cases their experiences have produced those changes in
character and activity which would be expected if the God
claimed by mystical experience existed. Belief in God may
therefore be taken as a reasonable hypothesis for human action,
James's pantheistic view of a world-consciousness offered sup-
port to his mysticism. If men are at all times in co-conscious
relation with God, mysticism can be explained as the experience
of moments of greater luminosity when the individual becomes
aY/are of this relation.
VKobbermin, on the otner hand, was strenuously opposed
to pantheism and held that the mystical experience in no way
demanded it,^^^ Pantheism thinks of God exclusively as imma-
nent and ignores hi s . transcendent character, -'^^ Wob-
bemin unites immanent and transcendent elements in the notion
of the ethical personality of God. Mysticism is for him "mono-
theistisch-personalistische Mystik."^^^ James's pantheism,
like Wobbermin's personalisti c mysticism, is strongly individu-
alistic, as is brought out by his insistence on pluralism.
t1
I.
184
Immortality is treated ratiier incidentally by both
thinkers. Neither tries to offer any conclusive proof of life
after death, but it is accepted as a reasonable belief, based
on the conception of the worth of personality. James says that
he believes in it more as he grows older because he is "just
getting fit to live,-^^^ and Wobbermin stresses the religious
105
value of this faith.
In conclusion we may point out from these various
sources certain general relations. James and 'liVobbennin differ
fundamentally on monism. Wobbermin is a monistic personalist
in the sense of believing that the total universe is under the
control of an absolute ethical personal God. Ke admits self-
limitation through purpose but no external limit to divine
power, James is a pluralistic pantheist, holding that all re-
ality is of the nature of consciousness but that no one con-
sciousness is all-inclusive. Rather, there are many cooperat-
ing consciousnesses which limit each other but which may work
together in the achieving of value, Vi/obbermin rejects pan-
theism and lays more stress on transcendence than does Jarnes,
Their difference on the explanation of evil grows out of the
original monistic-pluralistic opposition. Wobbermin largely
ignores the problem of natural evil and accounts for moral
evil on the basis of human free will. The question of natura.1
evil is, however, crucial in James's thought and forces him
to the conclusion that God must be finite. Other differences
are chiefly in emphasis
.
i
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The point E of o,greemerit are much more striking than
Wohbermin has realized. James and he take the same empirical
and methodological starting point for metaphysics and agree on
the place of metaphysics in the study of religion. They oppose
absolutism and materialism. Neither is clear on the doctrine
of matter hut both subordinate nature to personality and see
its main function as a means to the realization of personal
values. And finally, they unite in vievang God as a supreme-
ly ethical Person whose purpose is expressed in a community
of ethical persons joining v/ith him in the struggle for per-
fection. They differ also on some points and particularly on
the question whether God is absolute and perfect or finite and
grov»?ing.
i
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4. The Influence of Jajnes on Wobbemiin ' s
Metaphysics
"Wobljemin is not consciously influenced to any large
extent by James's metaphysics. He felt that he very largely
rejected its fundamental principles and he has never given it
any thorough study. Such influence as exists is in the foKn
of the strengthening of views derived originally from other
sources. This is true of the emphasis on personality and
even of the empirical psychological methodology, which is his
greatest debt to James and which nevertheless came to him first
through Schlei ermacher. The most obvious direct influence,
other than the psychological, is in the treatment of freedom.
In Vi/obbermin * s recent writings much less emphasis is
placed on God as absolute, while his ethical and personal char-
acter are maintained as strongly as ever. This suggests that
the special v/eight placed on the attribute of absoluteness in
the writings from 1904 to 1914 may have been only a temporary
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reaction against James's finite God,
The pragmatic argument of The Will to Believe is ap-
pealed to occasionally in the form of an assertion of the
reasonableness of faith, but this appeal is never an explicit
recognition of pragmatism on V/obbermin's part.
Our conclusion is that James's metaphysics is an un-
conscious intensifying influence upon Wobbermin's thought but
that none of Wobbermin's ideas are derived from James alone.
f1
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1, Vi/'obbermin ' s primary interest in Jaines is methodological, and
he has used James's psychology as a theolOt^^ co.j. metnod out
has not been interested in Jaines for his ov/n sake. (87;
2. Y/olDbermin regards James's psy-chology of religion as a con-
tinuation and su-n;^lementation of Schlei ermacher ' s method in
theology and inteijds, in his ovm metnod, to combine and cor-
rect the Schlei eiTmacher-James metuodolog^y , (9^*;
3. Y/obhermin' s methodology as transceridental (108 j and as "re-
ligio-psychologi cal" (109) owes much to Jemes, but as the
metiiod of the "religio-psychological" circle it is derived
chiefly from Scnlei ermacher. (113f
j
4. 'iVobbermin regards the influence of Joines's psycxiology as im-
plicit in all his thought, out the period of active interest
in James ended about 1913. (115)
5. vYobbermin's translation of the Vari eti es contributed greatly
to the reading and discussion of tne work in Germany. (53 j
6. 7/obbermin has sho¥/n that Jaines has had an indirect influence
in Germany tov/ard a new understanding of Schlei emacher s
psychological phase. (54)
7. vVobbermin is right in thinking that a psychological method
can be derived from the Vari eties without accepting either
its pragmatism or its pluralism. (133ff
j
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8, WolDbermin does not understand Jcjiies's prc^grnati srn and plural-
ism and has rejected them without makin^^ a thorough study of
them. (75, 169)
9, Woh'oermin is justified in criticizing- James for vagueness
in his definition of the pragmatic theory of truth, (140)
10, Wobbermin accepts the pragmatic method as far as it is em-
pirical and points toward relative truth in the empirical
v/orld, and uscg pragmatic criterion of truth when, from
human needs, he makes inferences regarding the nature of God,
but he does not recognize in these factors an affiliation
v/ith Jarnes. (138, 182)
11, 'vVobbermin bases his judgment of James's Tjhilosopny of re-
ligion on the material in The Will to Believe and the Va-
ri et i es (117), but the "Postscript" shov/s that James did
not regard his pnilosophy of religion as yet v/ritten. (lo4)
12, James's advocacy of self-psychology influenced Vi/obbermin
from the start and intensified his belief in the central
importance of personality. (60, 68f, 175)
13, Both men regard reality as composed of many free individucils
related to an ethical personal God, (62ff)
14, Neither gives a clear metaphysics of nature. (185)
fc
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15. James's treatment of freedom in The Will to .pelieve in-
fluenced WoblDermin. (180)
16. The agreement of V/o'b'bermin and James on the place of the
moral argument for God does not indicate influence since
it appears in Wo"bbermin's v/riting before the publication
of The Will to Believe and the Varieties, (60, 70f
,
132)
17. James and Wobbermin differ as to v/hether God is to be re-
garded as finite or absolute. (182)
18. Wobbermin does not fully meet the difficulty raised by
James regarding the problem of evil if God is held to be
omnipotent. (I81f, 184)
19. James's implicit personalism Yias a confirmation of Wob-
bermin' s explicit personalism, but James is only i. m.inor
source of Y/obbermin's viev/, (175)
20. Jaaies's influence upon 7/obbermin may be regarded as an
initial impetus in methodology (llS) bUt , in spite of the
similarities in their metaphysical positions (185), not
as a unique metaphysical stimulus. (186)
tc
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The problem of this dissertation is to study the influ-
ence of Vv'illiam James on Georg V^ohbermin ' s psychology and phil-
osophy of religion and to e:xamine V/obbermin's criticisms of
James's epistemology and metaphysics,
James's first teaching was in the field of anatomy and
physiology but he soon turned to psychology. His psychological
interest v/as developed in a psychology of religion as vifell as
in the general field. His philosophical writing follaiwed later.
The religious interest pervaded all his v/riting and expressed
itself through a nev/ treatment of empiricism and humanism,
James's em.piricism is a reaction against rationalism
and it insists that every element in experience be taken into
account in the final reckoning. His empiricism is radical in
the sense of including relational and value experiences as well
as sense experiences as its data. Radical empiricism combined
v/ith human moral demands points tov/ard pluralism and a finite
God, according to James. He feels that on any other vi ev/ God
is made responsible for evil and tnerefore limited in goodness.
James chooses limitation in power in x^reference to moral lim-
itation of tne divine Being.
James's humanism appears in his concern for human per-
sonality. His psychology and metaphysics and particularly
his
philosophy of religion stress the importance of the individual.
He defines religion in individualistic terms and defends finite
fI
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persons against absorption or loss of freedoin in any Absolute,
James's vi ev/ is not completely per sonali sti c because ne fails
to relate things to persons.
James's influence is widespread. His v^/ork was early
recognized in England and France and his writings have been
translated into many languages. His personal relations with
foreign philosophers were cordial and in many cases intimate,
but least so in the case of German philosophers,
woboermin's interest in James began v/ith the reading
of the Principles of rsycholOKy in 1893 and Wobbermin's dis-
sertation of 1894 shows traces of James's functional approach.
Like James, V/obbermin takes personal experience (but supple-
mented by history] as the basis for the study of religion. He
also emphasizes the moral argument for God, His conclusion,
hov/ever, is monistic for he regards God as absolute in pov/er,
knowledge, and goodness. This monism is to be interpreted per-
sonalistically. The relation of God to the v/orld and to human
persons combines transcendence and immanence in divine person-
ality. Wobbermin asserts the duality of nature and spirit and
the pluralism of many finite beings, but regards the dualism
as phenomenal and the pluralism as subordinated to the divine
purpose of achieving an ethical society of free persons in
loving allegiance to God.
Wobbermin develops a unified m.ethod for the scientific
study of religion from the combined methodology of Schleier-
macher and James, This method seeks to avoid the one-si dedness
r
of historicism and psychologism but to include the truth of
both. As first conceived, his method is a protest against a
narrow empiricism and an assertion that tne study of religion
must be transcendental in the Kantian sense. In this Wobber-
min finds support in James's interpretation of empiricism.
The second formulation - the "religio-psychological" method -
also shows the influence of James for the psychological ap-
proach through the individual to the proolem of religion is
central and the historical element is relatively suDordinate,
In its final form as the "religio-psychological" circle, the
method is an application of Schleiermacher ' s principle of giv-
ing equal weight to experience and history,
James's pragmatism and pluralism were rejected by V*ob-
bermin, and the fact that they played such a large part in the
development of James's later thought was influential in Y/ob-
bermin's turn back to Schleiermacher. James remains as an
implicit impetus but not as a guiding force in Woboermin's la-
ter t nought.
Pragmatism, for Jajiies, means the empirical considera-
tion of tfeftse facts vi/hich make a difference in tne lives of hu-
man beings. It also means the vi ev/ that human truth is in the
making, that the v/orld is growin^^, and that human effort makes
a difference. In so far as James is not clear in his state-
ments of the grovt^ing truth, his theory is a confusion of veri-
fication and truth and therefore false to the accepted meaning
of the latter. Pragmatism means, finally, the view that truth
r
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is tested "by practical consequences, James includes consis-
tency among the necessary consequences of a satisfactory view
and so escapes the charge of holding to illusionism or mere
satisfaction of passing desires. As applied to religion, the
vievr means for James that it is man's duty, in the absence of
conclusive demonstration, to act on that principle v/hich gives
the greatest satisfaction to man's higher nature when consid-
ered as a whole,
Wobbermin rightly criticizes Jajnes for vagueness in de-
fining pragmatism. But he does not fully understand James at
this point and does not recognize the pragmatic elements in his
own thought. He rejects pragmatism but asserts tiie necessity
of the empirical api^roach, accepts relative truth so far as the
empirical order is concerned, and appeals to religious needs
as one of tut. tests of religious trutn.
The metaphysical issue betv/een monism and pluralism is
of particular interest for religion because on it rests the in-
terpretation of the nature of God and his relations to tae uni-
verse. James and VKObbermin reject materialistic and 8.Dsolutis-
tic monism. James, hov^ever, tends tov/ard a pluralistic pan-
theism, regarding reality as an extensive conscious experience
v/ith v/hich human beings are co-conscious, V/obbermin rejects
all types of pantheism and accepts a monistic personalism in
which many finite persons are united under the controlling
purijose of a personal God.
rr
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Both men recognize freedom erj essential to human
morality and morality as a necessary "basis for religion, James
is more deeply concerned over the proolem of evil and it, com-
bined with the question of freedom, forces him to the view tnat
God is finite. Wobbermin's emphasis on God as absolute grows
partly out of hi;:; religious and philosophical traditions and
the influence of Schlei ermacher. Sut it is due more to his
feeling that the only adequate explanation ot the causal order
of nature, man's morQ.1 and religious experience, and the cos-
mos as a whole, must be absolute.
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NOTES
(U.B.: In the follov/inc^- notes reference v/ill be made in ab-
breviated form to books and articles which appear in the
biblie^rraphy. The v/ritings of James and 'JVobbermin have been
chronologically arranged in the bibliography. References to
them will therefore be identified by date and title initials,
which appear in the bibliography at the right hand side, af-
ter the bibliographical data, E.g. J-Y\Q (1897) equals James
The Will to Believe , New York; Longmans, Green, 1897 ; Yi/-TM
{ 1901J is Wobbermin, Theologie und Metaphysik , Leipzig; Hin-
richs, 1901, References to Wobbermin' s translation of the
yarieties of Religious Experience v/ill appear as YZ/j-VRE
( 1914 j , All references will be to the second edition unless
otherwise specified. References to other authors v/ill be
by last name and abbreviated title,)
1.IAGAZINE ABBREVIATIONS
Ag-Ps Archiv ftVr die gesarnte Psychologie
ARel Archiv fttr Religionswi ssenschaf
t
ArR Archiv fttr Religionspsychologi
e
ChF Christ liche Freiheit
ChW Christliche Welt
ChWi s s Chri stent ujn und Wissenschaft
DtEvM Deut sch-Evangeli sche Monat sbl?.tt er
LtLZ Deutsch Lit eraturzeitung
JrPhi
1
Journal of Philosophy
K-St Kar.t-Studi en
LGB Litcerari sches Centralblatt
PrJ Preussische Jahrbflcher
RevHR Revue de I'Histoire des Eeligions
RG Religion und Gei st eskultur
Riavi Revue de I^^taphysi que et de Morale
ThB Theologische Blatter
ThLB Theologische Literatur Bericht
ThLZ Theologische Literatur Zeitung
ThR Theologische Rundschau
ZaPs Zeitschrift fttr angewandte Psychologie
ZGym Zeitung des Gymnasialenv/esen
ZPpK Zeitschrift fttr Philosophic und phi losophi sche Kritik
ZPs Zeitschrift ft\r Psychologie
ZR Zeitschrift fttr Religionspsychologi
e
ZThK Zeitschrift fttr Theologie und Kirche
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II^TRODUCTION
1. Gf , this Dissertation, 231, for corrections of the Perry
Bibliography.
2. Cf. J-MS (1911) and J-CER (l920j. The latter volume is of
particular importance for the present study.
3. The Appendix (349-378) is entitled: "A Synopsis of tne
Philosophy of "jvilliam James." Kote that this volume is
dedicated to James.
4. Moore, Pra^natism and its Critics ,
5. Pratt, Psychology of .Relifeious Belief ,
6. Lovejoy, "Pragmatism and Theology" (1908); "The Thirteen
Pragmatisms" (1908); "Pragmatism and x^ealism" (1909).
7, Cf. Bradley, "On the Ainhiguity of Pragmatism" (1908); La-
lande, "Pragmati sme, Plumanisme et Verit^" (1908); Parodi,
"Le Pragrnatisme d'apr^s W. James et Schiller" (1908);
Lorenz, "Das Verhaitnis des Pragmatismus zu iiant" (1909;;
Stein, "Der Pragmatismus" (1908); and Waibel, "Studien
zum Pragmatismus,"
8. Cf. Preface, v.
9. Ueberv/eg, Grundriss der Gescnichte der Philosophie , 12. Aufl.
Herausg. von T .K. Uesterreich. The section by Cell is Bd. V,
368-413, "Die Philosophie in Kordamerika.
"
10. The book by Busch appeared in 1911 Vvliile Bixler's is a
1926 publication.
11. Cf, Busch, op. cit ., title page.
12. Busch, "William Jataes" (I91l) : "Ich hatte das Gluck noch in
seinem letziten Jahre in seinem Kause ein- und ausgehen zu
dttrfen, Ich werde sie nicht verges sen, die Stunden in seinem
Bibliothekszimmer ... in Cajnbridge, oder die Stunden am
Tisch beim Thanksgi vingturkey oder die v/enigen Minuten, als
er schon zu seiner letzten Europafahrt die Koffer schloss,"
301.
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IKTRODUGTION (cont'd)
13, The 1929 volume of this journal was dedicated to Otto and
V/obbermin on their sixtieth birthdays,
14, Most of the information on James's life is derived from
the introductory chapter to the Letters (Vol. I, 1-30) writ-
ten by his son, and from later explanatory notes in the same,
15, J-LST,I (1920), 12,
16, Ibid., 17ff.
17, Ibid
.
18, Ibid
. , 20.
19, Ibid, , 31.
20, Ibid , , 53,
21, Ibid
.
, 54f
.
22, Ibid
. ,
Ch. V,
23, Ibid
. , 139.
24, Cf , ibid , , 142-3n.
25, Ibid,, 194.
26, Ibid , , 193, 196, et passim .
27 , Ibid
. ,
320-323.
26, Published the follov/ing year vdth the same title, ibid.,
II, 17,
29. Ibid. , 300n.
30. The material which James had already v/ritten was pub-
lished in Some Problems of Philosophy (1911),
31, J-L3iT,II (1920), 350.
32, The data on Wobbermin' s life are derived chiefly from the
German Wer ist ' s? (1928), A few details v/ere corrected in
conversation v/ith Professor and Mrs. V/obbermin, Feb. 9-11,
1931.
0-'
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INTRODUGTIOE ( cont ' d)
33. W-SuK (1927), 3f.
34. W-IEG (1894), 88. It reads as follows:
"Scholas audivi virorum clari ssimorurn :
1. Beyschlag, Benrio Erdmann, Gunkel, rlayni, ?iaupt
,
Hiller,
Kautzsch, KShler, A. Kirchhoff, Loofs, A. Mtiller, Hoth-
stein, Uphues, Vaihinger Halensiiim;
2, Dillraann, Dilthey, T.d. Goltz, Harnack, Kaftan, Kleinert,
Scheffer-Boichorst
,
Siimnel, v. Soden, Strack, Weiss Bero-
linensium.
Seminariis theologicis intereram cura aliis turn Berolini
ecclesiastico - historico, cuius ad exercitationes Adolfus
Harnack "benigne raihi aditum concessit.
Viris doctissimis, quoriiin scholas audivi, omnibus gratiam
detoitaifi habeo sertiperque habebo. Praeter ceteros vero theolo-
gorurn Adolfo Harnack et Julio Kaftan, phi losopriorum Guilelrno
Dilthey, viris doctissimis et hu'nani ssimi s , qui in studiis
neis summa me adiuverunt benevolentia et benignitate, gratias
ago quam maximas,"
35. The Nathaniel V/illiam Taylor Lectures, "The Theology of
Albrecht Ritschl and its Significance for the Present Lay,"
and the Germanistic Society Lectures on "Das geistige Leben
Deutschlands in dem letzten fttnfzig Jaliren." Cf. Yale
Divinity Review
, Jan, 1908.
36. Conversations, Peb. 9-11, 1931.
37. Cf. W-TM (1901), 180, 230f, 238, 244, 280f,
38. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
39. Cf. VJ-VRE (1914), xxix-xxxi.
40. Wobbermin has written a great many book reviews for this
j ournal.
41. Wobbermin was associate editor from 1907 to 1917.
42. 1908-1913.
43. Founded in Vienna in 1928 and edited by Karl Beth. It is
the organ of the Internationale religi onspsychologi sche
Gesellschaft
.
44. Cf. Kant, Werke , Prussian Academy Edition, Vol VI.
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INTRODUCTION (cone.)
45. The general editor of the series is Arthur Liebert,
46. Six of these studies have now appeared, of v/hich Iftobbermin
has written two: Richtlinien evan^eli scher Theolo/^ie and
Wort Gottes und evan^^eli scher Glaube
.
47. "Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Religionsp sychologi e.
"
48. Cf. note 35 above,
49. "Religionsphilosophie als theologische Aufgabe." Published
in 1928.
50. The title of this lecture is as yet undecided.
51. Wobbermin objects to calling his view either idealistic
or monistic on account of the Hegelian connotation of
both words. Cf. conversations, Feb, 9-11, 1931.
52. W/J-VRE (1914), iv.
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CHAPTER I
1. J-LST,I (1920), 87f.
2. Ibid. , 138. Jaiaes wrote, "I begein the other day Kant's
'Kritik,' which is written crabbedly enough, but which
strikes me so far as almost the sturdiest and honest est
piece of work I ever saw, "Whether right or wrong ( and
it is pretty clearly wrong in a great many details of
its Analytik part, hov/ever the rest may be), there it
stands like a great snag or mark to v>fhich everything
metaphysical or psychological must be referred. I v/ish
I had read it earlier."
3. Ibid . This is Jaint;s's first reference to Renouvier. He
speaks of an article "by one Charles Renouvier, of vi^hom
I never heard before but who, for vigor of style and com-
pression, going to the core of half a dozen things in a
single sentence, so different from the namby-pamby dif-
fusiveness of most Frenchmen, is unequaled by anyone. He
takes his stand on Kant."
4. Ibid
. ,
II, 54f., cf. 45 and 47.
5. J-VRE (1902) , 444.
6. J-LET,I (1920), 118f,
7. Ibid. , 179.
8. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology , 494.
9. Ibid .
10 • I^id
.
, 507 , 494f
.
11. J-LET,I (1920), 179n.
12. Ibid.
,
II, 331f
.
13. J-PP (1890), vi.
14. Cf. J-CER (1920), 316-327, "A Plea for Psychology as a
'Natural Science,'" 1892.
15. Boring, 0£. cit . , 498
16. Ibid, , 498ff
.
17. J-CER (19 20 j , 43n.
18. J-PP 1(1890), 141.
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CHAPTER I (cont'd)
19. J-PP,I (I890j, 11.
20. J-PR (1907 j , 109.
21. J-LET,II (19 20), 127.
22. Ibid
. ,
170.
23. J-YKK (1902) , 520.
24. J-PP,II (1890), Ch. XXI, "The Perception of Reality."
Cf . Perry, Annotated Bibliography , 21.
25. Ibid . , 321.
26. Cf, i-erry, 0£. cit . , note under 1878-2.
27. Ibid .
28. J-CER (1920), 406-457. The reference to i-eirce is 410ff.
29. J-PR (1907), 201,
30. Ibid
. ,
47.
31. Cf. the book by that title.
32. Cf, Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James ,
198,
33. J-PU (1909), 328f. Cf. the classification of ideals in
Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals , Ch. III.
34. J-TO (1897) , xiii.
35. Cf, J-VRE (1902), 4, v/here existential judgments are con-
trasted v>rith spiritual judgments.
36. In a letter to F.G.S. Schiller (J-LET,I1 ( 19 20 j ,270ff . )
,
James said that it was too late to call his book "human-
ism" and that he greatly disliked the term "pragmatism."
Reference to The Meaning of Truth and later writings will
show that he adopted "humanism" wherever possible. Cf, 295.
37. J-MT (1909) , 125.
38. J-PU (1909), 124f
.
,
,
et passimj this Dissertation. Ch. V,
39. J-LET,II (1920)
,
' 2,
.
40. Ibid,
,
I, 147.
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41. J-SPr (1911), 165n.
42. In i:ind
. 7(1882), 186-208.
43. J-LST,I (1920), 205; cf. J-i'U (1909), 138.
44. J-LET,I (1920), 305.
45. Cf. this Eissertation, Ch. V.
46. J-PU (1909 ) , 98,
47 . Ibid
.
, 90.
48. Ibid .
49. Ibid
. ,
92.
50. J-PR (1907 ) , 222.
51. J-MT (1909), 155, et passim .
52. J-PR (1907), 58; cf. Ch. IV of this Dissertation.
53. J-MT (1909), 295ff for this general discussion.
54. J-\^B (1897), vif.
55. J-PU (1909 ) , 90.
56. Cf, Perry, o£_. cit . , 47,
57. J-RE (1912), 41,
58. Ibid. , 42f f
,
59. J-PU (1909 ) , 280.
60. J-LET,I (1920), 158; cf, Royce, Studies in Good and Jivil .
28.
61. J-PU (1909 ) , 314,
62. Ibid
.
,124.
63. J-LET,II,(19 20) , 269.
64. J-VRE (1902), 491.
65. Ibid . , 30ff. Cf. Y/undt's criticism of James's exclusion
of institutional religion, Probleme der V01kerpsycholo,^i
e
.
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CHAPTiJl I (cont'd).
»
66. J-VRE (1902j, 31; cf. V/hitehead's definition of religion in
Religion in the l;laking (1926), 17.
67. Cf, note 36.
68. J-VRS U902) , 498.
69. Cf. J-LET (1902) and also the recently published "Corre-
spondance de Charles Renouvier et de Willi am James," ^19 29).
70. Cf. James's review of Hoyce, The Religious Aspect of i^hil -
osophy (published in 1885 and reprinted in J-CJER (1920),
27 6-284).
71. William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life ,7f.
72. Ueberweg, 401,
73. Boring, o^. cit
. , 498.
74. Cf. CM. McConnell, Is God Limited? and E.S. Brightman,
The Problem of God .
75. 0£. cit .
76. J-LET, II (1920), 222.
77. The following is a list of the articles which appeared in
the Critique Philosophique in the ten years, 1878-88. The
first article v/as written in French oy James but the others
are transls.ti ons of articles published elsewhere.
"Q,uelCiUes Considerations sur la methode subjective" (1878),
"The Sentiment of Rationality" (lS79j.
"Great Men, Great Thoughts snd their Environment." (1881).
"The Feeling of Effort" (1880;.
"Reflex Action and Theism" (1881-82).
"Rationality, Activity and Faith" (1882).
"The Li lemma of Determinism" (1884).
"Yi/hat the Will Effects" (lb88).
A critical exposition of James's "Brute and Human Intel-
lect" ( J. sp. Phil . 12(1878), 236-276) was written by
Renouvier for the Critique (1879) and "Quelques remarques
sur la theorie de la volenti de M. W. Jajnes" is Renouvier 's
comment on James's "What the Will Effects," both in the
Critique for 1888. James's reply in a later issue of the
same year is "Reponse de M. W. Jajnes aux Remarques de M.
Renouvier sur sa theorie de la volenti."
78. Boutroux, Y/i Hi am James (1911) and Flournoy, La Philosophie
de Vi^illiam James
. ( 19 llT» Both have been translated into
Germa.n.

CHAPTSR I (cone.
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79. Cf. review of Bain and Renouvier, Nation , 22(1676), 567-
369 and the reviev/ of Renouvier 's Principes de la Natur e,
Phil. Rev
. ,
2(1893), 212-216.
80. J-SPP (1911) , 165n.
81. James corresponded with Wobbemin, but none of txie letters
have been preserved (cf, conversations, i'eb, 9-11, 1931J •
One letter tb Jerusalem is included in the published Let-
ters (II, 297f j.
82. Troeltsch, GesapgmJ^te Schriften , II, 364,
83. Cf. G.C. Cell, Lecture notes, 1927-28,
84. Y/undt , Probleme der Vftlkerpsycholo^i e , 2. Aufl,, 107.
85. Y/- "Religion" (1921), 34ff,
86. Busch, op. cit ., 4f,
87. Busch, "miliam James" (1911), 300-303.
88. V/illiam James als Relip;i onsphilosoph
, (1911).
89. Translated by Bruno Jordan,
90. Translated by H. Bauragarten.
91. Op. cit ., 4.
92. Conversations, Peb. 9-11, 1931.
93. Kote in this connection James's sympathetic preface to
Thilly's translation of the Introduction to Philosophy
by Paulsen,
94. Cf. Goldstein's preface. Cf, also J-LET,II (1920 J, 339f.
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CHAPTER II
1. W-ST,I (1913), 246.
2. W-ST,II (1921), 139.
3. Y/-ST, I (1913 j, 248n.
4. Ibid . . 249ri.
5. Ibid .
6. Ibid., 247 f.
7. Ibid . , 251n, Cf. also the follovdng articles by Vorbrodt
;
"Zur Religionspsychologi e : Frinzipien und Pathologie," Th -
StKr
, 79(1906 j , 237-303; "Stellung der Reli gionspsychologi
e
zur Theologie," ZThK, 20(1910), 431-474; "Williajii James'
Fhilosophie,",. ZPpK
, 151(1913), 1-27. Vorbrodt wrote the
preface to Flournoy's Observations de psycholoKie reli-
gi euse when it appeared in German (191lj and edited the
German edition of his Sxperimentalunt ersuchungen zur Re -
ligions- Unt erbewusst seins- und SprachpsycholoKi
e
in the
same year. He also assisted Beta in the translation of
St arbu c k ' s Psychology of Beligion .
8. Cf. "The Sentiment of Rationality" (1879;, "Reflex Action
and Theism" (1881), "Rationality, Activity and Faith" (1882J,
and "The Psychology of Belief" (1889). Wobbermin refers to
the last named in ST, I (1913), 251.
9. ST, I (1913), 251.
10« Cf, Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie
.
4(l911j, 217-223.
11. W-ST, I (1913), 246.
12. Conversations in Gttttingen, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
13. W-IEG (1894), 30; cf. J-PP,I (1890), 196ff.
14. Cf. this Dissertation, 67ff.
15. Cf. W-ST,I (1913), 249f.
16. ThLZ, 25(190Q), 52B.>
17. It appears under the title: Bishop Serapion's Frayer-Book ;
c f . B ib 1 i graphy v, -AS ( 189 8 )
.
18. Y/-TM (1901), 27f.
19. Ibid
. ,
130ff.

CHAPTER II (cont'd)
20. Cf. Preface of 1902 edition.
21. W-GG (1902), 15. Wundt and Paulsen are listed with James
as the chief voluntari sts
,
22. Ibid.
, 106, The note reads: "William Jaines an der Harvard-
Universitat zu CamlDri dge-Boston vertritt den bezeichneten
Standxjunkt vor allera in seinen "Principles of Psychologie"
2 Bde,, 18bi0, Fttr uns kommen hauptsftchlich in Betracnt
seine Zssays unter dem Titel: The Vv'ill to Believe, 1697;
deutsch (in Auswahl) von Th, Lorenz, 1899, Eeuestens: The
Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902."
23. Cf. V^-VRE (1914), xiii.
24. The English translation is by D.S. Robinson (Yale, 1918J,
25. W/J-VRE (1907), iii. This introductory paragraph is omitte
in the second and later editions.
26. Conversations with Wobbermin* Feb. 9-11, 1931.
27. Cf. M^/J-VRE (I914j, xxxi
.
28. Ibid
. , XXX.
29. Ibid
. ; cf. Royce, Y/illiani Janxes and Other Essays .
30. Ibid
. ,
iv.
31. Only six volumes of this journal appeared ( 1906-1913 j. A
new journal of the sarne name was founded in 1926 as tne
organ of the Internationale Religionspsychologi sche Ge-
sellschaft. Wobbermin is a contributing editor of the
latter as of the former.
32. Cf. Kote 10, • '
33. Since Vi/obbemin v/as esi-ecially influenced by Kaftan, it
is interesting to note two early psychological studies of
Kaftan's: Examenarbeit : "Die religiose Erfahrung im An-
schluss an Kant und Schlei ennacher als Erkenntnis Prin-
zip untersucht;" and Kabilitationsvorlesung : "Bedeutun^^
der Psychologie ftlr die Tneologie." Cf. ZThK, 21(1911)
34. Cf, W/J-TRE (1914), vi-vii.
35. The program of the Keplerbund as given in W-MIl (1911J, 55
cc
CHAPTER II (cont'd)
is as f ollov/s : "Der Keplerbund steht auf dera Boden der
Freiheit der 7i/i s sensehaft und erkennt als einzige Tendenz
die Lrgrttnduijg und den Dienst der Wahrheit an. Zr ist da-
bei der ITberzeugung, dass die Wahrheit in sich die Har-
nonie der naturwissenschaft lichen Tatsachen mit dem phil-
osophischen Erkennen ui'id der religlBsen Zrfahrung trflgt.
Von dieser Grundlage ausgehend und in diesern Sinne ist
der Zweck des Vereins die Fflrderung der Eaturerkenntni
s
in der Gesamtheit unseres Volkes."
36. W-ST,II (1921), vi.
37. W-ST,I (1913), 332.
38. Y/-ST,III (1925), 483.
39. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
40. Y/obbermin wrote the article on "Religi onsp sychologi e" in
Hauck, Realenzyklop&di e fflr die protestantische Theologie
und Kirche (1913); the article on "Die Methoden der re-
ligionspsychologischen Arbeit" in Abderhalden, Handbuch
der biologischen Arbeit smethoden (1921); and has articles
on "Religionspsychologie" and Schlei ermacher " in the
forthcoming volumes of the second edition of Religion in
G-eschichte und Ge^Jjenwart .
41. Richtlinien evanp:el. Theologie (1929) will be considered
in part since it is an important presentation of Wobber-
min's development of the psychological methodology,
42. Cf, J-"Psych. of 3elief." Note that James later felt that
his essay on "The Will to Believe" should have been called
"The Right to Believe," J-LET,II (1920), 207.
43. Y/-IEG (1894), 8.
44. W-iail( 1911) , 101. "Wir kflnnen nicht aus unserem Bewusstsein
heraus, um uns direkt von der Exist enz der Aussenv/elt zu
ttberzeugen.
"
45. V/-IEG (1894), 7.
46. J-VO (1897), 327.
47. W-IEG (1894), 26ff.
48. J-PF,I (1890), Ch. VII,
49. Y^-ISG (1894) , 51.
50. Ibid., 55,
51. Ibid . , 51.
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. . 73f. and W-GT (1899), 18.
53. W-IEG (1894), 6.
54. IMd.
,
69f; cf. KdrV, A446-448.
55. Cf. V».R, Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God , 7. "Just
as the data of sense-exijeri ence are found to manifest cer-
tain regularities from which 'laws of nature,' ... may be
inferred, so also in our moral experience a certain law or
order can "be discovered, v/ith a claim to be regarded as ob-
jective, which may be compared with the similar claim made
on behalf of natural law,"
56. W-MIvI (1911), 147.
57. J-PU (1909), 125, etc.
58. This Dissertation, Ch, V.
59. ¥-ST,I (1913 j , 6,
60. W-SR (1913), 32.
61. Cf, this Dissertation, Ch. Ill, and Khudson, 187f,
62. W-ST,I (1913), 353.
63. J-RE (1912), 42.
64. Ibid,, 90.
65. J-LET,I (1920), 82; cf. J-PR (1907 j, 93, 106f,
66. Cf, also J-Vffi (1697), 83 and J-VRS (1902), 140,
67. Cf. l^ote 55 above,
68. Y;-MIJr (1911), 4.
69 . Ibid . , 5
.
70 . Ibid
.
, 3
71. Note James's estimate of Kaeckel in PR (1907), 15f.
72. Cf, H-m (1911), 74.
73. J-VRE (1902), 14.
74. Y/-M1;I (1911), 8f.
75. Ibid
. , 18.
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76. Ibid , , 113.
77. Ibid. , 11.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid
.
, 150.
80. Ibid.
81. The demand that God be regarded as ethical personality is
to be fouijd throughout Wobbermin's writings.
82. Op. cit ., 148.
83 . Ibid
.
, 23 . .
84. Of. ibid.
.
86f.
85. Ibid., 28ff.
86. Ibid.
, 39.
87. Ibid . , 135. "Die christliche Weltanschauung ist .selbst monis-
tisch, aber sie ist monistisch auf duali sti scher Grundlage,
si e setat den Dualismus der empirischen Yi^irklichkeit voraus.
In dreifacher Stufenfolge der Differenzierung erscheint ihr
dieser IDualismus als der Gegensatz des Unorgani schen und Or-
ganischen, als Gegensatz des Unbewussten und Bevmssten, als
Gegensatz des ethi sch-Indifferent en und des ethi schBestiInm-
t en,"
88. W-ST,I (1913), 12, of. 9.
89. V/-m (1911), 137,
90. Ibid
^ and conversations, Feb, 9-11, 1931.
91. Conversations, Ij'eb. 9-11, 1931.
92. Y/-ST,II (1921), 290, 273.
93. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
94. W-SR (1913), 53.
95. Ibid., 54,
96. Ibid
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, 55.
97. Ibid.; cf. W-ST,III (1925 j, 175ff.
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98, J-VKE (19u2j , 525.
99. J-VRE (1902 J, 515; J-PU (1909), 290, 292, 318, et passim .
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2. ¥-SuR (19^7), 21.
5. W-ST,! (1913), 99; cf. W-RT (1929), 26.
4. Note V/obbermin' s rejection of this authority in his treat-
ment of immortality, TM (1901), 159. Gf. Khudson, Doctrine
of God , Gh. IV.
5. iDicl
. , 27 et passim. .
6. Y/-SR (1913), 57; cf. W-ST, I (1913), 246.
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12. W-RT (1929), 2.
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18. W-RT (19 29), 3.
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Khudson, The Doctrine of God , 113f.
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chological Study of Religion , Belief in God and Irrimortality
,
Psychology of Religious L'lysticism .
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modernen Feuerbacli, Ja die Theorie des Illusioni smus v/ird
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geftthrt als von Feuerbach."
22. W-SR (1913), 35.
23. Ibid. , 38.
24. Cf. W-Iffl (1911), 123f.
25. ^^^-ST,I (1913), 229, and W/J-VRE (1914), xvi
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26. W/J-VRE (1914), xvf.
27. Cf. Knudson, op . cit
. , 120.
28. W-ST,II (1921), 217.
29. Ibid . , 220f.
30. Lecture notes, 1930-31, Berlin University,
31. J-VRE (1902), 431.
32. ¥-ST,II (1921), 69.
33. Glaubenslehre , 2. Aufl. sec. 3; quoted in W-ST,II (1921), 62.
34. W-ST,II (1921), 69.
35. J-Vffi (1897), 15.
36. W-SR (1913) , 32.
37. Cf. especially J-VRE (1902), 486.
38. Cf. W-SR (1913), 33f.
39. J-VRE (1902) ,30.
40. W-ST,I (1913), 278; cf. J-VRE (1902), 274.
41. Busch, Vvilliain James als Reli^ionsphi losoph , 27; cf. J-VRE
(1902),^ST:
42. J-VRE (1902), 35,38.
43. ?/-ST,I (1913), 278.
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45. W-SR (1913), 5.
46. W-ST,I (1913), 279f.
47. IMd. , viif
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, 412f.
49. Op. cit
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, 187f
.
50. W-SR (1913), xiii.
51. "Der gegenw&rtige Stand der Reli^ionspsychologi e" (1910 ).
52. W-SR (1913), ix.
5 3 . Ibid . , xi
.
54. Ibid . , xii ; cf. 84,
55. Ibid , ,46.
56. Ibid
. ,
83ff.
57. Ibid., 15f.
58. Ibid
. , 19.
59. Cf . ibid , , 83, 91.
60. '^yj-YRh (1914), xvi
.
61. W-ST,I (1913), 314, 351i.
62. Ibid,, 351f.
63. Cf. note 50 above.
64. V.^-ST,I (1913), 424.
65. Y//J-VRE (1914), iv.
66. W-SR (1913), xiii.
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68. Gf. YZ-ST,!! (I92l), 139.
69. W-ST,I (1913), 406. Cf. also W- " Gegenwartige Stand" (19 10),
506.
70. "Gegenwartige Stand" (1910), 533, "Von der eigenen re-
ligiOsen Erfahrung aus fremdes religittses Seelenleben ver-
stehen lernen, bo den Blick fttr die Eigentumlichkeit en des
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kehren und diesen Prozess wechselseitiger FOrderung im Lr-
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dehnen; das und das allein ist die gewiesene Method^ religi-
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71. ¥-ST,I (1913), 428,
72. Ibid . , 437.
73. Y/-RT (1929 ), 27 and a lecture by Wobbermin in Gfittingen,
Feb. 11, 1951,
74. Cf, Y/-IEG (1894),
75. Cf. this Dissertation, Ch. II, note 33.
76. Starbuck's Psychology of Religion (1899) is omitted because
its statistical character limited its scope,
77. Conversations, Feb, 9-11, 1931.
78. Gf. this Dissertation, Gh. 1,34; Ch, II, 67ff.
79. V/-ST,II (1921), vi.
80. W-ST,III (1925), 483,
81. Ibid,, vi, &f, 25, 129, 374,
82. W-ST,II (1921), llff.
83. Cf, note 61 above,
84. W-ST,III (1925) , 11.
85. Conversations, Feb, 9-11, 1931,
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1. Prc
j
^ati sm is mentioned in Yi/-ST,I (1913), 275n and 282n.
The I.ieaning of Truth is cited ibid . > 283 n. A Pluralistic
Universe is mentioned in V/obbermin's article on "Der ge-
genv/artige Stand der Religionspsychologi e" (1910 ), 535n.
The writer has found no references to posthuraous books.
2. J-PR (1907), 54f.
3. Ibid . , 201.
4. Ibid., 73.
5. J-SPP (1911), 93.
6. Ibid . , 96.
7 . Ibid
.
, 94
.
8. Ibid .
9. Of. J-PU (1909), 212, 329.
10. J-VRE (1902), 443; cr. J-RS (1912), 72.
11. J-PR (1907 ) , 96.
12. Ibid
. .
98.
13. Ibid
. , 106; cr. J-VRS (1902), 517, v/hich gives practically
the ssjne statement.
14. Cf. note on J-MT (1909), 189f. This argument was used first
in the California address on "Philosophical Conceptions and
Practical Results;" cf. J-CSR (1920 ), 414-418.
15. Cf. This Dissertation, 37-39 ; 153.
16. Ka.rl Groos rightly says, "Ler Praginati smus von James wirkt
auch dadurch paradox, dass James 'Wahrheiten' sagt und
'Ueberzeugungen * meiht," Die Sicherun..'; der Erkenntnis , 19 n.
Y/obbermin tends to do the same in the religious field.
17. J-MT (1909), 195 and note.
18. J-TO (1897), 97.
19. J-MT (1909), 165.
20. Present Philosophical Tendencies (1912), 203.
t.
'
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CHAPTER IV (cont'd)
21. J-WB (1897), 17.
22. J-PR (1907), 222.
23. Ibid
. ,
192; cf. J-VRE (1902), 18, 19.
24. Cf. The Will to Believe .
25. Ibid
. , 97; cf. 100.
26 . Ibid
.
, 29
.
27. This Dissertation, 120.
28. J-PR (1907), 75; cf. note 23 above.
29. J^m (1897), 20.
30. J-PU (1909), 328f.; cf. Bowne's principles of reason and
vi sion.
31. Willi sin James als Relipgonsphilosoph
, 6; cf. also Knudson,
Doctrine of God
.
153f.
32. "Wagnis im Glauben" (1928).
33. Ibid
.
, 1188.
34. Cf. W-SR (1913), 67; W-ST,I (1913), 316, 322, et passim .
35. Oesterreich states this objection in just form in his re-
view of the second edition; "In der newen Auflage ist
nichts 7»'esentliches geftndert. Zu einer Mitaufnahme eini-
ger seiner Zeit fortgelassener Stflcke des englischen Ori-
ginals hat sich Y/oboermin auch dies Mai nicht zu entschlie
sen vermocht. Ls kann ihm nattlrlich nicht das Recht be-
stritten werden, nur das zu verOffentlichen, was ihm zu-
sagt und wovon er wert voile Beeinflussung des deutschen
wi ssenschaftlichen Lebens erwartet, aber es scheint niir
vom wi ssenschaftlichen Standpunkt nach, v/ie vor ganz prin-
zipiell wtlnschenswert zu sein, dass eine Uebersetzung den
ganzen und vollen Gehalt des Originals wiedergibt, ohne
es einer Zensur zu untei^erf en. " K-St
, 20(1915), 441.
36. Probleme der VOlkerpsycholoRi
e
, 2. Aufl., 68.
37. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), x, xix, et passim .
38. Op. cit .. 109.
39. J-LET,II (1920), 112.

CHAPTER IV (cont'd)
40. Ibid,, 170.
41. W-ST,I (1913), 275n.
42. Wobbennin omits "Pragmati smus'' from the Index although
there are references to it on 353f and 400,
The pragmatic turn in the translating is seen in tne fol-
lowing; James, "The gods believed in agree ... in recog-
nizing personal calls," (491), Wobbermin, "Alle Gottneiten
... haben das gemein, dass sie persttnlicne Vvttnsche und Be-
dttrfnisse befri edigen , " (385); and in tne same paragraph,
James, "The divine meets him on the basis of his personal
concerns," Y/obbermin, "Gott sorge ftlr seine persttnli cnen
Bedttrfnisse."
Also V/obbermin fails in several cases to bring out James's
emphasis on personality. This is particularly strange
because of Wobbermin 's own interest in the concept. Cf.
his failure to italicize the phrase "in den Erlebnissen
persttnlichen Innenlebens handelt es sich dagegen urn x^eali-
taten im strengsten Sinne des Worths," (388, cf, English,
498). In the closing chapter, he omits all the long notes
including those on "personaii sm" and "Bowne," (English,
oOlf.).
43. quoted by V/obbermin in "Der gegenwartige Stand der Religions-
psycho logie, " (1910), 498.
44. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931. Cf. review of Busch, (1913).
45. J-PU (1909), 329.
46. Cf. note 39 above.
47. J-Yffi (1897), 56.
48. Cf. W-IEG (1894).
49. W-ST,II (1921), 12f.
50. YMiM (It^ll), 159,
lMi.« t 9f, Wobbermin says: "Das tneoretische Wahrheits-
interesse and Wahrheit sideal erwftchst im Menschen nur ganz
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